Strengthening Asia's Philanthropic Ecosystems for Inclusive and Sustainable Growth by 2050

Interim Report, September 2026



Commission on Asian Philanthropy

About our front cover

The designs on our front cover are inspired by the deep-rooted cultural heritage, symbolic motifs, and diverse landscapes of the Commission jurisdictions.

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The Commission on Asian Philanthropy

The Commission on Asian Philanthropy is a three-year research-to-action initiative launched in September 2024, which aims to accelerate the quantity, quality, and impact of Asia's domestic philanthropic ecosystems towards inclusive and sustainable growth over the next two decades. Commissioners represent some of the leading philanthropies in East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, bringing experience from different cultural traditions, political systems, and development models.

At the halfway mark of the initiative, the Commission's interim report offers policymakers and decision-makers:

- the first comprehensive estimate of the scope and scale of Asia's philanthropic ecosystems
- a longer-term perspective on those ecosystems' potential to contribute to national missions
- an invitation to realise that potential together and to position Asia as a global leader in inclusive and sustainable growth

Over the next year, the Commission will engage policymakers and decision-makers to discuss the findings presented in this report. The discussions will inform an action roadmap to shape the next decade of development for Asia's philanthropic ecosystems, to be shared in the Commission's final report.

Signed,

Commissioners

Co-convenors


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Executive summary



The next two decades will be a defining period in Asia's development: towards inclusive and sustainable growth by 2050, requiring a society-wide effort

Asia is home to ~60 percent of the world's population. The region today accounts for more than one third of global trade, almost half of global gross domestic product (GDP), and 37 percent of global wealth.[1] More than a billion people in Asia have escaped extreme poverty in the past two decades.[2]

At the same time, hundreds of millions of people remain in vulnerable conditions, facing challenges in basic needs across livelihoods, education, and health. Meeting these needs is becoming more complex as societies grapple with ageing populations, climate change and related disasters, rapid technology-driven shifts, and the dynamism of the multipolar global environment.

The next two decades will be a defining period in Asia's development. Leading economies in the region share the ambition for inclusive and sustainable growth by 2050. This means measuring success well beyond GDP growth to include social and environmental wellbeing—ensuring no one is left behind. China's goal is to achieve common prosperity by the middle of the century.[3] India's Viksit Bharat 2047 states that India's inclusive development depends on the empowerment of youth, poor households, women, and farmers.[4] Golden Indonesia 2045 aspires to eliminate extreme poverty and reduce the overall poverty rate to only 0.5–0.8% by 2045.[5]

This report makes the case that Asia's philanthropic ecosystems can help society act together, and are therefore a strategic asset to be cultivated for national development

These national visions emphasise that a society-wide effort is needed. Communities need to be strengthened, and all three societal engines—state, market, and community (the major forces that drive societal development at scale)—need to work together on national missions and priorities to deliver inclusive and sustainable growth at the scale and level of complexity required.

This shared ambition frames the report's central case: that Asia's philanthropic ecosystems can help society act together, and are therefore a strategic asset to be cultivated for national development.

1 Asia is defined according to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) M49 regional classification. Calculations were based on the following sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024,* online ed. (New York: United Nations, 2024); World Trade Organization, "World Trade Statistics," accessed July 2026; International Monetary Fund, *IMF DataMapper,* "GDP Based on PPP, Share of World," accessed July 2026; Anthony Shorrocks et al., *Global Wealth Databook 2023* (Zurich: UBS, 2023).

2 Calculation based on: Christoph Lakner et al., *Reproducibility Package for Poverty, Prosperity and Planet Report 2024* (World Bank, 2025), updated with the Poverty and Inequality Platform (March 2026).

3 Xi Jinping, "Making Solid Progress Toward Common Prosperity," *English Edition of Qiushi Journal,* no. 20 (2021).

4 "Address by the Hon'ble President of India Smt. Droupadi Murmu to Parliament," President's Secretariat, Government of India, January 31, 2024.

5 *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 59 Tahun 2024 tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional Tahun 2025–2045* (Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 59 of 2024 concerning the National Long-Term Development Plan for 2025–2045), September 13, 2024.

This interim report from the Commission on Asian Philanthropy offers policymakers and decision-makers three headline findings based on the research to date.

First

Asia's philanthropic ecosystems are larger than conventional frames suggest and offer valuable capabilities for development beyond money

The Commission estimates that domestic monetary giving in its jurisdictions reached $109 billion in 2024, equivalent to more than $1 trillion over the next decade.[6] Of the $109 billion, $55 billion came from mass individuals, $27 billion from corporates, $23 billion from public discretionary sources, and $4 billion from ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWIs). The composition shows that philanthropy in Asia is not dominated by one model. Our research identified five philanthropy models that collectively facilitate domestic giving: community-led, faith-based, corporate-led, state-led, and UHNWI-led.

The five models have different mindsets that guide their funding and each brings valuable capabilities for development beyond money: trusted, last-mile networks; the ability to mobilise around shared values; corporate assets and capabilities; institutional trust and legitimacy; and the ability to make long-term, patient commitments.

Second

Philanthropic ecosystems can help countries pursue national missions more effectively

They do this by using their resources and capabilities to support states to strengthen community and enhance the collaborative infrastructure between state, market, and community. This infrastructure comprises the institutions, mechanisms, norms, and channels that foster trust and enable large numbers of actors across the three engines to work together effectively on a shared national mission or priority.

Consider China's national mission for poverty alleviation. Under state leadership, China lifted ~99 million rural residents out of extreme poverty between 2013 and 2020.[7] One major contribution of collaborative infrastructure established by the State was the East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, which paired the wealthier eastern region with 573 impoverished counties in central and western China.[8] State-led and corporate-led models of philanthropy supported this mechanism, adding resources and capabilities to expand reach at the last mile.

6 All amounts provided in this report are in US dollars, denoted by $, unless otherwise specified. Quantification total includes all Commission jurisdictions with sufficiently validated data; partial United Arab Emirates (UAE) data for corporate giving is presented separately as shown in Exhibit 4. Commission jurisdictions collectively represent 70 percent of Asia's population and 80 percent of its GDP. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

7 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation: China's Experience and Contribution* (Beijing: State Council Information Office, April 2021).

8 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation.*

Another example is India's rural livelihoods mission. In Bihar, one of India's lowest-income, most populous states, ~38 million people were moved out of multidimensional poverty within a decade between 2014 and 2023.[9] State-led and community-led philanthropy models worked together to strengthen the community by organising 12 million rural women into more than one million self-help groups.[10] This infrastructure transformed financial inclusion, enabling the community to access $4.7 billion in credit to accelerate activities promoting growth in livelihoods. It further improved how the government delivered public services to reach the poorest, with self-help groups enabling last-mile distribution, offsetting the public cost of delivery and raising the return on public spending.

These examples suggest that the impact of philanthropic ecosystems can extend far beyond monetary giving. When philanthropy models contribute their complementary resources and capabilities to strengthen community and enhance the collaborative infrastructure between the three engines for national missions, they can contribute to a much greater collective and systemic impact.

Third

Philanthropic ecosystems need targeted investments to be a productive development asset, and cross-learning in Asia can accelerate progress

Three sets of targeted investments are needed for jurisdictions to see more national missions and priorities achieving faster, better, and more cost-effective outcomes at scale by partnering with philanthropic ecosystems.

1. **Improve data visibility of the philanthropic ecosystems' resources and capabilities.** For example, the Commission supported Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs to conduct a nationally representative public survey, which estimated *zakat mal* and *infak and sedekah,* two Islamic giving types that could be used for the main purpose of poverty alleviation, at roughly $15 billion in 2025. Behind this giving are trusted last-mile informal networks that mobilise their social capital to improve community resilience and economic empowerment at scale. Together, these represent a major invisible force of informal giving and capabilities that merit closer understanding as Indonesia pursues its national mission on poverty alleviation.

9 Government of India, NITI Aayog, "24.82 Crore Indians Escape Multidimensional Poverty in Last 9 Years," *Press Information Bureau,* January 15, 2024.
10 World Bank Group, "Unleashing the Power of Women's Collectives for Rural Development in the Indian State of Bihar," *Results Brief,* World Bank, October 20, 2020.

2. **Cultivate philanthropy models inspired by growth playbooks.** The Commission's research documents 12 growth playbooks used by jurisdictions to grow their domestic philanthropy models, six of which operate at scale with more than $1 billion a year in monetary value alone. There is room for further growth, which requires intentional leadership commitment and domestic investment to cultivate. The Commission estimates that cross-learning and further domestic innovation in growth playbooks across its jurisdictions could lead to an additional $189 billion in monetary giving over the next decade.

3. **Integrate philanthropic ecosystems as a strategic asset in the planning and coordination of national missions.** Planning departments and ministries of finance can mobilise more resources and capabilities by coordinating national mission partnerships with their philanthropic ecosystems. For example, Malaysia's Ministry of Finance aims to "Raise the Floor" by improving the quality of life for the most vulnerable and ensuring inclusive growth and minimum living wage commitments. It actively deploys a network of government-linked companies and their philanthropic vehicles, mobilising their resources and capabilities to deliver more coordinated programmes in community development, livelihoods, and education.

Regional cooperation to accelerate domestic development

Each jurisdiction will explore its own development path suited to its national conditions. Regional cooperation can accelerate progress by collectively investing in shared principles and practices, interoperable frameworks and data taxonomies, and mechanisms for cross-learning, including sharing demonstrations of the impact that philanthropic ecosystems add to national missions aimed at inclusive and sustainable growth.

This interim report is intended to be a conversation starter for policymakers and decision-makers, including national and sub-national planning departments, policy think tanks, ministries of finance, and ministries overseeing philanthropy, charity, and development.

The concrete ask is to engage with the Commission over the next year to discuss the findings presented in this report—and to inform the development of an action roadmap to shape the development of philanthropic ecosystems for the next decade. The roadmap will be featured in our final report at the end of 2027.

Interim report at a glance

1 Why this matters: Asia's next development challenge to achieve inclusive and sustainable growth by 2050 calls for a society-wide effort

National visions by 2050

Examples:

China
Common prosperity by middle of the century

India
Viksit Bharat 2047


Indonesia
Golden Indonesia 2045

National missions and priorities focused on inclusive and sustainable growth

Examples:


- Poverty alleviation and livelihoods
- Rural/regional revitalisation
- Ageing populations
- Skilling and lifelong learning in the AI era
- Climate and energy transitions

Our visions and missions call for a society-wide effort




2 Asia's philanthropic ecosystems can help society act together

In Asia, philanthropy is not a separate sector operating independently of state, market, and community; the philanthropic ecosystem is a shared space where all three engines choose to act beyond fiscal or commercial obligation for the greater common good



3 What our research suggests: these ecosystems are worth cultivating as strategic development assets

Total domestic monetary giving in Commission jurisdictions




Beyond the money: the five philanthropy models that make up the ecosystem bring diverse mindsets and valuable capabilities for development

	Community-led	Faith-based	State-led	Corporate-led	UHNWI-led
Primary mindset behind monetary giving	Mutual help and support	Sustained and perpetual giving	Complementarity and synergies with public budgets	Alignment to stakeholder value	Catalytic, patient risk capital for innovation or niche issues
Primary capabilities for development	Trusted last-mile networks and social capital at scale	Unifying people in shared beliefs and action	Institutional trust to blend public-private capital and coordinate partnerships; Legitimacy to anchor and coordinate national missions	Corporate assets and capabilities	Relationship networks and longer-term, patient commitments

4 They can complement national missions by supporting states to strengthen community and enhance the collaborative infrastructure between the engines


Examples from China and India suggest the potential for philanthropic ecosystems to support national missions and why they merit systematic consideration in development planning

China's poverty alleviation national mission: China lifted ~99mn rural residents out of extreme poverty between 2013 and 2020



China's philanthropic ecosystem supported the State's leadership and direction; for example, state-led and corporate-led philanthropy models supported East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation at the last mile

India—Bihar's rural livelihoods mission: ~38mn lifted out of multidimensional poverty between 2014 and 2023




State-led and community-led models worked together to strengthen community by mobilising ~12mn women into over 1mn self-help groups, changing how community interacted with market and state for poverty alleviation and livelihood empowerment at scale

5 Three targeted investments are needed for these ecosystems to play their roles more effectively and to demonstrate their full impact potential

1. Improve data visibility e.g. Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs: national public survey for Islamic philanthropy

Total 2025 Islamic mass giving by type, IDR tn



Total = **343tn ($20.8bn)**

2. Cultivate philanthropy models inspired by growth playbooks to unlock an additional $189bn in monetary resources over 2027 to 2036

$ billion in 2024 price level



3. Integrate philanthropic ecosystems in the coordination of national missions e.g. Malaysia's Ministry of Finance coordinating its philanthropic ecosystem to ensure inclusive growth for the most vulnerable

Ministry of Finance


Government-linked companies

Government-linked investment companies

"Raise the Floor": Philanthropic ecosystem supports community development, livelihoods, and education

6 Call to action: engage with the Commission over the coming year to inform an action roadmap to advance our philanthropic ecosystems for inclusive and sustainable growth

The action roadmap will be added to the Commission's final report following further domestic and regional engagement over the next year



China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; India; Indonesia; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Malaysia; Thailand; Singapore; United Arab Emirates

Foundational concepts: the role of state and defining philanthropy in Asia

The role of state in Asia's philanthropic ecosystems

The state operates at three tiers with respect to the philanthropic ecosystem:

- **Enabling environment tier:** The state sets the rules and regulations for the philanthropic ecosystem within which every actor operates.

- **Sources of giving tier:** The state participates in philanthropic giving alongside community and market, injecting new resources each year into the philanthropic ecosystem. The Commission calls the state engine's injection "public discretionary giving".
  - Public discretionary giving is defined by its mandated usage (for the benefit of the public beyond fiscal mandates) and the existence of a strong governance structure for the allocation of funds.[11] It includes matching funds whose primary purpose is to crowd in non-state philanthropic resources, lottery funds, dormant deposits, special funds or endowments, and ring-fenced levies. It excludes government spending in the delivery of fiscal mandates and services such as general education, health, welfare, or development spending.[12]

- **Actor tier:** The state participates as an actor through state-funded or -established institutions that operate the state-led philanthropy model: collecting and distributing philanthropic resources and coordinating partnerships for national priorities. Classification of what is philanthropic attaches to the resource flows these actors manage, as opposed to the institutions themselves. State actors may simultaneously manage mandated fiscal budgets for development purposes (not considered philanthropic resources but public budgets) and operate as state-led philanthropic vehicles collecting and distributing philanthropic resources. When doing this, state-led models are not limited to distributing only public discretionary giving. In some jurisdictions in Asia, they collect and distribute philanthropic resources from more than one engine, enabling state-led models to play unique roles in blending public and private resources and coordinating cross-sector partnerships for national missions and priorities. The institutions that do this might include multiple forms of state-affiliated institutions given different names across jurisdictions, such as government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), autonomous public organisations, authorities, bodies, and state-established societies, trusts, and charitable companies.

11 Governance structures vary by jurisdiction; examples include structures separate from line ministries with discretionary power to allocate the resources, structures governed by central and/or coordinating ministries such as Ministries of Finance or Cabinet and Presidential Offices, and structures representing multiple ministries.

12 Tax incentives and other foregone public revenue are not counted as public discretionary giving. They subsidise private giving that is already counted as philanthropy, so counting the foregone revenue in addition would lead to double counting. These types of incentives represent choices as part of the enabling environment tier, for example, the extent to which to incentivise versus obligate giving. The full definition used by the Commission for public discretionary giving can be found in Annex 2 along with jurisdictional examples.

How the Commission defines philanthropy

The Commission defines philanthropy as the giving of private or public resources, with discretionary allocation for the benefit of others, beyond fiscal or commercial obligation.

This definition recognises that all three societal engines participate in philanthropy. This broadens the definition often used outside Asia, namely "private, voluntary giving for public good", by recognising two differences commonly found in jurisdictions in Asia. First, the Commission recognises that the state plays a major role in shaping philanthropic ecosystems in Asia—operating at all three tiers described above, and through its direct contribution of public discretionary giving at the sources-of-giving tier. This is distinct from mainstream fiscal government spending.

Second, the Commission recognises that the voluntary criterion is not universally shared. In some jurisdictions, giving mandated by law or faith is still widely understood in those contexts as an expression of acting philanthropically. In these cases, the actors retain discretion over how to deploy or allocate the resources for the benefit of others. Requiring the decision to give to be voluntary would exclude forms of giving that many communities themselves would consider philanthropic by nature.

Therefore, for the quantification of philanthropic resources by sources of giving, we include all forms of private resources for the public good and include public discretionary giving that meets the Commission's definition. For philanthropy models, we include all actors that collect and distribute philanthropic resources and capabilities for the benefit of others, whether through operating their own programmes or giving to third parties.

Interim report: major findings

1. Seeing the full ecosystem

Asia's philanthropic ecosystems are larger than conventional frames suggest and offer valuable capabilities for development beyond money.

2. Reimagining its potential

Philanthropic ecosystems can help countries pursue national missions more effectively.

3. Building together for the next decade

Philanthropic ecosystems need targeted investments to be a productive development asset, and cross-learning in Asia can accelerate progress.



Finding 1

Seeing the full ecosystem

Asia's philanthropic ecosystems are larger than conventional frames suggest and offer valuable capabilities for development beyond money.

The Commission estimates that domestic monetary giving in its jurisdictions constituted $109 billion in 2024, equivalent to more than $1 trillion over the next decade.[13]

The composition reveals a diverse and rich ecosystem of five philanthropy models, facilitating four sources of giving from the three societal engines (Exhibit 1).

In Asia, philanthropy is not perceived to be a separate sector operating independently of the state, market, and community engines. Instead, Asia's philanthropic ecosystems are a microcosm of the three societal engines, and the five philanthropy models that make up the ecosystems are imbued with the mental frames, resources, and capabilities of their originating societal engines. Seen this way, philanthropic

Exhibit 1

Estimated quantification of Asia's domestic philanthropic ecosystems in 2024[1,2]




1 Quantification total includes all Commission jurisdictions with sufficiently validated data; partial UAE data for corporate giving is presented separately as shown in Exhibit 4. Commission jurisdictions collectively represent 70 percent of Asia's population and 80 percent of its GDP. For details on methodology and sources, please refer to Annex 2: Quantification methodology, jurisdiction estimates, and recommendations.
2 Cross-border philanthropic giving is small relative to domestic giving at the aggregate level, estimated at $1.4 billion in 2024 across Commission jurisdictions with available data.
3 Total may not add due to rounding.

13 More than $1 trillion is the estimate before accounting for organic growth. If we include assumptions to estimate organic growth, the estimated total over the next decade is $1.5 trillion, as indicated in Exhibit 14.

ecosystems hold an important space, as visualised in the centre of Exhibit 2: a shared space where all three societal engines choose to act beyond fiscal or commercial obligation for the greater common good and towards inclusive and sustainable growth. Later sections of the report expand on why and how these ecosystems can bring an advantage to national missions and priorities for development: the philanthropy models can strengthen collaboration between their respective engines, building trust and enabling each to bring its core strengths to the shared ambition for inclusive and sustainable growth.

Exhibit 2

Asia's domestic philanthropic ecosystems are a microcosm of the three societal engines' shared ambition for inclusive and sustainable growth



Technical note 1

Empirical evidence for the five philanthropy models

The five philanthropy models were derived empirically from the policies and approaches that jurisdictions in Asia tailor to engage distinct sets of actors and cultivate the collection and distribution of resources and capabilities for philanthropic purposes (Exhibit 1). These policies and approaches have been documented as growth playbooks and are discussed in Finding 3 of the report, summarised in Exhibit 13. A full overview of the 12 playbooks across the five philanthropy models is provided in Annex 1: Asia's growth playbooks for philanthropy models.

The philanthropy models facilitate resource flows originating from the three societal engines, as depicted in Exhibit 2. Philanthropy models may facilitate resource flows from multiple engines. For example, in some jurisdictions, state-led models may facilitate resources from all three engines, and community-led and faith-based models may facilitate resources from both the community and market engines.

Beyond the sources of giving lies a deep network of actors with different mindsets that guide their funding, and complementary capabilities that can offer immense value for development

The deep roots of actors beyond the money

Monetary giving in domestic philanthropic ecosystems is best seen as the visible indicator. Beyond the sources of monetary giving lies a deep network of actors with different mindsets that guide their funding, and complementary capabilities that can offer immense value for development (Exhibit 3).

Consider the mindsets and capabilities of **community-led** and **faith-based models**, such as self-help groups for rural women or local faith groups at the last mile. These models help communities to organise themselves and aggregate their social and financial capital to help solve their own problems and improve the overall resilience of the community, especially in times of natural disasters. In countries where fiscal constraints may limit the coverage of social protection systems, these last-mile networks often provide the first safety net in the form of peer-to-peer giving and group support. These networks also bring unmatched insight into local needs and challenges, which is invaluable in informing the targeting of government programmes, such as identifying the most needy for poverty alleviation efforts or partnering with local leaders to enhance grassroots behavioural change campaigns. These capabilities offer significant value as they can enable government spending to reach communities and achieve intended outcomes more effectively.

Faith-based models have the additional benefit of unifying people in shared beliefs that inform what philanthropy should be used for, which generally leads to more cohesive and aligned efforts for sustained and perpetual giving. They may also have the ability to mobilise both philanthropy and private investment into development priorities; for example, Islamic finance and Islamic social finance.

Corporate-led models consider alignment to stakeholder value in their giving and, beyond funding, they bring their core assets and capabilities (products and services, technology, intellectual and human capital, physical and infrastructure, brand, and relational assets) to national priorities and missions, strengthening government capacity and enabling inclusive business. When corporates support nation-building with both money and capabilities, governments can gain access to capabilities that may not be easy to acquire at market rates, especially in less-developed regions.

State-led models facilitate giving that is complementary to public budgets. Given their authority, they can bring the institutional trust and legitimacy to anchor and coordinate collective action towards national priorities and break down silos to enable government cooperation and public-private partnerships. They also bring the reach of public infrastructure, with the delivery systems, administrative networks, and physical presence essential for scaling impact.

Finally, **UHNWI-led models** can also bring corporate assets and capabilities, and, in addition, often leverage their relationships and networks to exert greater influence. When combined with monetary giving, they can offer flexible and patient risk capital to encourage innovation and fund longer-term commitments, which may be particularly useful for niche gaps and issues that mainstream policies and market services may not reach.


To what extent are jurisdictions in Asia maximising the impact of their domestic philanthropic ecosystems for their most important development priorities?

Seeing the full ecosystem through this lens of capabilities, the policy question becomes more consequential. It is not simply, "How much charitable giving do we have and how do we get more?" It becomes, "How can we partner with philanthropic ecosystems in the coordination of national missions and priorities to increase our overall societal impact?"

Each jurisdiction answers this in its own context. A starting point for jurisdictions to understand the resources and capabilities their philanthropic ecosystems can bring to national development is to review the monetary sources of giving as the visible layer, signalling the actors and philanthropy models that are behind the money. The Commission provides a first-cut quantification estimate of the four sources of monetary giving for each jurisdiction in Exhibit 4. For more guidance on how to read these numbers and the quantification methodology, see technical notes 2 and 3 and Annex 2: Quantification methodology, jurisdiction estimates, and recommendations.

Exhibit 3

Beyond the money: the deep roots of actors and capabilities for development priorities



1 For details on methodology and sources, please refer to Annex 2.

Exhibit 4

Estimated quantification of domestic monetary giving in 2024 in Commission jurisdictions


Total amount of domestic philanthropic monetary giving by source and jurisdiction

2024, $ billion[1]

Commission jurisdictions	Community engine	Market engine		State engine	Total giving
	Mass individuals	Corporates	UHNWIs	Public discretionary[2]	
Total %	**50%**	**25%**	**4%**	**21%**	**100%**
$	**54.8[3]**	**27.3**	**4.0**	**23.0**	**109.2[3]**
China[4]	4.1–20.9[5]	13.7*	1.1	15.5	**34.3–51.2**
Hong Kong SAR, China	0.9	0.9	0.2	0.2	**2.2**
India	11.6*	4.4	0.6	3.9	**20.5**
Indonesia	12.6[6]	1.2*	0.08	1.6	**15.5**
Japan	3.1*–5.0[7]	2.4*	0.3	1.1	**7.0–8.9**
Malaysia	0.9–2.1[8]	0.2*	0.03	0.03	**1.1–2.3**
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	7.4	3.0*	1.4	0.1	**12.0**
Singapore	2.2*	0.9*	0.1	0.4	**3.6**
Thailand	2.2*	0.6*	0.05	0.1	**2.9**
United Arab Emirates[9]	TBD	0.9	TBD	TBD	TBD

Composition of domestic philanthropic monetary giving by source and jurisdiction

2024, % of total[1]



Notes: *Value may include some monetised value of in-kind giving and corporate capabilities, when monetary giving could not be reliably disaggregated. In-kind giving was excluded from the quantification estimates due to the limited availability of comprehensive data and the absence of standardised valuation methodologies across jurisdictions. 1. Totals and sub-totals may not add up due to rounding. The data in Exhibit 4 focus on domestic giving. They therefore do not represent the cross-border giving that may be significant in the philanthropic profile of some jurisdictions, including Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; Singapore; and the United Arab Emirates. 2. Includes components of funds based on definition of public discretionary (detailed in Annex 2). 3. Midpoints were taken from ranges for the totals. 4. Only includes data from the Chinese Mainland. Data for formal mass individual giving and corporate giving from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) for 2024 are not yet available at the time of this interim report and are to be updated with official MCA data once available. 5. Lower range includes formal giving based on Giving China and traceable informal giving through digital platforms, and upper range includes estimated mass informal giving based on survey data from National School of Development, Peking University. 6. Figure includes 2% uncategorised giving that may encompass monetised value of in-kind donations. Most in-kind donations are excluded. 7. Range is based on two alternative data sources: Family Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau of Japan, and Giving Japan published by the Japan Fundraising Association (detailed in Annex 2). 8. Lower range includes institutional collection of individual *zakat* and *waqf* data from State Islamic Religious Councils and Yayasan Waqaf Malaysia, and upper range includes estimated informal giving and non-Islamic formal giving based on survey data from Charities Aid Foundation and official income data. 9. Erth Zayed Philanthropies, the UAE Commissioner, has convened relevant local and federal stakeholders across the local giving system to develop estimates of the total value of domestic giving. Majra, the National CSR Fund, has contributed its 2024 data reflected in this table, detailed further in Annex 2. The UAE data presented on corporate giving is not included in the totals.

Technical note 2

How to read the quantification estimates

The figures in Exhibit 4 offer the first comprehensive estimates to understand the scale and scope of domestic giving in Asia, with the Commission's jurisdictions representing 70 percent of Asia's population and 80 percent of its GDP.[14] For the quantification of philanthropic resources, we count the resources newly injected into the ecosystem by the engines each year, which avoids double-counting resources that pass through multiple actors before reaching their destination.

These estimates are best understood as indicators of the scale and composition of monetary giving for each jurisdiction's ecosystem. They indicate which sources of giving and therefore which of the five philanthropy models may be more active in each jurisdiction. In this first iteration, the data for each jurisdiction are not equally comparable line items for methodological reasons explained transparently and in detail in Annex 2.

Annex 2 also provides additional quantification estimates of income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems (for jurisdictions where data are available), which are not new injections (for example, investment income from charitable and/or faith-based endowments), and volunteer hours, which is an indicator of the large civic participation of populations in Asia.

14 Asia is defined according to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) M49 regional classification. Calculations were based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 2024*; and International Monetary Fund, "GDP Based on PPP, Share of World."

Technical note 3

Towards interoperable frameworks and data taxonomies

Our methodology involved in-depth, bottom-up reviews of available local data sources, assessing quality, comprehensiveness, and recency. Official local government data were preferred when and where available, and other data were used only where their origin was clear and their methodology transparent. Data sources and methodologies of extrapolation are specific to each jurisdiction, based on the best available local data and local government guidance.

There is significant room to strengthen data visibility. For jurisdictions wanting to improve data visibility, the Commission recommends the following good practices, with full details in Annex 2.



Mass individual giving. Relevant questions can be integrated into population censuses to capture informal giving by individuals as an expenditure item, reducing the social desirability and sampling biases that can come from the alternative of standalone surveys. Data on formal individual giving are usually more available from charitable organisations' recipient data or tax department data. Our estimate adopted the most suitable methodology that emerged from consultations with local experts and within the constraints of available data sources.



Corporate giving. Government data such as administrative corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting or tax department numbers provide the most accurate data, depending on the local policy framework. The next-best option is recipient-based data that can distinguish giving by corporates. At least one of these is available for most of the jurisdictions. Only two jurisdictions use sampled local data for estimation.

UHNWI giving. Population censuses and tax department data could segregate UHNWI giving from mass individual giving or corporate giving to avoid double-counting. Platforms specifically designed to channel UHNWI giving are a high-potential alternative that could provide reliable data, subject to the scale of coverage. Bottom-up aggregation and validation of giving data by UHNWIs is another alternative, but may result in an underestimate when UHNWI giving is intentionally discreet. Three jurisdictions have local data, and the rest use giving-to-wealth benchmarks alongside local wealth data.



Public discretionary giving. This was collated bottom up with local Commissioner and expert guidance. Going forward, a more comprehensive estimate can be achieved by applying the Commission's definition to include sources across all government departments.

Finding 2

Reimagining its potential



Philanthropic ecosystems can help countries pursue national missions more effectively.

Across Asia, countries are pursuing national visions that converge around a shared ambition for inclusive and sustainable growth over the next two decades. These visions operate in different political systems and cultural contexts, but they share a common perspective: communities need to be strengthened, and all three engines need to work together in ways that are more coordinated and more effective at delivering national missions aimed at inclusive and sustainable growth.

Exhibit 5
National visions emphasise society-wide effort

China aims to achieve common prosperity by the middle of the century. It frames three distributions as part of achieving common prosperity: the first from the market, the second from the State, and the third from the community in charity and philanthropy. This will enable enterprises, social organisations, and individuals to participate actively in charitable and public-interest initiatives.[1]

India's Viksit Bharat 2047 emphasises inclusive development through its core focus on youth, poor households, women, and farmers whose empowerment and progress are viewed as central to India's development.[2]

Golden Indonesia 2045 emphasises community-level micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and cooperatives as critical to economic transformation. It highlights the need to optimise socio-cultural capital as a key mission to strengthen the resilience of individuals, families, communities, and the environment.[3]

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 includes an explicit goal of increasing the contribution of the non-profit sector to 5 percent of GDP, signalling the importance of recognising community contributions to society.[4]

1 Xi Jinping, "Making Solid Progress Toward Common Prosperity"; "How to Understand the Construction of a Coordinated and Complementary Institutional System for Primary Distribution, Redistribution, and Tertiary Distribution," in *100 Questions and Answers on Studying the Report of the 20th CPC National Congress* (Beijing: Party Building Books Publishing House and Study Publishing House, 2022).
2 "Address by the Hon'ble President of India Smt. Droupadi Murmu to Parliament."
3 *Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 59 of 2024.*
4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, "Vision 2030," accessed May 2026.

Philanthropic ecosystems can support states to strengthen community and enhance the collaborative infrastructure between the engines

Collaboration requires trust and coordination, and often depends on collaborative infrastructure—the institutions, mechanisms, norms, and channels—to build, amplify, and sustain it. Philanthropic ecosystems can support states to strengthen community and enhance collaborative infrastructure, enabling large numbers of actors across the three engines to work together effectively on a shared mission. There are three interfaces for collaborative infrastructure, referred to as the state<>community interface, state<>market interface, and community<>market interface.

This section details two long-term examples of collaborative infrastructure development for national missions and the role philanthropic ecosystems played in China and India, the two largest countries represented in the Commission.

China's poverty alleviation mission

When state and community actors work together well, public programmes can be better designed, targeted, and delivered because they are informed by trusted last-mile networks. When state and market actors work together well, private investment and capabilities can be channelled more productively into underdeveloped areas. When market and community actors work together well, businesses can support more inclusive forms of growth through models that are tested, adapted, and legitimised by local communities.

China's poverty alleviation mission offers a striking example of these collaborations on a large scale. Between 2013 and 2020, China eliminated extreme poverty, lifting 98.99 million rural residents out of it.[15] The State strengthened impoverished communities by dispatching more than 255,000 resident work teams and over three million officials into impoverished villages, injecting management talent, policy knowledge, and external connections into grassroots communities.[16]

The State also built collaborative infrastructure at the state<>market interface. One example was the East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, which created a trusted bridge between capital and capabilities from the wealthier eastern region to 573 impoverished counties in central and


15 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation*.
16 Xi Jinping, "Speech at the National Conference to Review the Fight Against Poverty and Commend Outstanding Individuals and Groups," *Qiushi*, last modified May 2023.

western China (Exhibit 6).[17] This provided a mapping of demand-side needs in the impoverished counties, which eastern provinces could use to inform their investments and philanthropic spending.[18] Central State-owned enterprises (central SOEs) served as role models, contributing more than CNY 100 billion ($15.3 billion)—comprising CNY 46 billion ($7.0 billion) of investment and CNY 54 billion ($8.3 billion) in philanthropic donations—alongside more than CNY 14 billion ($2.1 billion) in purchases of agricultural products from impoverished areas.[19] Other enterprises across China collectively provided CNY 1 trillion ($149.7 billion) in investment in impoverished areas.[20]

Exhibit 6

The East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation as collaborative infrastructure in China's national mission

Rough estimation of spending for poverty alleviation mission, 2015–2020*
CNY billion ($ billion)



Notes: *China's poverty alleviation mission started in 2013 and *The Decision on Winning the Battle Against Poverty* was issued in 2015 by The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, hence figures for the 2015–2020 data period are used where available. Several data sources were only available for different time periods, and these are included as-is to remain accurate to sources. These include: central SOEs investments and philanthropy (2013–2020); government infrastructure investment categories of Transportation (2016–2020), Water conservancy (2016–2020), and Energy (2012–2019). Therefore, this analysis is to be interpreted as a rough estimate of the scale of investment in poverty alleviation in China; it includes the major spending categories and is not exhaustive.


Sources: 1. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation*. 2. Wang Zi and Lian Pinjie, "The Ministry of Transport Stated That During the 13th Five-Year Plan Period, a Total of 953.8 Billion Yuan Was Invested in Highway Construction Projects in Impoverished Areas," *People's Daily Online*, October 22, 2020. 3. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "The State Council Information Office Held a Press Conference on Water Conservancy Support for Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects," September 9, 2021. 4. National Energy Administration, "The State Council Information Office Held a Press Conference on the Energy Sector's Efforts to Win the Battle Against Poverty," October 19, 2020. 5. Party Committee of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, "'Data Speaks' on the Poverty Alleviation Report Card of Central SOEs," *Qiushi*, no. 4 (2021). 6. All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, *Annual Report on the Private Corporate Social Responsibility of China (2021)*, December 21, 2021.

17 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation*.
18 Gansu Daily, "全省东西部协作和中央单位定点帮扶新闻发布会实录" (Transcript of the Press Conference on East-West Cooperation and Targeted Assistance from the Central Government Departments Across the Province), July 27, 2026.
19 Party Committee of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, "'数说'国资央企脱贫攻坚答卷" ('Data Speaks' on the Poverty Alleviation Report Card of Central SOEs), *Qiushi,* no. 4 (2021).
20 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation*.

In this phase, China's philanthropic ecosystem supported the State's direction, with state-led and corporate-led philanthropy contributing to the impact of the East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation at the last mile. For example, the China Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, a government-organised non-governmental organisation (GONGO), partnered with the Office of the State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce to work with private entrepreneurs to launch the "10,000 Enterprises Helping 10,000 Villages" campaign, a targeted poverty alleviation initiative. At the end of 2020, 127,000 private enterprises had contributed CNY 111 billion ($16.6 billion) in investment and donated CNY 17 billion ($2.5 billion) to philanthropic projects, collectively benefitting more than 18 million impoverished people.[21]

Exhibit 7

Poverty Alleviation (2013–2020): the philanthropic ecosystem supported state direction*




*Only showing selected examples to illustrate the role of philanthropy.

21 All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, *中国民营企业社会责任报告 (2021)* (Annual Report on the Private Corporate Social Responsibility of China (2021)), December 21, 2021.

Exhibit 8

Rural Revitalisation (2021 onwards): strengthening the community<>state interface




From poverty alleviation to rural revitalisation (2021 onwards)

With extreme poverty eradicated, rural revitalisation from 2021 onwards is China's next mission related to inclusive growth.[22] This mission is more complex, requiring multidimensional improvement, including thriving businesses, pleasant living environments, social etiquette and civility, and effective governance and prosperity. The government is clear that local communities need to be better organised, be able to understand their own needs, and be empowered to develop and implement their own solutions—so that the community engine can handle this greater complexity and improve its interactions with the state and the market.

In this phase, China's philanthropic ecosystem has been particularly active. Corporate-led models in China brought their core assets and capabilities to strengthen the interfaces, enabling the national mission to deliver greater impact at scale (Exhibit 8).

Strengthening the community<>market interface



For the community<>state interface, efforts are needed to strengthen community to facilitate better communication between community groups and local governments, so community groups can develop their own solutions and provide feedback on local needs to the government. In line with the State's direction for Five-Community Linkage (coordinated collaboration among communities, social organisations, social workers, community volunteers, and social charitable resources), Shanzhimei is one demonstration of the role corporate-led philanthropy played.

22 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation*.

Tencent Foundation brought its technology capabilities to develop a digital platform with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, which covered 82,000 administrative villages serving 16 million residents.[23] This platform has enabled villagers to raise issues, participate in collective decision-making, and track local government and other social organisations' responses in real time. In Sichuan, for instance, the platform has reduced the processing time for village-level affairs by 65 percent, decreased repetitive administrative tasks by 40 percent, and increased public satisfaction to 92.3 percent.[24]

For the community<>market interface, village corporations and cooperative networks enable market participation for communities to be more commercially viable and sustainable for rural livelihood development. Throughout this phase, the China Foundation for Rural Development, a GONGO, developed stronger cooperatives in 50 villages across 17 provinces.[25] Tencent Sustainable Social Value Organization (Tencent SSV) focused on capacity building for rural CEOs to develop village economies. Alibaba dispatched special envoys to 29 underdeveloped counties in 12 provinces across China to help villages and local governments identify and cultivate local produce, and leveraged its e-commerce platform to sell the products at scale. Alibaba carried out more than 110 projects, driving sales of more than CNY 9 billion ($1.3 billion) in the host counties (Exhibit 8).[26]


23 Tencent SSV, "为村发展实验室" (WeCounty Development Lab), *Tencent Sustainable Social Value,* accessed July 2026.
24 Zhang Yuxi, "'川善治'平台入选全国典型案例" ('Chuanshanzhi' Platform Selected as National Typical Case), *Sichuan Daily,* March 10, 2026.
25 China Foundation for Rural Development, *百美村庄项目2025 年度总结* (Hundred Beautiful Villages Project: 2025 Annual Summary) (Beijing: China Foundation for Rural Development, December 2025).
26 Yang Yang, "阿里巴巴入选中国民营企业社会责任优秀案例" (Alibaba Selected as Outstanding Case of Private Enterprise Social Responsibility), *Yuhang Times,* December 25, 2025.

India's rural livelihoods mission

India's long-term progress in rural development brings to life more examples of how a philanthropic ecosystem, particularly community-led and state-led philanthropy, can play a significant role in strengthening the community engine and the interfaces between community, state, and market for rural development (Exhibit 9).


Exhibit 9

Community-led pilots
1980




In the 1980s, community-led philanthropy, represented by community organisations such as the Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency (MYRADA) and Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN), organised poor rural women into self-help groups, which initially functioned as informal savings-and-credit groups. These groups showed that rural women could sustain savings discipline, repay loans, and self-govern with minimal external support.[27]

Nationalisation phase I
1992–1999



In 1992, in close partnership with hundreds of community organisations, the government adopted the self-help group model with the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD, a public-sector bank under the Ministry of Finance), which brought rural women into the mainstream as a bankable population.[28]

Nationalisation phase II
1999–2011



In 1999, the mandate shifted to the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) with a greater emphasis on poverty alleviation and on taking the model to a national scale.[29] By the early 2000s, millions of rural women had formed self-help groups. In 2011, the Ministry of Rural Development established the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM) and parallel State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs) as autonomous entities with independent mandates to continue to strengthen and scale the programme. By 2025, 100.5 million rural women in India were in 9.09 million self-help groups, reaching at least one in two rural households.[30,31]

27 Ajay Tankha, *Banking on Self-Help Groups: Twenty Years On* (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2012), 11–13.
28 Tankha, *Banking on Self-Help Groups*, 11–13.
29 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, "National Rural Livelihoods Mission: Another Step towards Poverty Alleviation," *Press Information Bureau*, June 1, 2011.
30 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, "Target Achieved under Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Rural Livelihoods Mission," *Press Information Bureau,* March 18, 2025.
31 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, "SECC 2011 at a Glance," *Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) 2011*, accessed July 2026.

A particularly noteworthy example of the role philanthropic ecosystems played in transforming collaborative infrastructure at the interfaces comes from Bihar—one of India's lowest-income, most populous states (Exhibit 10).[32] Between 2014 and 2023, ~38 million people were moved out of multidimensional poverty.[33] State-led and community-led philanthropy organisations contributed significantly by working together to strengthen the community engine, mobilising more than 12 million rural women and households into more than one million self-help groups between 2008 and 2020. The state-led institution (JEEViKA) brought institutional trust and legitimacy to anchor the mission and played a central coordinating role. JEEViKA built its capabilities through a co-investment of $175 million from the Bihar Government and $453 million from the World Bank, which provided technical assistance and expertise.[34]


The self-help groups enabled financial inclusion at scale, transforming the community<>market interface and enabling a cumulative INR 39,000 crore ($4.7 billion) in credit to be channelled to livelihood support, while keeping non-performing assets below 1.5 percent, well under the market average. They also transformed the community<>state interface by increasing the effectiveness of public service delivery and offsetting state costs to enable 75,000 ultra-poor households to graduate out of extreme poverty through public livelihood grants of INR 11,000 crore ($1.3 billion), and to enable enrolment of 2.08 million rural women in public insurance schemes.[35]

Exhibit 10

India—Bihar Rural Livelihood Promotion (state-based mission)

One of India's lowest-income, most populous states moved 37.7 million people out of multidimensional poverty within a decade

2014–2023



32 There are many examples from different states across India of large-scale impact because the community of rural households was strengthened through self-help groups. We describe these in greater detail in Annex 1.
33 Government of India, "Multidimensional Poverty in India Reduced Significantly; 24.82 Crore People Escaped Multidimensional Poverty between 2013–14 and 2022–23," *Press Information Bureau,* January 15, 2024.
34 World Bank Group, "Unleashing the Power of Women's Collectives".
35 Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (JEEViKA), *Annual Action Plan and Budget FY 2024–25* (Patna: BRLPS, 2024).

Why the philanthropic ecosystem and a strong community engine matter for public budgets in India

For ministries with development mandates, a major contribution that the philanthropic ecosystem and a strong community engine offer is enabling public budgets to be more effective in achieving the intended outcomes and reaching the people they aim to serve. There are three practical effects. First, organised community networks improve the targeting and delivery of public programmes, reducing leakage and raising the return on public spending. Second, they extend reach into places and households that public systems find expensive to serve, offsetting the unit cost of delivery incurred by the government while raising local legitimacy. Third, community-led monetary and social capital can absorb the experimentation risk to help increase the likelihood that public schemes succeed.

These examples from China and India are not exhaustive, but they help explain the roles philanthropy models can play to strengthen community and enhance the collaborative infrastructure so that all three engines can work more effectively towards national missions aimed at inclusive and sustainable growth (Exhibit 11). Across Asia, national missions may cover more than poverty alleviation and rural or regional revitalisation, including, but not limited to, adapting to rapidly ageing populations, skilling and lifelong learning in the AI era, and climate and energy transitions.

Exhibit 11
Examples of roles played by philanthropy models for national missions
(non-exhaustive)

	Philanthropy models: specific actors	Capabilities leveraged beyond monetary giving	Roles played to strengthen community engine and the interfaces between the engines
China examples	**State-led:** China Charity Federation, China Society for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, China Foundation for Rural Development	Authority to own and coordinate national missions and priorities	Resource mobiliser Coordinator at scale
	Corporate-led: Tencent, Alibaba	Core assets and capabilities: digital capabilities, social media, and e-commerce platforms	Platform connector and builder
India examples	**State-led:** National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM) State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs)	Authority to own and coordinate national missions and priorities	Mission anchor and orchestrator Resource mobiliser Coordinator at scale Localiser
	Community-led: PRADAN, MYRADA, and 100s of other community-based organisations	Trusted networks and social capital at scale	Innovator/model builder Trusted implementor



Finding 3

Building together for the next decade

Philanthropic ecosystems need targeted investments to be a productive development asset and cross-learning in Asia can accelerate progress.

Three sets of domestic investment are needed. These are interim suggestions that the Commission intends to refine by engaging policymakers and decision-makers over the next year towards an action roadmap in a final report in 2027.

Investment 1

Improve data visibility

Better data visibility informs jurisdictions of the resources and capabilities their philanthropic ecosystems can offer for development, which can lead to more consequential policy questions and decisions.

Interoperable frameworks, data taxonomies, and data collection methodologies can help jurisdictions avoid reinventing the wheel. A fuller discussion of these opportunities can be found in Annex 2.

Better visibility can lead to material findings for national development. For example, a commonly undercounted or less visible source of monetary giving is mass individual giving, particularly informal, everyday giving that may be facilitated by community-led and faith-based philanthropy models. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was interested in improving the visibility of this source to better understand the scale of potential behind informal giving in Islamic philanthropy. In 2026, the Commission supported the Ministry to conduct its first national public survey in more than 20 years (Exhibit 12).[36]

The survey showed the immense scale of Islamic philanthropy's everyday giving, with a total of IDR 343 trillion a year ($20.8 billion) including both monetary and in-kind giving.[37] It is estimated that informal giving represented roughly 80 percent of the total (about $16.7 billion). The breakdown raises important questions on how to optimise domestic resources for national missions such as poverty alleviation. *Zakat mal* (mandatory annual giving if annual wealth exceeds a certain threshold) is intended to be used for wealth redistribution and poverty eradication according to Islamic teachings, while *infak and sedekah* (voluntary donations and alms) are flexible donations

36 Republic of Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs, Commission on Asian Philanthropy, and Social Trust Fund UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, *National Public Survey for Islamic Philanthropy*, unpublished dataset, data collected January–February 2026, covering 2025 data.

37 The total is different to what was included in the mass individual giving figure of the quantification estimates (Exhibit 4) as in-kind giving, with an estimated value of IDR 134.5 trillion ($8.2 billion), was excluded, and the remaining amount was further adjusted to the 2024 price level.

that are often managed and used together with *zakat mal* for similar purposes. Collectively, the two types of giving could contribute about $15.1 billion to the national poverty alleviation effort—almost 50 percent of the government's national budget for social protection of $31.5 billion in 2026 (one of the core state budget categories for poverty alleviation, which includes basic-needs programmes and community empowerment initiatives).[38]

Exhibit 12


Findings from Indonesia National Public Survey for Islamic Philanthropy, 2026

Total 2025 Islamic mass giving by type
IDR trillion ($ billion)




Total = **343 trillion ($20.8 billion)**

Share of giving (*waqf, zakat mal,* and *infak and sedekah*) through formal and informal channels



Distribution of givers that gave ≥1 giving type among *waqf, zakat mal,* and *infak and sedekah*



Note: Total weighted sample size is 181mn, based on a raw sample size of 8,360. Informal-formal channel analysis uses a subset of samples (n = 6,055) with sufficient information for reliable analysis.

38 Julian Isaac, "Govt Raises 2026 Social Protection Budget, Focusing on Basic Needs, Poverty Reduction," *Indonesia Business Post,* August 19, 2025.

According to Professor Dr Waryono Abdul Ghafur (Director of Zakat and Waqf Empowerment at the Ministry of Religious Affairs), these findings reflect the strong culture of mutual cooperation and social solidarity among Indonesians, which can serve as important social capital in the development of Islamic philanthropy. He said:

> Indonesia possesses enormous potential in Islamic philanthropy. Our challenge is to ensure that this potential is managed more effectively so that it can generate greater impact in poverty reduction, community economic empowerment, education, and humanitarian assistance... Reliable survey data is essential for strengthening collaboration among the government, *zakat* institutions, *waqf* institutions, and other stakeholders to optimise the management and utilisation of Islamic social finance.[39]

Jurisdictions may also find it valuable to improve data visibility for non-monetary giving of core capabilities. For example, when corporates leverage their core assets and capabilities for development priorities, there is no set of standards or methodology to recognise the value of these contributions, beyond donations and staff time. To highlight one example, as part of the Nan Sandbox project in Thailand, Kasikornbank, in partnership with the government, leveraged its business networks, entrepreneurial capabilities, and its top managerial talent to build an integrated place-based model spanning inclusive healthcare, youth empowerment, and an end-to-end pharma-agroforestry value chain to improve livelihoods sustainably and conserve the forest.

Finally, for jurisdictions where faith-based models are prominent, there is often sizeable value in land and property assets that can also be useful for development priorities. For example, jurisdictions with Islamic philanthropy may aim to improve data visibility on *waqf* (perpetual endowments) land and related properties.

39 Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Directorate General of Islamic Community Guidance, "National Survey Estimates Indonesia's Annual Islamic Philanthropy at IDR 343 Trillion," *Bimas Islam*, June 22, 2026.

Investment 2

Cultivate philanthropy models inspired by growth playbooks

Cultivating domestic philanthropy models requires intentional leadership and commitment. Our research has uncovered 12 growth playbooks for the five philanthropy models across Commission jurisdictions; six of these operate at a scale of more than $1 billion a year in monetary value alone (Exhibit 13). These growth playbooks often take five to ten years to materialise at scale, and perhaps even longer to deliver the impact originally intended. A full description of all 12 playbooks is available in Annex 1.

Exhibit 13

Six of 12 growth playbooks have generated over $1 billion a year in domestic giving

Philanthropy models	Growth playbooks	Emerging or at scale (at scale is defined by reaching $1bn+ annually in at least 1 jurisdiction)
Community-led	Digital giving platforms China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	At scale
	Self-help groups India	At scale
Faith-based	Active *zakat* coordination and institutionalisation Indonesia	At scale
State-led	State-affiliated institutions China, Thailand, United Arab Emirates	At scale
	Dormant deposits Japan	Emerging
	Non-profitisation of government assets Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Emerging
Corporate-led	Mandatory corporate social responsibility India	At scale
	Core assets and capabilities giving China, India	Emerging
	Collaboration platforms for government-linked companies Malaysia	Emerging
	Corporate hometown tax Japan	Emerging
UHNWI-led	Community impact partnerships Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	At scale
	Financial hubs for family offices Hong Kong SAR, China; Singapore	Emerging

The upside opportunity is for each jurisdiction to identify philanthropy models with more room for growth and to innovate its own approaches to cultivate that growth. They may find inspiration in other jurisdictions' growth playbooks. Notably, most of the approaches documented in the growth playbooks use policy levers or other means that do not rely on tax incentives—contrary to commonly held assumptions outside the region. It is important for policymakers to consider the wide variety of approaches and possibilities at their disposal.

The Commission estimates the upside opportunity to be unlocked through cross-learning and further domestic innovation in growth playbooks across its jurisdictions to be an additional $189 billion in monetary resources, on top of the ~$1.5 trillion expected over the next 10 years (Exhibit 14). To estimate the upside opportunity, Commissioners used growth playbooks as inspiration and envisaged 23 stories of possibility for their jurisdictions, which were then valued using the best available data.

Getting started: closed-door policy roundtables focused on growing domestic philanthropic ecosystems


Closed-door policy roundtables can be an effective way of starting the dialogue on upside opportunities together with policymakers and decision-makers. In February 2026, a closed-door policy roundtable was held with policymakers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as part of the Commission's convening in Riyadh. Commissioners presented growth playbooks to local policymakers from the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Fund for Development, and General Authority of Awqaf, among others. Policymakers expressed support and interest in continuing discussions about developing the local philanthropic ecosystem, highlighting key themes of trust-building, transparency, and collaboration.

+$189bn Additional monetary resources over the next decade if all upside stories of possibility are realised

Exhibit 14

Estimation of potential domestic monetary giving upside across Commission jurisdictions between 2027 and 2036


Breakdown of potential upside over 2027–2036 by philanthropy models



1 Totals and sub-totals may not add up due to rounding.
2 State-led upside can potentially be sizeable, but stories of possibility were limited as public discretionary sources are especially specific to local context.

Estimation of total monetary resources across Commission jurisdictions over 2027–2036

$ billion in 2024 price level



1 Does not include income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems.
2 Organic growth estimation assumes economic growth as a proxy indicator, based on real GDP growth projections by jurisdiction from the International Monetary Fund.
3 Upside includes all stories of possibility identified by the Commission.

Technical note 4

Estimating the quantity upside

At the time of this report's publication, there is no comprehensive estimate of the scope and scale of domestic philanthropic giving in Asia, nor any credible estimate of its upside potential. Applying high-level benchmarks such as a percentage of GDP from other countries to indicate Asia's potential ignores the diverse composition of Asia's philanthropic ecosystems and the region's substantively different local policy and tax environments and national conditions. The Commission therefore took a bottom-up approach to its 2024 quantification estimate and its upside opportunity estimate, which used tailored stories of possibility for each jurisdiction, inspired by empirical evidence from Asia's growth playbooks that operate in the region's political, economic, and cultural realities.

Investment 3

Integrate philanthropic ecosystems as a strategic asset in the planning and coordination of national missions

Planning departments and ministries of finance that coordinate national missions aiming for inclusive and sustainable growth can explore how they can better partner with their philanthropic ecosystems to maximise the impact of their domestic resources and capabilities.

National missions can provide a common language and frame to mobilise stronger collaboration between the philanthropic ecosystem and the engines. For example, Malaysia's Ministry of Finance launched the Government-linked Enterprises Activation and Reform Programme (GEAR-uP) in 2024, mobilising government-linked companies (GLCs), government-linked investment companies (GLICs), and their philanthropic efforts to contribute to two main pillars: (1) "Raise the Ceiling", accelerating industrial transformation in high-growth, high-value sectors, such as semiconductors and energy transitions; and (2) "Raise the Floor", improving the quality of life and ensuring inclusive growth and minimum living wage commitments for the most vulnerable. By mid-2025, GEAR-uP had mobilised MYR 11 billion ($2.6 billion) for high-growth, high-value sectors, and secured commitments for a monthly living wage of at least MYR 3,100 ($724.5) for 153,000 employees.[40, 41]

40 Ministry of Finance Malaysia, "Pre-Budget Statement 2025," press release, July 30, 2024.
41 Ministry of Finance Malaysia, "MOF's GEAR-uP Mobilises RM11 Billion, Secures Living Wage Commitment for 153,000 Employees," press release, June 30, 2025.

Within the Raise the Floor pillar, the Ministry of Finance works closely with the GLC Demi Rakyat dan Negara (GDRN: a collaborative network for GLCs and GLICs and their philanthropic efforts, with Yayasan Hasanah and Yayasan TM as its co-secretariats) to coordinate philanthropic initiatives and facilitate cross-learning for community development, livelihoods, and education, together with the relevant government departments. The Ministry of Finance has committed matching grants of at least MYR 100 million ($23.5 million) annually throughout 2024–26, and actively encourages coordinating efforts to leverage the combined expertise, physical presence, and implementation capacity of the entire network.[42]

Regional cooperation to accelerate domestic development

The three domestic investment areas discussed above can enable jurisdictions to cultivate their philanthropic ecosystems and accelerate their impact on national missions and priorities. An initial framework for measuring success of these investment areas is provided in Exhibit 15.

Each jurisdiction will explore its own development path suited to its national conditions. As an example, the China Soong Ching Ling Foundation commissioned scholars to write a report on the development path of China's philanthropic ecosystem, as a companion to the Commission's research.[43]

The Commission looks forward to more in-depth domestic and regional exchanges in the coming years. There is much to learn from one another and regional cooperation can accelerate domestic development.

42 Anwar Ibrahim, "Belanjawan 2024 Speech: Introducing the Supply Bill (2024) in Dewan Rakyat," Government of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, October 13, 2023; Government of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, *Budget 2025 Touchpoints* (Putrajaya: Ministry of Finance, 2024); Government of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, *Budget 2026 Touchpoints* (Putrajaya: Ministry of Finance, 2025).
43 China Soong Ching Ling Foundation, *中国慈善研究报告* (A Study on China's Charity), 2026.

For improving data visibility, while data definitions should remain driven by local context, there is a clear regional opportunity to develop shared principles and practices to make philanthropic data more visible, granular, interoperable, and ultimately, more actionable and insightful for policymaking. First, shared principles for the design of the governance architecture of philanthropic data can cover common questions of ownership, accountability, and coordination of data both by sources of giving and in aggregate at the national level. Second, shared practices can support the development of interoperable, high-quality data, across taxonomies, data collection methodologies, and infrastructure building, to enable regular and consistent measurement over time. This effort will result in an important regional public good, not only supporting learning in Commission jurisdictions but also enabling other jurisdictions beyond the Commission to benefit from an established knowledge base.[44]

For cultivating domestic philanthropy models, convening policymakers and decision-makers to share their experiences in realising the stories of possibility can bring growth playbooks to life and inspire more innovation across the region. Depending on policymaker interest in specific growth playbooks, there can also be tailored peer-to-peer exchanges that go deeper into actionable, operational details to accelerate implementation.

For national mission planning and coordination, while contexts will differ, there will still be scope to learn the different ways in which domestic philanthropic ecosystems contribute to national missions and priorities, especially when jurisdictions share similar priorities. For example, the mission for rural or regional revitalisation is a common priority for China, India, and Japan. Grappling with rapidly ageing populations and accelerating preventative, community-based healthcare is a priority for major cities like Beijing, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo. Every jurisdiction needs to address the challenge of skilling and lifelong learning in the new technological era of generative AI to instil more hope in our youth for the future.

44 For more details, please refer to Annex 2.

Exhibit 15

Towards a measurement framework for strengthening philanthropic ecosystems for inclusive and sustainable growth

Discover and cultivate domestic philanthropic ecosystems' resources and capabilities for development

Accelerate impact on national missions and priorities towards inclusive and sustainable growth

Jurisdiction level indicators

More giving of resources counted and/or added

- Monetary resources across the four sources: mass individuals, corporates, public discretionary, and UHNWIs

More actors in each philanthropy model giving capabilities for development

- Across the five models: community-led, faith-based, corporate-led, state-led, and UHNWI-led

More national missions or priorities achieving faster, better, and more cost-effective outcomes at scale by partnering with philanthropic ecosystems

- Note: to work towards measurement approaches for how philanthropic ecosystems strengthen the community engine and enhance the collaborative infrastructure between state, market, and community engines in the context of national missions

Domestic investment areas

1. **Improve data visibility**
2. **Cultivate philanthropy models, inspired by growth playbooks**
3. **Integrate philanthropic ecosystems as a strategic asset in the planning and coordination of national missions or priorities**

Regional investment areas

Shared principles, practices, convening, and other tailored cross-learning mechanisms (to be further detailed in the final report)

Towards the final report

The call to action: engage with the Commission over the next year to inform an action roadmap to shape the next decade together

There is a much bigger vision at stake. Success in our national missions moves us towards our collective vision for inclusive and sustainable growth by 2050. Asia can be a global leader, inspiring other regions with rich and diverse pathways for models of growth that leave no one behind and leave a better world for the next generation.

Partnering together to learn from each other on how our philanthropic ecosystems advance national missions can continually remind us of the purpose behind our broader collaborations in technology, trade, supply chains, security, and energy transitions.

This interim report is a conversation starter for policymakers and decision-makers, including national and sub-national planning departments, policy think tanks, ministries of finance, and ministries overseeing philanthropy, charity, and development.

The concrete ask is to engage with the Commission over the next year to discuss the findings and messages presented in this report and to explore the actions and investments needed to support a regional movement to advance our philanthropic ecosystems for inclusive and sustainable growth. These discussions will inform an action roadmap in the Commission's final report, due at the end of 2027.



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45 Listed in alphabetical order by surnames of individuals and first letters of names of institutions or teams (where individuals are not named).

- **Mohamed Azam Abdul Aziz,** Chief Executive Officer, Warees Investments
- **Professor Dr Waryono Abdul Ghafur,** Director of Zakat and Waqf Empowerment, Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
  Direktur Pemberdayaan Zakat dan Wakaf, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia
- **Zulfirdaus Bin Abu Hassan,** General Manager, Asnaf Development Division, Lembaga Zakat Selangor
  Pengurus Besar, Divisyen Pembangunan Asnaf, Lembaga Zakat Selangor
- **Bhirawa Anoraga,** MA, PhD, Researcher, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
- **Rizky Bianco,** Directorate of Social and Economic Independence, Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) of the Republic of Indonesia
  Direktorat Kemandirian Sosial dan Ekonomi, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
- **China Volunteering Development Index Measurement taskforce,** Huizeren Probono Academy
  北京惠泽人公益发展中心中国志愿服务发展指数测量课题组
- **Sh. Balamurugan D,** IAS, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India; former CEO JEEViKA, Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
- **Sh. Narendranath Damodaran,** National Anchor, National Coalition for Natural Farming; former Executive Director, Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN)
- **Development Intelligence Unit Analytics**
- **Directorate of Social Assistance Funding Source Management (PSDS),** Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
  Direktorat Pemberdayaan Potensi dan Sumber Daya Sosial, Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia
- **Professor Amelia Fauzia,** MA, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta; Director, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
  Profesor, Fakultas Adab dan Humaniora, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta; Direktur, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
- **Ferro Ferizka,** Senior Advisor to the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Cultural Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Cultural Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
  Staf Khusus Menteri Koordinator, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Pembangunan Manusia dan Kebudayaan, Kemenko PMK Republik Indonesia
- **Mona Hammami,** Partner and Head of the United Arab Emirates, Oliver Wyman
- **Professor Nur Hidayati,** MA, PhD, Researcher, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
- **Sri Hidayati,** MEd, Researcher, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta
- **Professor Dr Huang Haoming,** Dean, Asia Academy of Philanthropy in Hainan
  海南亚洲公益研究院院长黄浩明教授
- **Japan Network for Public Interest Activities (JANPIA)**
  日本民間公益活動連携機構
- **Kasikorn Research Center**
  บริษัท ศูนย์วิจัยกสิกรไทย จำกัด
- **Dinar Dana Kharisma,** PhD, Director for Social and Economic Independence, Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) of the Republic of Indonesia
  Direktur Kemandirian Sosial dan Ekonomi, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
- **Tatsuaki Kobayashi,** Professor and Senior Researcher, Center for Sustainability Management, Tama University
  多摩大学サステナビリティ経営研究所教授・主任研究員 小林 立明
- **Sh. Anish Kumar,** Transforming Rural India Foundation
- **Dr Lan Yuxin,** Dean, Institute for Philanthropy Tsinghua University
  清华大学公益慈善研究院院长蓝煜昕

- **Joyce Lee,** Senior Manager (Policy Research), Financial Services Development Council
  香港金融發展局高級經理（政策研究）李恩如
- **Professor Li Jian,** Vice Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences (School of Public Administration), Beihang University
  北京航空航天大学人文社会科学学院（公共管理学院）副院长李健教授
- **Professor Ma Jingjing,** Professor, National School of Development, Peking University
  北京大学国家发展研究院马京晶教授
- **Maliki,** PhD, Deputy Minister for Community Empowerment, Population, and Employment, Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) of the Republic of Indonesia
  Deputi Bidang Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, Kependudukan, dan Ketenagakerjaan, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
- **Sh. Aman Mittal,** IAS, Joint CEO, Maharashtra Institution for Transformation, Planning Department, Government of Maharashtra, India
- **Professor Burhanuddin Muhtadi,** MA, PhD, Executive Director, Indikator Politik Indonesia
- **Rungsun Munkong,** International Relations Expert, Thai Health Promotion Foundation
  นายรังสรร มั่นคง, ผู้เชี่ยวชาญด้านวิเทศสัมพันธ์ สำนักพัฒนาภาคีสัมพันธ์และวิเทศสัมพันธ์, สำนักงานกองทุนสนับสนุนการสร้างเสริมสุขภาพ
- **Srikrishna Sridhar Murthy,** Co-founder and CEO, Sattva Consulting
- **Professor Adil Najam,** Dean Emeritus and Professor, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University
- **Dr Amelia Nur Natasha Nazeri,** Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Islamic Social Finance, INCEIF University
- **Sh. Praveen Pardeshi,** Retd. IAS, CEO, Maharashtra Institution for Transformation, Planning Department; Chief Economic Advisor to the Chief Minister, Government of Maharashtra, India
- **Michele Petochi,** Advisor, Labor Market and Social Issues, Riyadh
- **Hendro Prasetyo,** PhD, Director, Indikator Politik Indonesia
- **Professor Dr Amir Shaharuddin,** Director, Centre of Excellence for Islamic Social Finance, INCEIF University
- **Sarah Shaw,** Chief Executive Officer, Majra – National CSR Fund
- **Sh. Nagendra Nath Sinha,** Retd. IAS, Former Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
- **Social Impact, Technology & Transformation team,** Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India LLP
- **Boonwara Sumano,** PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Thailand Development Research Institute
  ดร. บุญวรา สุมะโน, นักวิชาการอาวุโส, สถาบันวิจัยเพื่อการพัฒนาประเทศไทย
- **Tao Ze,** Founder and CEO, YiSHAN Data
  易善数据创始人兼总裁陶泽
- **Sumit Tayal,** CEO, Give
- **Jinny Uppal,** Director and Head of Centre for Social Impact and Philanthropy, Ashoka University
- **Professor Wang Zhenyao,** Founding Dean, China Philanthropy Research Institute, Beijing Normal University
  北京师范大学中国公益研究院创始院长王振耀教授
- **Chris Worman,** Chief Global Strategy and Partnerships Officer, GivingTuesday
- **Yayasan Waqaf Malaysia**
- **Professor Zhang Qiang,** Director, Innovation Center for Risk Governance, Beijing Normal University
  北京师范大学风险治理创新研究中心主任张强教授

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Commission on Asian Philanthropy team

Commissioners

- China Soong Ching Ling Foundation
- Erth Zayed Philanthropies: **HE Dr Mugheer Khamis Al Khaili,** HE Amal Saleh Al Braiki, Dr Hamad Al Darmaki, Mariam Al Hosani, Karama Al Katheeri, Sufanah Hamza, Amy Smith, Zainab Al Mulla
- Kasikornthai Foundation: **Kobkarn Wattanavrangkul,** Pipit Aneaknithi, Anan Lapsuksatit, Siwat Luangsomboon, Puthita Kachintorn
- King Khalid Foundation: **HH Princess Nouf Muhammad AlSaud,** Osamah Alhenaki, Rahaf Al Sanosi
- Piramal Foundation: **Aditya Natraj,** Manmohan Singh
- Tanoto Foundation
- Tata Consultancy Services: **Shailja Mehta,** Balaji Ganapathy (former Chief Social Responsibility Officer), Sunil Joseph
- Temasek Foundation: **Ng Boon Heong,** Charina Chan, Goh Ek Jun, Crystal Ong, Debbie Chan, Audrey Sukotjo, Lim Ying Kit, Chin Shuen Lin
- Tencent Charity Foundation: **Xiao Liming,** Zhang Fan
- The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust: **Gabriel Leung** and team
- The Nippon Foundation: **Ichiro Kabasawa,** Takehiro Umemura
- Yayasan Dompet Dhuafa Republika: **Ahmad Juwaini,** Bobby Porman Manullang, Haryo Mojopahit, Prasetyo Wibowo
- Yayasan Hasanah: **Siti Kamariah Binti Ahmad Subki,** Sharifah Norjumiza Binti Syed Agil, Aditi Malhotra, Danial Sharif Bin Mustaffa, Nur Shaadah Binti Zulkifli, Nur Dina Farhana Binti Zu

Co-convenors

- Institute of Philanthropy: **Brian San,** Vickie Cheng, Marcus Chiu, Ada Chu, Shirley Kwan, Melanie Sze, Shirley Wan, Angel Wang, Vanessa Yu, Eileen Yue
- Asia Philanthropy Congress: **Masato Seko** (former Senior Director, The Nippon Foundation)

Research secretariat

- Voyage: **Warren Ang,** Jennifer Chan, Yoori Kim, Benjamin Suen, Annu Mehta, Winston Sun, Valerie Chiu, Summer Siu, Su Yuan, Suan Ee Ong, Sabrina Cheng, Frank Juan, Mina Wong, Liu Xiwen, Kanishka Bhattacharya, Lola Woetzel (Senior Advisor)

Platform partner

- AVPN: **Naina Subberwal Batra**

Report production team

- Editorial team: Janet Bush, Colin Douglas, Anne Taylor, Henrietta Rose-Innes
- Design team: Courtney Cox, Limika Nel
- Print team: Wong Chun-hong, Ellen Zee

Glossary

A. Terms defined by the Commission

- **Collaborative infrastructure:** The institutions, mechanisms, norms, and channels that foster trust and enable large numbers of actors across the three societal engines to work together effectively on a shared mission. This infrastructure is often located at the interfaces between the engines to facilitate effective and scalable collaboration:
  - **State<>market interface:** The interaction between state and market actors. An example of collaborative infrastructure at this interface is public-private partnership platforms and financing mechanisms designed to incentivise private-sector investment to flow to underdeveloped regions.
  - **State<>community interface:** The interaction between state and community actors. An example of collaborative infrastructure at this interface is digital platforms to enable community residents to participate in collective decision-making, raise issues, or provide feedback on government services and provisions.
  - **Community<>market interface:** The interaction between community and market actors. An example of collaborative infrastructure at this interface is village corporations and farmer cooperative networks that connect community-level producers to broader market value chains.
- **Growth playbook:** Tailored approaches and policies used by jurisdictions to cultivate their domestic philanthropy models. The Commission's research has identified 12 growth playbooks in jurisdictions across Asia, which can support cross-learning and inspiration across the region's philanthropic ecosystems. These playbooks span all five philanthropy models: (1) community-led; (2) faith-based; (3) corporate-led; (4) state-led; and (5) ultra-high-net-worth-individual (UHNWI)-led.
  - **At-scale playbook:** Six growth playbooks that have reached scale, facilitating at least $1 billion a year in monetary giving.
  - **Emerging playbook:** Six growth playbooks that have not yet reached scale but have potential and offer insights for jurisdictions across Asia.
- **Action roadmap:** An outline of strategic opportunities for investment and action to support a regional movement in advancing Asia's philanthropic ecosystems for inclusive and sustainable growth over the next decade, to be included in the Commission's final report.
- **Philanthropic ecosystem:** The Commission defines a philanthropic ecosystem as a domestic ecosystem that includes the five philanthropy models. Each jurisdiction may have varying relative emphases on different models within the five depending on its local context.
- **Philanthropy:** The Commission defines philanthropy as the giving of private or public resources, with discretionary allocation for the benefit of others, beyond fiscal or commercial obligation.
- **Philanthropy models:** The Commission defines philanthropy models by the distinct sets of actors that collect and distribute philanthropic resources and capabilities for the benefit of others, whether through operating their own programmes or giving to third parties. The research identified five philanthropy models that collectively facilitate domestic giving—community-led, faith-based, corporate-led, state-led, and UHNWI-led. The five philanthropy models were derived empirically from the policies and approaches that jurisdictions in Asia tailor to engage distinct sets of actors and cultivate the collection and distribution of resources and capabilities for philanthropic purposes (documented in growth playbooks).
- **Public discretionary giving:** The state engine's new resource injection into the philanthropic ecosystem. Public discretionary giving is defined by its mandated usage (for the benefit of the public beyond fiscal mandates) and the existence of a strong governance structure for the allocation of funds.

- **Resource stream:** A distinct and identifiable channel of monetary or non-monetary resources that flows into, or is generated within, domestic philanthropic ecosystems.
  - **New philanthropic monetary inflows:** Monetary resources newly contributed to philanthropic purposes, including giving by mass individuals, corporates, UHNWIs, and public discretionary sources.
  - **Voluntary time contributions:** Time contributed voluntarily without the expectation of direct personal benefit, and directed towards organisations, communities, or individuals outside one's own household or family.
  - **Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems:** Income generated by endowments or assets already held within philanthropic ecosystems, including assets of charitable organisations and faith-based assets.
- **Societal engines:** The major forces that drive societal development at scale, including state, community, and market. In Asia, all three societal engines participate in philanthropy.
- **Sources of giving:** The originating sources of philanthropic resources, as distinct from the downstream organisations that receive, manage, or distribute those resources. Includes mass individuals, corporates, UHNWIs, and public discretionary resources.
- **State-affiliated institution:** For the report's purposes, this refers to the state-funded or -established institutions that collect and distribute philanthropic resources.
- **Stories of possibility:** Scenarios of upside quantitative growth through intentional cultivation of philanthropy models, envisaged by Commissioners from each jurisdiction, inspired by growth playbooks in Annex 1.

B. General terms

By philanthropy models:

Community-led

- **Community resilience:** Communities' ability to respond to, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse situations, such as natural disasters or economic shocks, in a sustained manner.
- **Social capital:** Networks, trust, values, and norms shared among members of a community or social group that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.

Corporate-led

- **(Core) assets and capabilities:** The core resources and expertise that corporates can use to contribute their capabilities for public good, including products and services, technology assets, intellectual and human capital assets, physical and infrastructure assets, relational assets, and brand assets.
- **Corporate hometown tax:** A Japanese tax incentive policy allowing companies to receive tax benefits for donating to projects aligned with the national priority of regional revitalisation.
- **Corporate social responsibility (CSR):** The idea that a business has a responsibility to the society that exists around it. It often includes philanthropic, environmental, ethical, and economic dimensions—whereby companies embed socially responsible practices into their operations and decision-making beyond the pursuit of profit.[46] Different jurisdictions take different approaches to its regulation and accountability, ranging from voluntary self-regulation (for example, Japan) to a statutory obligation mandating spending and disclosure (for example, India's Companies Act, 2013).
- **Inclusive business:** A business that provides livelihood opportunities and/or expands access to basic goods and services for economically vulnerable and marginalised populations, on a commercially viable basis.[47]

46 Tim Stobierski, "What Is Corporate Social Responsibility? 4 Types," *Harvard Business School Online,* July 10, 2026.
47 International Finance Corporation (IFC), "Inclusive Business at the Base of the Pyramid," accessed July 2026.

Faith-based

- ***Awqaf* or *awkaf* (plural)/*waqf* or *wakaf* (singular):** *Awqaf* assets are Islamic endowment assets that are typically permanently set aside for religious, charitable, or public-benefit purposes. Income and returns generated from the assets can be used for charitable purposes or allocated to beneficiaries as specified in the *waqf* deed. (Note: As this term has multiple spellings, the spelling commonly used in each jurisdiction is used in the relevant sections).
- **Faith-based assets:** Assets set aside by religious organisations or faith communities for religious, charitable, or public-benefit purposes (for example, *awqaf* assets).
- ***Infak and sedekah:*** Voluntary charitable giving in any form.
- ***Qurban:*** A ritual sacrifice performed during Eid al-Adha as a form of worship.
- ***Zakat fitrah:*** An obligatory form of giving (defined based on a unit of rice or staple food per person) that every Muslim with sufficient means must pay at the end of the month of Ramadan.
- ***Zakat mal:*** An obligatory annual contribution requiring Muslims to pay 2.5 percent of their wealth once it exceeds a minimum threshold.

State-led

- **Dormant deposits:** Funds held in dormant bank accounts and other eligible savings instruments that have remained unclaimed by account holders or legal heirs for a statutory period defined by law. As such, they can be a source of funding that governments redirect towards public-benefit purposes.
- **Lottery funds:** Funding generated from lottery proceeds and allocated to specific public-benefit purposes.
- **Matching funds/matching grants:** Public funding that matches philanthropic contributions from non-state actors to crowd in additional resources.
- **Non-profitisation:** An approach to transferring organisations or assets from governmental ownership to the non-profit sector.
- **Ring-fenced levies:** Levies whose proceeds are earmarked and protected for specific public-benefit purposes, such that the funds cannot be used for general government expenditure.

UHNWI-led

- **Family office:** A private organisation that manages the investments, wealth planning, governance, and related affairs of one (single-family office) or more (multi-family office) wealthy family or families.
- **Financial hub:** A city with a significant concentration of financial activities, such as banking and asset management.
- **Patient risk capital:** Capital that prioritises long-term impact over financial returns.

By jurisdiction:

China

- **Common prosperity:** Common prosperity refers to prosperity for everyone and covers enrichment of people's lives in both the material and non-material senses. China has proposed that by the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021–2025), it will have made solid progress towards bringing prosperity to all, while gaps between individual incomes and actual consumption levels will gradually narrow. By the middle of this century, common prosperity will be basically achieved, while gaps between individual incomes and actual consumption levels will be narrowed to an appropriate range.[48]
- **East-West Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation:** A major policy in China to reduce poverty and achieve common prosperity by pairing the developed provinces and municipalities in the East with the impoverished regions in the West, encouraging more developed regions to provide support in various forms including private investment, social assistance, and human resources.[49]
- **Rural revitalisation:** Rural revitalisation is one of the seven strategies for reaching the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects. The strategy emphasises the importance of rural development, including the need to develop rural businesses, create a pleasant living environment, promote civility and effective governance, and improve the living standards of rural residents.[50]
- **Social organisation:** Social groups, foundations, and social service agencies. Social groups are non-profit legal entities that are formed voluntarily by Chinese citizens. Foundations are non-profit legal entities that operate in line with their respective charters and use the assets donated for charity activities. Social service agencies are non-profit legal entities that are set up by natural persons, legal entities, and other organisations with non-state asset donations to provide public-interest social services in line with their respective charters.[51]
- **Central State-owned enterprise (central SOE):** An enterprise owned by the Chinese Government and administered by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).

India

- **Crore:** A unit in the Indian numbering system equal to 10 million (10,000,000).
- **Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana—National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NRLM):** The flagship poverty alleviation programme run by the Government of India's Ministry of Rural Development with the primary goal of reducing rural poverty by organising poor households into self-help groups and empowering them with sustainable livelihood opportunities and financial services.
  - **State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs):** Government-backed, state-level agencies responsible for executing the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM).
  - **Self-help groups (SHGs):** Collectives of 10–20 women from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, operating on savings and credit discipline, mutual accountability, and peer-based decision-making.
- **JEEViKA:** Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project (Bihar SRLM)
- **Lakh:** A unit in the Indian numbering system equal to 100,000.
- **Lakh crore:** A unit in the Indian numbering system equal to one trillion (1,000,000,000,000), or 100,000 crore.
- **MYRADA:** Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency
- **NABARD:** National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
- **PRADAN:** Professional Assistance for Development Action

48 Xi Jinping, "Making Solid Progress Toward Common Prosperity."
49 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Poverty Alleviation.*
50 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "The Strategy for Rural Revitalization," last modified July 13, 2022.
51 The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "Social Organizations," last modified December 10, 2024.

Malaysia

- **GDRN:** GDRN was first established as The Government-Linked Companies (GLC) and Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLIC) Disaster Response Network, and was renamed GLC Demi Rakyat dan Negara in 2022, using the same acronym.
- **GEAR-uP:** Government-linked Enterprises Activation and Reform Programme
- **Government-linked company (GLC):** A company that is invested in and controlled by government-linked investment companies (GLICs) or statutory bodies, with its primary objective being more focused on conducting commercial activities.[52]
- **Government-linked investment company (GLIC):** A Federal Government investment entity that holds controlling interests in companies it invests in (known as GLCs).[53]

Other terms:

- **Assets under management:** The total market value of assets that an investment manager, financial institution, or fund manages on behalf of clients or beneficiaries.
- **Bottom-up estimate:** An estimate derived from aggregating data reported by individual entities.
- **Charitable organisation:** A non-profit organisation established for charitable purposes, where charitable purposes may be defined differently across jurisdictions.
- **Extrapolation:** The process of estimating values that are not directly observed by applying observed ratios, patterns, or benchmarks from available data to a broader population, data period, or jurisdiction.
- **Giving:** Philanthropic donations.
  - **Cross-border giving:** Giving made across jurisdictional borders.
  - **Domestic giving:** Giving made within the donor's own jurisdiction.
  - **Formal giving:** Giving made through formal organisations or entities.
  - **In-kind giving:** Giving made in the form of goods, products, supplies, or other tangible resources other than money.
  - **Informal giving:** Giving not made through formal organisations or entities. Includes giving made directly to those in need, or through communal entities or places of worship that may not be registered.
  - **Monetary giving:** Giving made in the form of cash or cash equivalents.
  - **Non-cash contribution:** Giving made in non-cash form, including shares, in-kind goods, assets, capabilities, volunteering, etc.
  - **Religious giving:** Giving made to a religious organisation or for a religious cause. Excludes personal purchases of religious goods or materials.
- **Governance architecture:** The structure of roles, accountability, decision-making, and coordination through which a system or institution is governed.
- **Impact investment:** An investment made with the intention of generating both measurable positive social or environmental impact and a financial return.
- **Inclusive and sustainable growth:** Economic growth that creates opportunities and improves living standards for all segments of society while preserving environmental resources and supporting long-term social, economic, and environmental wellbeing. Definition and scope may vary by jurisdiction.
- **Jurisdiction:** A territory within which a court or government agency may properly exercise its legislative, executive, or judicial authority.
- **Last-mile network:** The local organisations, institutions, and community actors that deliver services, resources, support, and philanthropic contributions directly to people and communities.

52 Government Investment Companies Division (GIC), Ministry of Finance Malaysia, "Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)," Putrajaya: Ministry of Finance Malaysia, PDF, accessed July 2026.
53 GIC, Ministry of Finance Malaysia, "Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)," accessed July 2026.

- **Mass individuals:** Individuals that constitute the general public.
- **Non-profit organisation (NPO):** An organisation established for charitable, social, or public-benefit purposes rather than generating profit for private distribution. NPO is an umbrella term rather than a single legal form; each jurisdiction may have its own definition and/or specific legal forms for entities with these characteristics.
- **Taxonomy:** A structured framework for classifying and categorising data, concepts, or activities according to a defined set of categories and rules.
- **Triangulation:** The process of validating an estimate by comparing results from multiple data sources or calculation approaches to validate, cross-check, and strengthen the reliability of findings.
- **Ultra-high-net-worth individual (UHNWI):** An individual with a net worth exceeding $30 million.
- **Volunteering:** Work or activities undertaken voluntarily without the expectation of direct personal benefit, and directed towards organisations, communities, or individuals outside one's own household or family.
    - **Formal volunteering:** Volunteering undertaken through formal organisations.
    - **Informal volunteering:** Volunteering undertaken through informal or community-based settings.

Annex 1: Asia's growth playbooks for philanthropy models

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Overview of the annex

The Commission on Asian Philanthropy's research has identified 12 growth playbooks in jurisdictions across Asia, which have been used to cultivate the region's philanthropic ecosystems. These playbooks span all five philanthropy models: community-led, faith-based, corporate-led, state-led, and UHNWI-led.

This annex provides snapshots for each playbook. Six playbooks have reached scale, facilitating at least $1 billion a year in monetary giving, and six are emerging, with proven potential and insights for jurisdictions across Asia, though not yet at scale (Exhibit A1). This set of playbooks is by no means exhaustive; instead, we have chosen to highlight those with reliable data and clear insights that may be relevant across several jurisdictions.

These playbooks are reference documents to inspire cross-learning rather than recipes for direct replication, as contexts vary widely among jurisdictions. Each playbook outlines why it matters, provides an overview, and shares key lessons from profiled jurisdictions. For playbooks that have reached scale, enabling conditions are also covered to share what helped.

Should it be helpful to understand more specific details, we encourage policymakers to reach out to the Commission to explore facilitating a cross-learning dialogue with relevant peers. The distinction between at-scale and emerging playbooks should not obscure the shared reality that all 12 are works in progress and are live, dynamic, and constantly evolving. All of them are looking to improve the impact of giving, not just its quantity.

In this annex, we start with the six playbooks that have reached scale, followed by the six emerging playbooks.[i]

i Throughout this annex, all bracketed amounts with $ signs are US dollar equivalents of the local currency. Exchange rates to US dollars are based on the relevant data period. Where the data period spans two years, the annual average rate of the year with the majority of months is applied; where it spans more than two years, the average of the annual average rates for all relevant years is used. Exchange rates from www.exchange-rates.org.

Exhibit A1

Six of 12 growth playbooks have generated over $1 billion a year in domestic giving

Philanthropy models	Growth playbooks	Emerging or at scale (at scale is defined by reaching $1bn+ annually in at least 1 jurisdiction)
Community-led	Digital giving platforms China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	At scale
	Self-help groups India	At scale
Faith-based	Active *zakat* coordination and institutionalisation Indonesia	At scale
State-led	State-affiliated institutions China, Thailand, United Arab Emirates	At scale
	Dormant deposits Japan	Emerging
	Non-profitisation of government assets Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Emerging
Corporate-led	Mandatory corporate social responsibility India	At scale
	Core assets and capabilities giving China, India	Emerging
	Collaboration platforms for government-linked companies Malaysia	Emerging
	Corporate hometown tax Japan	Emerging
UHNWI-led	Community impact partnerships Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	At scale
	Financial hubs for family offices Hong Kong SAR, China; Singapore	Emerging

Six growth playbooks have generated over $1 billion a year in domestic giving

1. Community-led: Digital giving platforms

Why this playbook matters

Digital platforms are transforming philanthropy by making giving faster, more accessible, and easier to scale. Those supporting mass individual giving have expanded participation among ordinary citizens and strengthened trust in the philanthropic sector through data-driven transparency and accountability. More recently, they have also demonstrated potential to improve allocation efficiency by better matching the supply and demand of philanthropic resources.

This playbook draws on the experiences of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (henceforth referred to as Saudi Arabia), where digital platforms have reached a scale of $1 billion annually (Exhibit A2). Such platforms are already widespread in Asia, and lessons learned could be relevant across jurisdictions. To highlight a few emerging examples: in India, Milaap has raised more than INR 2,400 crore ($257.5 million) since 2010; while Give, established in 2000, has seen more than 1.6 million donations made through its platform to date, with INR 60 crore ($6.9 million) raised in the 2025–26 financial year.[1] In Singapore, the National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre launched giving.sg in 2015, a one-stop national giving platform backed by the Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth, reaching SGD 104.9 million ($80.3 million) in scale in 2025, its highest annual total since launch.[2] In Thailand, examples such as Taejai and Cheewid, launched in 2014 and 2021 respectively, have together raised more than THB 599.2 million ($17.8 million).[3]


Overview of digital giving platforms in China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

In China, digital giving emerged in the 2000s and was scaled by corporate innovation. The largest tech firms running super-apps with hundreds of millions of existing users—Tencent's Weixin (1.4 billion users at the end of 2025) and Ant Group's Alipay (890 million users as of April 2025)—integrated philanthropic giving into their broader digital ecosystems. The Ministry of Civil Affairs played a crucial regulatory role to ensure the platforms' public-serving orientation and to prevent the misuse of funds in accordance with the 2016 Charity Law and its amendments in 2023.[4] There are now 29 online fundraising service platforms designated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to serve charitable organisations, alongside separate peer-to-peer crowdfunding platforms, commonly used by individuals to seek financial support for medical purposes, which are considered to be informal giving. Collectively, these platforms channelled CNY 11.4 billion ($1.6 billion) in 2024.[5]

Exhibit A2


Growth in mass individual giving through digital platforms

Annual giving through digital platforms in China
CNY billion ($ billion)



Source: 2014–22 data from Yang Tuan and Zhu Jiangang, eds., *Annual Report on China's Philanthropy Development 2024* (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), March 2025); 2023–24 data from Institute for Philanthropy Tsinghua University, and YiSHAN Data, *Giving China 2024* (Beijing, April 2, 2025), and *Giving China 2025* (Beijing, January 29, 2026).

Annual giving through the Ehsan platform in Saudi Arabia
SAR billion ($ billion)



Source: Ehsan National Platform for Charitable Work, "Statistics Dashboard," accessed July 2026.

Saudi Arabia's path has been government-enabled under the leadership of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since the launch of Vision 2030, the national policy framework, in 2016, at least six digital giving platforms have been established, including sector-specific and mission-focused platforms, to collect financial donations. Two examples are Shefaa (health sector) and Jood Eskan (housing provision for low-income families).[6] The largest platform by giving volume is the National Platform for Charitable Work (Ehsan), which was launched in March 2021 and reached total annual giving of SAR 4.2 billion ($1.1 billion) by 2024.[7] The intent was for the government to incubate digital platforms and for non-profit sector actors to operate them independently in the longer term. An example of this is Jood Eskan, a housing-focused donation platform initiated by the Development Housing Foundation (Sakan), which now operates as an independent non-profit arm of the Ministry of Municipalities and Housing.[8]

Giving through these platforms is dominated by ordinary citizens, as indicated by the scale of participation and an average donation as low as $8.20–$12.26 in both jurisdictions. By the end of 2024, China's 29 designated platforms had facilitated more than 60 billion charitable donation transactions from citizens.[9] Tencent's 99 Giving Day campaign alone generated 700 million public interactions and nearly 46 million donations in 2024.[10] The average donation amount was about CNY 58 ($8.20) on 99 Giving Day in 2023. This is a similar figure to the Ehsan platform, which recorded an average donation of SAR 46 ($12.26) per transaction in 2024.[11]

Enabling conditions

In both jurisdictions, two conditions have ensured the success of digital mass individual giving.

First, high smartphone and digital payment penetration. In 2015, when Tencent launched its 99 Giving Day initiative, smartphone penetration was estimated at 73 percent nationally and above 90 percent in many cities, with 358 million mobile payment users nationwide.[12] In the same year, Weixin, Tencent's flagship instant messaging application and the largest of its kind in China, had 697 million monthly active users, and more than 200 million users had connected their Weixin accounts to their bank accounts for mobile payments.[13] By December 2025, mobile payment users had reached 1.02 billion, covering over 70 percent of the total population.[14] Saudi Arabia also recorded high levels of digital adoption, with about 92 percent smartphone penetration in 2024. In that year, nearly 80 percent of all retail payments were electronic, according to the Saudi Central Bank.[15]

Second, a foundation of trust that giving platforms could leverage. In China, trust was rooted in the broader advancement of social credit and civic norms in society, driven by economic, technological, governance, and cultural development.[16] This environment, together with user familiarity in digital payment platforms such as Weixin and Alipay, facilitated large-scale public participation in digital donations. In Saudi Arabia, citizens have a high level of trust in the state.

In the 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer, for example, 89 percent of respondents in Saudi Arabia said that they trusted their government "to do what is right", the highest of 28 countries surveyed.[17]

Lessons learned

1. **The best starting point is where reach and trust already exist.** Jurisdictions with existing digital infrastructure, payment systems, and mass user bases can leverage these rapidly to increase mass individual giving. Where these platforms are community- or market-led, states can partner with them. Where platforms do not yet exist but there is a high level of trust in government, a state-first approach that embeds governance into the initial platform design may be preferred.

2. **Thoughtful user experience design makes it fast, convenient, and fun for ordinary citizens to give.** Saudi Arabia's Ehsan has made it easy and fast to donate—within 10 seconds—through a smartphone app, which has encouraged broad participation. For example, its April 2024 Ramadan campaign achieved more than one million individual donations within 24 hours, setting a new Guinness World Record.[18] In addition to speed and convenience, Chinese internet platforms have made philanthropy a fun experience in daily life by enabling users' actions, such as liking a post or donating physical steps, to lead to actual donations. Actual donations are typically achieved through corporates and their foundations matching funds to specific behaviours (for instance, the number of steps and likes) according to a preset ratio. This approach is known as behavioural philanthropy.[19] For example, in 2016, Alipay's charity platform launched Ant Forest, which converts daily user behaviours, such as walking, using public transit, or opting for paperless tickets, into virtual green energy points. Once enough points have been collected, a virtual tree is generated in the app, and Ant Group and its partners plant a real tree in arid regions. By 2025, Ant Forest reported 700 million users adopting low-carbon lifestyles and planting 600 million real trees.[20] A 2023 report indicated that 19 philanthropy platforms in China had adopted behavioural philanthropy practices.[21]

3. **Digital platforms can strengthen trust through greater transparency and disclosure.** Digital tracking of contributions gives donors more granular transparency.[22] These platforms also raise disclosure standards for charitable organisations through their requirements of use and complementary training in financial management and compliance. Ehsan's artificial intelligence (AI)-driven eligibility verification draws on consolidated government databases to identify and prioritise demand for resources, further reinforcing confidence that resources go to those who need them.

4. **Digital giving can be a gateway to other forms of philanthropic participation.** The value of mass digital giving lies as much in the donation as in the promotion of a culture of volunteering and care for communities. For example, Saudi Arabia's National Volunteering Portal is integrated with the national identity system and extends the Ehsan giving infrastructure into documenting volunteer hours. This portal, launched in 2020, helped achieve Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 volunteering target ("rally one million volunteers annually") well in advance, with 1.7 million volunteers contributing a total of 59 million hours in 2024.[23] The Digital Care Platform, piloted by Tencent Sustainable Social Value Organization (Tencent SSV), also moves beyond cash giving by individuals. As a digital matching mechanism, it connects local needs with available philanthropic resources, mobilising resources from corporates, local merchants, or residents. Through electronic vouchers, monetary cards, and other digital assistance tools, the platform enables non-monetary giving, including meals and medical services for the elderly, support for children with cancer, community inclusion services for people with autism, local merchant discounts and donated goods, and other giving to underserved populations. This optimises the flow of resources to and within grassroots communities.[24]

5. **Governance and regulatory infrastructure are critical to safeguard practices and trust.** China's Charity Law established sector-wide standards for fund management and strengthened trust among citizens. It requires charitable organisations to conduct online fundraising only on platforms designated by China's Ministry of Civil Affairs—both online fundraising service platforms and websites of organisations with public fundraising qualifications. In Saudi Arabia, Ehsan's integration with government databases was designed to reduce the chance of funds being misused. Its governance structure includes oversight by a supervisory committee with members from various government entities and ministries, which houses five multi-ministerial sub-committees. These committees collaborate on a range of functions, such as approving the platform's strategy, managing budgets, ensuring *Shariah* (the holy laws of Islam) compliance, conducting security audits, and setting eligibility controls for donations.[25]

Future directions

Three frontiers are emerging in China and Saudi Arabia to further leverage digital platforms.

The first is a shift from everyday volunteering to professional capability-sharing. Saudi Arabia's platform is already linked to the national identity system, creating a foundation for matching professionals and their capabilities to social needs, thereby enhancing the value of volunteering.

The second is the use of digital platforms to enhance community-level communication among villagers, local governments, and other social organisations. For instance, the Tencent Foundation worked with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs to create the Shanzhimei grassroots digital platform, which enables residents to engage in village affairs.[26] In Sichuan, the platform has reduced the processing time for village matters by 65 percent, decreased repetitive administrative tasks by 40 percent, and increased public satisfaction to 92.3 percent.[27]

Third, the influence of digital giving on other philanthropy models. The Digital Care Platform already channels in-kind resources such as home appliances or services, as noted above. Core corporate capabilities can be matched in the same way. For example, Lalamove, a logistics company, recently launched the Transportation Capacity Care Card, standardising its logistics services so that eligible disadvantaged people can book logistics services directly on the Digital Care Platform.[28] Digital transparency, machine-learning needs assessments, and real-time reporting may ultimately make digital infrastructure a common layer across different philanthropy models.

2. Community-led: Self-help groups

Why this playbook matters

This playbook introduces self-help groups (SHGs), a leading form of community architecture in rural India, providing an organised, legible structure for the self-empowerment of rural households, which are often difficult to reach at the last mile. SHGs have the dual benefit of transforming the relationship between communities and both state and market actors, and enabling community-led philanthropy. The structured savings-and-credit system and shared socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds strengthen social cohesion, trust, and mutual care. Frequently, this organically extends beyond the original savings-and-credit mandate to include community-led philanthropy, where SHG members donate time and money to support community care and resilience, most visibly during crises and disaster responses.

Overview of SHGs in India

As community architecture, mature SHGs in India strengthen connections between rural women and both state and market. For governments, SHGs serve as last-mile distributors, frontline facilitators, accountability auditors, and even formal contractors. For example, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, trained SHG women audit the country's flagship rural employment programme across all village councils, uncovering irregularities worth ~INR 233 crore (~$28 million) a year.[29] In Odisha, Mission Shakti has integrated women's SHGs into public service delivery, delivering nearly INR 5,000 crore ($600 million) in government procurement and service contracts including supplying uniforms and midday meals to government schools, supplying meals to hospitals, managing fair price shops, and maintaining ~10,000 km of rural roads across the state.[30]

SHGs also enable rural producers to engage with markets on terms that would not be possible for individuals, underpinning some of India's largest cooperatives and farmer producer companies. In Maharashtra, for example, women-led producer collectives processing pulses, millets, and other crops recorded a turnover of more than INR 75.93 crore ($9.1 million).[31] In Bihar, more than 33,000 SHG households supply milk to the state dairy cooperative, recording a 33.41 percent increase in net dairy income. Trained women known as *Pashu Sakhis* also provide doorstep veterinary care, helping to maintain a reliable dairy supply chain.[32]

As a philanthropic model, SHG members go beyond programme mandates to contribute time, cash, and in-kind resources towards community care. These contributions are most evident during crises and disaster response. SHGs are India's largest and most trusted rural emergency network. For example, during the 2018 Kerala floods, the SHG network of more than four million women operated community kitchens, supported relief camps, cleaned nearly 200,000 flood-affected houses, rehabilitated almost 39,000 families, distributed more than 35,000 meals and food packets, and contributed INR 11.18 crore ($1.6 million)

to the state relief fund.[33] When Odisha was hit by Cyclone Fani in 2019, around seven million SHG women helped evacuate more than 1.2 million people. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020, women in these groups ran community kitchens serving more than 45,000 people daily.[34] Nationally, the SHG-led COVID-19 response became one of the largest women-led civic mobilisations in history. SHGs produced about 20 million masks, 5,000 personal protective equipment (PPE) kits, and 115,000 litres of liquid sanitiser.[35] SHG members contribute beyond savings and credit mandates towards community care despite coming from economically vulnerable households, and time volunteered is often in lieu of time spent on wage labour. These contributions are not currently tracked at the national or state level, but we estimate that they amount to at least INR 2,010 crore ($241.2 million) in cash and 11.9 billion volunteered hours annually.[36]

By the end of 2025, more than 100 million women in rural areas had organised into over nine million SHGs, federated with more than half a million village organisations and 33,590 cluster-level federations.[37] Membership covers close to one in every two rural households, with the programme continuing to expand in coverage and scope.[38]

Enabling conditions

Three conditions enabled India's SHGs to succeed.

First, India had strong community-based organisations, which piloted and de-risked the SHG model before the state scaled it nationally. Community organisations such as the Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency (MYRADA) and Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN) piloted the organisation of rural women into small savings-and-credit groups in as early as the 1980s as an alternative to exploitative moneylenders, proving that poor women could save, repay loans, and effectively self-govern.

Second, a pre-existing rural banking infrastructure incentivised and institutionalised the banking of previously unbanked women. The SHG–Bank Linkage model worked because India had: (1) a dense network of rural branches; (2) the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), a development bank to anchor and de-risk the programme for commercial public and private banks; and (3) priority-sector lending norms that made these banks receptive to serving rural women.

Third, long-term, multi-actor financing from the Government of India and several development partners (notably World Bank adaptable programme loans) allowed for institution-building across successive phases as the SHG mandate expanded its scope while simultaneously scaling the model nationally.

Lessons learned

1. **Trust and financial discipline within SHGs were built before introducing external credit.** SHGs were organised into members from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Internal savings and credit activities built savings and repayment discipline while building pooled capital with collective accountability. Formal credit was introduced only once a SHG had been active for at least six months, and had demonstrated adherence to the Panchasutra—the five SHG foundational principles of regular meetings, regular savings, internal lending, timely repayment, and up-to-date books of accounts. SHGs also had to pass a state-prescribed grading assessment.

2. **A three-tiered, federated architecture across administrative and economic clusters enabled scale.** In India, federating SHGs of 10–20 women into village organisations with 10–20 SHGs which, in turn, federate into cluster-level federations of 15–25 village organisations, gave small groups the aggregate scale to negotiate with banks, hold state and market procurement contracts, run audits, and manage public funds.

3. **Credit linkage was anchored in a public apex institution that de-risked and standardised lending for mainstream banks.** The government scaled the SHG–Bank Linkage Programme and anchored it at NABARD. NABARD's core role was to de-risk and standardise SHG lending for mainstream banks: it set the operating guidelines within the Reserve Bank of India's priority-sector framework, provided refinance to participating banks, and funded programme promotion and capacity-building on both sides. This made collateral-free lending to poor rural women viable for commercial and cooperative banks, and created access to mainstream, previously inaccessible capital.

4. **Autonomous, professionally staffed entities enabled quality programme delivery.** The Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India set up the National Rural Livelihoods Mission (NRLM, now DAY–NRLM) and parallel state-level State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs) as autonomous bodies to own the SHG mandate. These bodies were set up as registered societies with independent CEOs and contractual specialists with long tenures. This insulated them from typical shorter-term administrative postings and transfers, and enabled them to pursue multi-year strategies.

Future directions

To achieve Viksit Bharat 2047, the government has set out three directions for SHGs to evolve from primarily being poverty-alleviation and micro-savings mechanisms to being stronger drivers of rural entrepreneurship.

First, policy is increasingly oriented towards helping SHG women move from vulnerable, subsistence livelihoods into more sustainable, higher-income enterprises. In the Ministry of Finance's Interim Budget 2024–25, the government increased the target under the Lakhpati Didi initiative from 20 to 30 million women. The programme aims to enable an SHG woman to reach a household income of at least INR 100,000 ($1,200) annually on a sustainable basis through diversified farm, non-farm, and service-sector livelihoods.[39] Support includes livelihood planning, skills and entrepreneurial capacity development, finance, technology, market access and value-chain linkages. Separately, the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises' Udyam Assist Platform facilitates the registration of informal micro-enterprises, including eligible enterprises operated by SHG members. This supports a pathway to formalisation by creating access to priority sector lending benefits, government tenders, and institutional credit guarantees.

Second, SHG systems are becoming increasingly digitised, allowing group records to be used more effectively by both community institutions and lenders. NABARD's e-Shakti began as a pilot for digitising SHG financial and non-financial records, improving bookkeeping and enabling banks to make more informed credit decisions through a management information system. Alongside e-Shakti, DAY–NRLM and state livelihoods missions are developing wider digital systems for livelihood planning, monitoring and financial inclusion. These systems can improve the availability of information for programme management and lending decisions and support the broader integration of rural women into the formal digital economy.

Finally, SHGs are taking on more leadership roles in local governance, agricultural value chain development, and overall rural economic growth. This aligns with the policy framing of NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog, the apex public-policy think tank to the Government of India, and DAY–NRLM's framework, which emphasise a shift from "women's empowerment" to "women-led development".[40]

Note: This playbook focused on rural India's experience, but it is worth noting that other Commission jurisdictions have their own forms of community-group based approaches relevant to and emerging from their unique domestic contexts. For example, in Singapore, "ground-up groups", groups of individuals who voluntarily come together to carry out a self-organised project or initiative to benefit the community, aim to implement innovative, sustainable solutions for vulnerable communities by leveraging mutual-help and self-help.[41] Temasek Foundation's OSCAR Fund is a micro-philanthropy fund that supports these ground-up initiatives. This is an extension and expansion of an earlier version of the fund, the oscar@sg fund, previously administered by Temasek Trust. Since 2020, OSCAR has supported more than 420 projects, mobilised over 3,000 volunteers, and reached over a million beneficiaries.[42] As added support to nurture more community-led innovations, the government has recently launched a SGD 50 million ($39.1 million) SG Partnerships Fund to support ground-up initiatives and help them build sustained capabilities and impact.[43]

3. Faith-based: Active *zakat* coordination and institutionalisation

Why this playbook matters

Zakat mal, commonly referred to as *zakat*, is obligatory giving under Islamic law for the purpose of alleviating poverty by redistributing income.[ii] *Zakat* has deep cultural and historical roots in Muslim communities. This playbook addresses the coordination and institutionalisation of *zakat* by governments, unlocking benefits from both formal and informal approaches to its collection and distribution.

The development of formal, licensed institutions that adhere to professional standards is a common approach to institutionalisation. This creates opportunities for more strategic and large-scale aggregation and programming, which can complement more localised grassroots ecosystems that tend to provide immediate relief. While the ideal approach and extent of institutionalisation differ across jurisdictions, a common objective could be for formal institutions and grassroots actors to each contribute effectively to national priorities, leveraging their complementary strengths.

Overview of *zakat* coordination and institutionalisation in Indonesia

Indonesia's coordination and institutionalisation of *zakat* giving is one example of a jurisdiction cultivating its Islamic philanthropy model, which other jurisdictions may want to reflect upon. Indonesia regulates and manages *zakat mal* together with several other types of Islamic giving, including *infak* and *sedekah* (voluntary donations and alms), *zakat fitrah* (mandatory giving at the end of Ramadan), *qurban* (sacrifice during Eid al-Adha), and other types of religious social funds. In this playbook, *zakat* refers to all these types of giving.

In Indonesia, regulatory frameworks introduced in 1999 and 2011 established a dual institutional system to manage *zakat* giving, anchored by Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS), the national *zakat* authority and state collector, and Lembaga Amil Zakat (LAZ), licensed non-state institutions that are formally registered but initiated by the community.[44] These organisations, accountable to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, must meet certain professional management standards, such as submitting audited reports.[45] The national and provincial versions of these organisations aggregate large-scale *zakat* funds, and create strategic programmes that support national missions, including community-empowerment initiatives focused on long-term livelihood outcomes for poverty alleviation.[46]

On the other hand, grassroots actors, such as *zakat* committees in mosques, *mushollas* (places for prayer), and residential neighbourhoods benefit from strong local trust and their proximity to communities. This makes them a

ii According to Islamic law, all Muslims are required to pay 2.5 percent of their total wealth (for investment or commercial purposes) as *zakat mal* if their net wealth exceeds a minimum threshold over a full lunar year.


natural preference for some donors and gives them a deep understanding of communities' needs that helps them deliver assistance in a timely and context-specific manner.[47] BAZNAS has been bridging grassroots actors and the formal system through outreach and the registration of Unit Pengumpul Zakat (UPZ, *zakat* collection units attached to BAZNAS), with more than 40,000 mosque UPZs and 12,500 village or *kelurahan* (urban village) UPZs as of August 2025.[48] This represents considerable progress, but achieving comprehensive coverage is still a work in progress.

These efforts led to a total reported *zakat* collection of IDR 44.7 trillion ($2.7 billion) in 2025, according to official BAZNAS statistics (Exhibit A3), representing an annual growth rate of 28 percent since 2019.Of the total, formal collection accounted for 27 percent of giving in 2025.[49] Informal channels accounted for the larger share of reported collection, reflecting the scale of grassroots activity. However, reported figures still understate donations channelled through informal networks or given directly to beneficiaries.

Exhibit A3

Growth in reported *zakat* collection in Indonesia driven by coordination and institutionalisation efforts

Annual reported *zakat* collection in Indonesia
IDR trillion ($ billion)



Note: Informal collection amounts are based on "off-balance sheet" data.
Source: National Board of Zakat of the Republic of Indonesia (BAZNAS), *National Zakat Management Reports*, 2020–2025.

More recently, in 2026, the Ministry of Religious Affairs partnered with the Commission on Asian Philanthropy to understand the full scale and patterns of Islamic giving, including *zakat*, to inform policy guidance on the allocation of resources and the strategy for developing the different types of actors. The investment in this effort signalled the commitment of the government to data-driven policymaking. A national public survey of 8,360 respondents was conducted between January and February 2026, and an institutional survey is planned for the second half of 2026. The public survey results indicate that the true scale of *zakat* could have been as much as IDR 309.5 trillion ($18.8 billion) in 2025, substantially more than the reported collection figure of IDR 44.7 trillion ($2.7 billion) shown in Exhibit A3.[iii] More comprehensive reporting and a refined approach to leveraging grassroots actors are among the key opportunities the public survey findings point to for advancing coordination and institutionalisation.

Enabling conditions

Three aspects of the Indonesian context have enabled the scale and growth of *zakat* giving in both its informal and institutional forms.

First, a tradition of community reciprocity and faith-based community philanthropy is deeply rooted in Indonesia's Muslim population, which accounts for about 87 percent of the country's overall population.[50] *Gotong royong*, which translates roughly as "mutual cooperation", is grounded in values of communal reciprocity, trust, social obligation, and spiritual belonging. It is widespread in Indonesia, reinforcing faith-based practices.[51]

Second, broadened religious engagement from the 1970s onwards was driven in part by university-based Islamic movements.[52] Muslim student groups developed structured forms of *dakwah* (religious outreach and education), leveraging campus-based mosques as key settings, which encouraged more intensive engagement with religion among educated Muslims.[53] As these individuals progress in their careers to more influential positions in society, they contribute to wider adoption of religious practices, including philanthropy, in everyday life.

Third, the strength and size of Indonesia's community-led organisations, which were active long before the enactment of formal *zakat* laws in the late 1990s, are significant. For instance, mass organisations Muhammadiyah (MU), founded in 1912, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926, have long acted as welfare institutions for local communities, managing *zakat* and providing social services.[54] Subsequently, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis led to widespread social needs and prompted the creation of community-led Islamic charitable organisations in response, such as Human Initiative and Rumah Zakat Indonesia.[55]

iii The figure of IDR 309.5 trillion is different from the total reported in finding 3 of the interim report as it excludes *waqf*, Islamic endowments, which is often managed separately to *zakat* in Indonesia.

Lessons learned

1. **A more patient and tailored approach is needed to engage with culturally rooted grassroots intermediaries.** Influencing community-embedded practices with long histories will take time and intentional effort. While the 2011 law concerning *zakat* management requires licences for organisations to manage *zakat*, Indonesia does not penalise non-licensed grassroots actors, giving them space and time to adjust while continuing to add value to the system.[56] In parallel, the UPZ registration mechanism provides a structure for grassroots actors to work with the formal ecosystem, but as collectors only, with simpler organisational and reporting requirements.[57] Continuous efforts are also underway to improve engagement approaches, an area that the upcoming institutional survey will explore.

2. **Including both state and community-based institutions in the design of the formal ecosystem draws on their distinct strengths.** Through its data consolidation, BAZNAS, the state-established regulator and manager for *zakat*, contributes to a national view of the scale of *zakat* collections.[58] It also plays a role in monitoring the quality of *zakat* management through instruments such as the National Zakat Index, a composite tool that assesses the governance, operational performance, and socioeconomic impact of BAZNAS and LAZs in Indonesia.[59] LAZs, drawing on their community networks and shorter decision-making chains, play a key role in driving innovation in *zakat* management through their agility, pioneering practices such as digital platforms, corporate partnerships, and *zakat*-linked investment models. For example, Dompet Dhuafa partnered with iPaymu, a digital payment platform, to introduce mobile QR codes for *zakat* collection in 2014, a pioneering move at the time. Others introduced similar mechanisms in the following years, including BAZNAS in 2017, LAZISNU in 2019, and others.[60] LAZs have also continued to evolve digital collection innovations. For example, Rumah Zakat started to offer cryptocurrency-based donation and *zakat* services in 2025.[61] Dompet Dhuafa also partnered with Maybank Indonesia to enable automated recurring *zakat* payments via linked bank accounts.[62]

3. **State-established institutions are well positioned to bridge and coordinate with government efforts on a national scale.** BAZNAS has introduced several flagship national initiatives prioritising poverty alleviation. One example is the ZMart programme, which supports micro-retail businesses operated by *mustahik* (*zakat* beneficiaries) in urban areas through capital assistance and capacity building. Between 2023 and 2025, ZMart supported 4,588 beneficiaries, achieving key outcomes such as 224 participants becoming *muzaki* (*zakat* contributors), 653 surpassing the *had kifayah* (minimum living standard), and 734 rising above the national poverty line.[63] BAZNAS also works alongside government-led programmes. Under the government's

People's School (*Sekolah Rakyat*) programme, some participating families living in uninhabitable housing face difficulties in accessing government housing assistance because their homes are built on land they do not own. BAZNAS addresses this gap by leveraging *zakat* funding to finance housing renovations for these households.[64]

Future directions

The Ministry of Religious Affairs aims for continuous performance and coordination improvements across the ecosystem. For formal institutions, a key focus is the development of the capacity and professionalisation of *amil* (*zakat* administrators). With only around 6 percent of Indonesia's approximately 12,000 *amil* certified in 2025, the ministry recently introduced programmes aimed at strengthening the technical and managerial capabilities of *amil*.[65]

For actors operating outside formal reporting structures, strengthening linkages and engagement is a priority. One current area of focus is increasing the number of UPZs by simplifying the regulatory and administrative requirements for their establishment.[66] This could help expand coverage of *zakat* collection across communities. The upcoming institutional survey, conducted as part of the partnership between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Commission on Asian Philanthropy, will focus on grassroots actors with the aim of generating insights to inform how the government can better engage with them and harness their contribution.

More broadly, improving coordination across philanthropy models to maximise their contribution to national priorities remains an ongoing priority. Professor Dr Waryono Abdul Ghafur, Director of Zakat and Waqf Empowerment at the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, said in the public survey press release, "Indonesia possesses enormous potential in Islamic philanthropy. Our challenge is to ensure that this potential is managed more effectively so that it can generate greater impact in poverty reduction, community economic empowerment, education, and humanitarian assistance."[67] This aligns with the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS), which aims to strengthen coordination between philanthropy and government efforts in support of Golden Indonesia 2045, the country's long-term national development vision.

4. State-led: State-affiliated institutions

Why this playbook matters

Population-level, cross-cutting challenges such as poverty alleviation, climate change, and ageing populations require coordinated action across multiple ministries and sectors. State-affiliated institutions can play a key role in mobilising and coordinating public and private resources towards these national development priorities. Government affiliation gives these institutions authority and legitimacy to work across organisational silos and coordinate national priorities.

State-affiliated institutions are present in many jurisdictions across Asia and therefore this may be one of the most relevant playbooks for cross-learning across the region.[iv]

Overview of state-affiliated institutions in China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates

State-affiliated institutions in China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (henceforth referred to as the UAE) offer examples of how these institutions add value to development efforts. China's example demonstrates how these institutions mobilise substantial amounts of private resources primarily from corporates, leveraging the institutions' legitimacy derived from government affiliation. Thailand's ThaiHealth is an example of a state-affiliated institution that addresses population-level outcomes through effective public health promotion. The UAE's institutions show how place-based models aggregate and channel philanthropic resources based on a deep understanding of community needs.


In China, state-affiliated institutions with a philanthropic purpose are known as government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). They are key actors in Chinese philanthropy, aggregating a total of CNY 64.6 billion ($9.0 billion) in donations in 2024, which was 49 percent of total donation income by philanthropic organisations (Exhibit A4). Initially, these organisations primarily relied on government-administrative fundraising and donations from outside of the Chinese Mainland but have gradually shifted towards leveraging general government endorsement to attract corporate and individual donations both locally and abroad.[68] For example, the China Foundation for Rural Development (CFRD) voluntarily withdrew from government funding in 2000, and in 2024, most of its donations came from non-government sources, primarily corporates.[69]

iv Other jurisdictions in Asia have state-affiliated institutions. India's NRLM and SRLMs (national and state rural livelihood missions), registered as state-established societies, are examples shared in the main report and in Playbook 2 of this annex. The UAE has more types of state-affiliated institutions, in addition to the place-based institutions covered in this playbook. Some jurisdictions have faith-based versions of these institutions, such as BAZNAS in Indonesia discussed in Playbook 3 of this annex, and State Islamic Religious Councils in Malaysia.

Exhibit A4

Approximately half of all giving to organisations are channelled through GONGOs in China

Annual giving by types of organisation recipients in China
CNY billion ($ billion)



Note: No earlier data with this breakdown is available prior to 2023.
Source: Institute for Philanthropy Tsinghua University, and YiSHAN Data, *Giving China 2024* (Beijing: Tsinghua University, April 2, 2025), and *Giving China 2025* (Beijing: Tsinghua University, January 29, 2026).

Funds facilitated by GONGOs often complement fiscal budgets by innovating models for national missions. CFRD collaborated with county-level governments to pilot the development of tourism in selected villages in line with China's national mission of rural revitalisation. In this initiative, CFRD is responsible for homestay construction and the training of local talent, while county-level governments match funds for basic infrastructure improvements. As of December 2025, the project had raised CNY 0.4 billion ($53.3 million) in donations, with CNY 1.4 billion ($210.4 million) in government matching funds. It also mobilised CNY 0.8 billion ($115.6 million) in private capital and investment by local residents, resulting in a total of CNY 2.5 billion ($379.3 million). Together, these funds have benefited approximately 230,000 people across 50 villages in 17 provinces.[70]

In Thailand, state-affiliated institutions for philanthropic purposes are called autonomous public organisations (APOs), which were set up by the 1999 Public Organisation Act.[71] One successful example is ThaiHealth, established by the Health Promotion Foundation Act in 2001 with a dedicated 2 percent excise tax surcharge on tobacco and alcohol.[72] Since its establishment, ThaiHealth has on average collected THB 4.2 billion ($130.7 million) annually.[73]

ThaiHealth has contributed to national efforts to reduce population health risks by playing two distinct roles.

First, it coordinates and facilitates multi-stakeholder efforts across sectors. As part of its anti-smoking effort, ThaiHealth funded and coordinated networks of researchers, advocates, schools, and local governments to support smoke-free public campaigns, warning labels, and advertising restrictions. It has played similar role in other public health issues, including alcohol consumption, road safety, sugar-sweetened beverages, and mental health. Over the 20 years following the act (2001–21), ThaiHealth's efforts contributed to reducing smoking among the adult population from 25 percent to 17 percent and the prevalence of alcohol drinking in adults decreased from 33 percent to 28 percent.[74]

Second, it acts as a mediator between the government and private sectors to support policy reform, leveraging its government relationships and its relatively neutral positioning when engaging with the private sector. In the case of Thailand's tax on sugar-sweetened beverages, it brokered negotiations between the finance ministry, food regulators, the World Health Organization, academic researchers, and the food and beverage industry. The parties agreed on a phased implementation of the tax, which contributed to a decline in per capita sugar consumption from 27.0 teaspoons to 25.4 teaspoons daily between 2016 and 2022.[75]

Finally, in the UAE, place-based, state-affiliated institutions at the emirate level aggregate and channel philanthropic resources towards locally identified priorities. The Authority of Social Contribution (Ma'an) is the Abu Dhabi government's official platform for receiving and deploying social contributions.[76] Dubai established JOOD, the Dubai Community Contributions Establishment, in 2024, under the Community Development Authority to perform the same function.[77]

These platforms aggregate contributions from multiple sources, including corporates, high-net-worth individuals, and *awqaf* (Islamic philanthropic endowments).[78] They deploy the contributions across defined social priority areas. To incentivise corporate participation, Ma'an offers contributors tax deductions through partnerships with Qualified Public Entities, a recognition under the National In-Country Value programme, and additional points in government procurement processes.[79] What distinguishes these institutions from other philanthropic intermediaries is their close integration with emirate-level government departments responsible for understanding community needs. Ma'an is guided by the priorities set out by the Department of Community Development, which conducts regular quality-of-life surveys to identify social priorities across various population segments.[80] It provides Ma'an with data-informed insights for directing contributions towards areas of greatest need. This demand-side intelligence, combined with the platform's commitment to transparency, gives corporate and individual contributors confidence that resources are directed towards validated community needs.

Enabling conditions

In China and Thailand, a broader environment of government reform created the space for these institutions to emerge. In China, GONGOs were a direct product of institutional reform following the 1978 decision to open up the economy.[81] They were established under the sponsorship of government departments within the broader regulatory framework.[82] Over subsequent decades, de-administration reforms post-2000 progressively separated GONGO staff and finances from government,[83] and the 2016 Charity Law established the most comprehensive legal framework to date, moving GONGOs onto a regulated, but more autonomous, footing, providing the foundation for today's operating model. In Thailand, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis exposed the limitations of centralised bureaucratic responses, prompting the 1999 Public Organisation Act, which initiated government decentralisation and created APOs as a legal category.[84]

In the UAE, the emirate-based federal structure is the key context for the place-based developments from which both Ma'an and JOOD emerged. Ma'an was established as part of Abu Dhabi's Ghadan 21 development plan, a three-year, AED 50 billion ($13.6 billion) initiative to enhance competitiveness.[85] Similarly, JOOD was launched as an initiative under the Dubai Social Agenda 33, which aims to build a system of social protection and empowerment, promote humanitarian work, and foster volunteering activities.[86]

Lessons learned

1. **Governance design and leadership appointment choices can balance government affiliation and independent decision-making to maximise credibility.** The value of these institutions lies in simultaneously maintaining credibility with both government and non-government actors. ThaiHealth's board is chaired by the Prime Minister, ensuring cross-sectoral authority and high-level political commitment, and eight independent experts drawn from law, education, and community development sit alongside nine ministry representatives, preventing the dominance of any single ministry's priorities.[87] China's GONGOs tend to be led by retired senior government officials, which gives the state trust and confidence in the institutional leadership while giving entities access to established political networks and policy knowledge.[88] In the UAE, Ma'an, established under the Department of Community Development (DCD), aligns its activities with DCD's strategic direction and priorities, while maintaining operational discretion over project selection and fund deployment, in cooperation with partners.[89]

2. **Clear boundaries of the institutions' mandate relative to state or ministerial mandates help avoid duplication or mission creep.** ThaiHealth illustrates this. The Ministry of Public Health retains responsibility for clinical services, national health targets, and regulatory oversight of government health infrastructure, which is beyond ThaiHealth's scope. ThaiHealth's

mandate is clearly defined as multi-sectoral health promotion, funding research networks, and brokering cross-sector negotiations on issues such as tobacco, alcohol, and diet. The Ministry treats illness while ThaiHealth helps to prevent it.[90] This boundary enables ThaiHealth to operate across ministerial silos without duplicating or encroaching on the ministry's core regulatory and service delivery functions.

3. **State-affiliated institutions can strengthen public policy by leveraging their issue-specific expertise and specialisation.** State-affiliated institutions concentrate on specific sectors, such as poverty, education, health, and the environment, and build deep expertise through sustained research, data infrastructure, and frontline implementation. Their policy recommendations, grounded in continuous investigation across economic and political cycles, carry credibility that enhances public decision making. For example, ThaiHealth's university-based alcohol and tobacco research provided the empirical foundation for the 2008 Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and the 2017 Tobacco Product Control Act.[91] In China, the China Development Research Foundation has been implementing an early childhood care intervention project in rural areas since 2015. Over the past decade, nearly 100,000 children have benefited from the project, which has spurred local governments to pay more attention to the early development of children from birth to the age of three. Bijie in Guizhou, Haidong in Qinghai, and Tibet have incorporated early childhood development into their local 14th or 15th Five-Year Plans. Guzhang County in Hunan Province has even included the funding needed for early childhood care guidance in its fiscal budget.[92] Formalising channels for this expertise to feed into policy development multiplies the entity's impact far beyond its direct spending.

4. **State-affiliated institutions are well positioned to build professional capacity in the broader philanthropic ecosystems.** For example, ThaiHealth spent its first decade investing the capacity of communities to promote health, including community organisations, non-governmental organisations, and universities, creating a strong ecosystem that is now robust enough to promote public health from an independent standpoint.[93] In the UAE, Ma'an actively supports social enterprises and local non-profits through its Ma'an Social Incubator. By providing seed funding of up to AED 200,000 ($54,460) per startup, customised technical assistance workshops, and mentorship, Ma'an helps them grow into credible partners capable of delivering innovative solutions for community development priorities.[94] These state-affiliated institutions cultivate a broader ecosystem of capable actors, multiplying impact far beyond what they could achieve through direct spending alone.

Future directions

Looking ahead, there appear to be two primary opportunities for the further evolution of state-affiliated institutions and their relevance as national priorities evolve.

The first is for state-affiliated institutions to continue strengthening their professional capabilities. Some of the larger GONGOs are leading the way as role models for the thousands of other GONGOs in China. For example, the China Women's Development Foundation and the China Red Cross Foundation have achieved full scores of 100 out of 100 in the Chinese Foundation Transparency Index, an index for self-discipline, transparency, and information disclosure.[95] The professional development of the whole sector will take more time, especially for more grassroots level GONGOs. The China Charity Federation is one of the largest networks of GONGOs. It is implementing internal capacity-building programmes especially for its local-level branches, several of which do not yet meet the criteria to be recognised as charitable organisations.[96]

The second opportunity is to demonstrate lasting impact beyond large-scale resource mobilisation. The UAE provides a clear example of this. Ma'an is actively developing outcome-based financing mechanisms, such as Social Impact Bonds and contractual agreements, that tie the deployment of contributions to measured results rather than activity volume. Demonstrating tangible, accountable change in this way could help maintain the platform's credibility.[97] In Thailand, ThaiHealth has been highly effective at controlling smoking and the consumption of alcohol and sugary drinks. It is now well placed to expand into newer, evolving, and more complex areas such as public participation as a health determinant and equality of resource accessibility.[98]

5. Corporate-led: Mandatory corporate social responsibility

Why this playbook matters

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a common form of corporate-led philanthropy, based on the principle that a company has a responsibility towards the communities where it operates. This playbook examines India's approach to mandating CSR by law, for qualifying companies. The CSR mandate applies to every company that, in the immediately preceding financial year, meets any of the following thresholds: net worth of at least INR 500 crore ($53.5 million), turnover of at least INR 1,000 crore ($107 million), or net profit of at least INR 5 crore ($0.54 million).[99] This could be most directly relevant to jurisdictions considering or expanding a CSR mandate, including Indonesia, which has an existing CSR mandate for companies conducting business in or related to natural resources under Law No. 40 of 2007, and Saudi Arabia, which has a mandate to grow its private sector under its Vision 2030.

Overview of mandatory CSR in India

In 2014, India became one of the first countries to mandate CSR.[v] Under Section 135 of India's Companies Act, 2013, qualifying companies must spend at least 2 percent of their average net profits over the three preceding financial years on approved CSR activities.[vi]

India's experience shows that a CSR mandate can mobilise private sector buy-in and giving on a national scale when designed with sufficient flexibility, institutional backing, and in partnership with the private sector. Within a decade of implementation, eligible companies had nearly tripled to more than 27,000. Zero-spending firms fell from 55 percent to 16 percent, and 56 percent of firms now exceed the 2 percent benchmark. Close to 400 firms are voluntarily contributing CSR without a legal obligation, and CSR spending reached approximately INR 34,909 crore ($4.2 billion) in the 2024 financial year (Exhibit A5).[100]

v In this playbook, an indicated year is the end year of the financial year. For example, 2014 represents the 2013–14 financial year.


vi Schedule VII permits CSR expenditure on eradicating hunger, poverty, and malnutrition; healthcare, sanitation, and safe drinking water; education, vocational skills, and livelihoods; gender equality, women's empowerment, support for orphans and senior citizens, and reducing socioeconomic inequalities; environmental sustainability, conservation, and animal welfare; national heritage, art, culture, libraries, and traditional crafts; support for armed forces, Central Armed Police Forces, and Central Para Military Forces veterans, widows, and dependants; sports; specified government relief and welfare funds; government-supported research, incubators, and public research institutions; rural development; slum-area development; disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and subscriptions to zero-coupon, zero-principal instruments on the Social Stock Exchange.

Exhibit A5

India: Growth in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending under the statutory CSR mandate

Annual corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending in India

INR thousand crore ($ billion); years denote end of financial years



Source: Government of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, "CSR Data," accessed June 2026.

Key enabling conditions

India already had a centuries-old tradition of giving, with modern institutional philanthropy emerging by the late 19th century. From as early as the 1890s, prominent business families, including the Bajaj, Birla, Godrej, and Tata families, established and supported major philanthropic institutions across education, healthcare, scientific research, and social development. India also possessed a sufficiently large, profitable corporate base. Beyond this context, India's journey to enact a meaningful 2 percent CSR mandate had three key enablers.

The first was the institutional strength of the government to own and guide implementation. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) owned the mandate, including compliance accountability and data management. The MCA was supported by its think tank, the Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs (IICA), which guided implementation through research, training and capacity building, and stakeholder convening. This dual structure provided both compliance oversight and direction setting for major corporations and industry bodies.

The second key enabler was a set of pre-existing percentage-giving precedents. In 2010, four years before the statutory mandate, the Department of Public Enterprises issued formal CSR guidelines for central public sector enterprises (CPSEs), introducing a tiered, profit-linked formula for companies.[vii] Percentage-based giving was therefore not a new concept when the 2014 mandate expanded beyond CPSEs to include all eligible companies.

The third enabler was an ecosystem of credible implementation partners that had community reach and trust. For example, a 2017 study of the 100 largest companies by market capitalisation listed on India's National Stock Exchange found that 50 percent of public-sector companies implemented CSR exclusively through agencies.[101] More recently, a 2025 sector survey found 76 percent of corporate respondents preferred working through community organisations and other implementing agencies, compared with 16 percent using CSR foundations and 8 percent conducting direct implementation.[102]

These enabling conditions guided design choices that drove national buy-in and gave India's mandate durability.

Lessons learned

1. **CSR was designed as a corporate duty to nation-building rather than a levied corporate tax.** This approach was reflected in two key decisions. The first was an iterative co-design process with extensive stakeholder consultations that secured early ownership and buy-in. The second was aligning a broad range of eligible activities with national development priorities, retaining company-level autonomy over preferred areas of investment.

2. **Compliance was phased to provide companies with the space to build internal systems.** The "comply or explain" period (2014–18) let firms that missed the annual 2 percent threshold disclose why—penalty-free—giving companies time to develop a CSR strategy, and set up teams, partnerships, and data systems.

3. **Mechanisms to protect smaller firms were built in.** First, India mandated a three-year average profit base to avoid isolated growth spurts triggering giving obligations during periods of uncertain future profits, especially for smaller firms. Second, compliance requirements were lower for smaller firms. For example, companies with a giving obligation below INR 50 lakh ($53,650) do not need a corporate board-level CSR committee. Third, procedural lapses were decriminalised and replaced with reasonable fines after industry pushback. Finally, the mandate provisioned for easy entry points to giving across eligible government funds, universities, or pooled vehicles. This helped companies with limited bandwidth for programme design and delivery.

vii The precise guidelines were 3–5 percent of profit after tax for companies earning under INR 100 crore ($10.7 million), 2–3 percent (minimum INR 3 crore [$321,900]) for those earning INR 100–500 crore ($10.7–53.5 million), and 0.5–2 percent for those earning above INR 500 crore ($53.5 million).

4. **Both compliance and community outcomes are important to provision for.** Compliance mechanisms such as audit thresholds, for instance, can risk nudging companies towards many fragmented, lower-risk projects. Yet India's three-year carry-forward provision, which lets unspent funds earmarked for ongoing projects be spent over up to three subsequent years rather than forfeited, is encouraging longer-term investments. For example, across mainboard companies of the National Stock Exchange, funds transferred to designated Unspent CSR Accounts nearly doubled in two years, from INR 1,643 crore ($208.7 million) across 1,296 companies in the 2023 financial year to INR 3,223 crore ($386.8 million) across 1,549 companies in the 2025 financial year.[103] The simultaneous rise in both the absolute amount and its share of yearly spending indicates that companies are increasingly using the provision to structure CSR as multi-year projects rather than single-year outlays.

Future directions

India continues to iterate on this playbook in a bid for continuous improvement, with two new changes. First, the Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposed raising the net profit threshold for CSR from INR 5 crore ($0.54 million) to INR 10 crore ($1.07 million), while the other criteria remain unchanged: net worth of INR 500 crore ($53.5 million) or turnover of INR 1,000 crore ($107 million). While this may result in a reduced quantity of CSR expenditure from this group, the legislation can protect small companies with low or fluctuating annual profits. Second, another legislation allowed up to 10 percent of CSR spending to flow through Zero Coupon Zero Principal instruments on India's Social Stock Exchange (SSE).[viii] The SSE's rigorous project listing and outcomes reporting criteria will enable a wider pool of implementing organisations to build trust with CSR departments and unlock funding, while companies can readily access a pipeline of verified projects for investment.

In the first decade of the law, between FY2014 and FY2024, listed companies alone cumulatively deployed INR 1.2 lakh crore ($17.5 billion), demonstrating that CSR funding can be mobilised at scale.[104]

Looking ahead to the next decade, India's focus is moving from "how much was spent" to "what changed". Official signals across 2025 and 2026 point to this shift. At the CSR Day hosted by the MCA and the IICA in October 2025, the Department of Public Enterprises called for clear objectives, measurable targets, defined milestones, and outcome evaluation to demonstrate the tangible impact of deployed CSR funding. In February 2026, the Ministry confirmed in Parliament that companies with an average CSR obligation of at least INR 10 crore ($1.07 million) must independently assess the outcome and impact of completed projects valued at INR 1 crore ($107,300) or more, reporting both CSR activities and impact assessment results in the company's annual report.

viii Zero-coupon, zero-principal (ZCZP) instruments are securities listed on the Social Stock Exchange that raise philanthropic funding for eligible non-profit organisations. Unlike conventional bonds, they pay no interest (zero coupon) and do not return the principal to investors (zero principal), making them a regulated mechanism for charitable giving rather than financial investment.

6. UHNWI-led: Community impact partnerships

Why this playbook matters

This playbook profiles Saudi Arabia's approach to curating partnerships between the government and wealthy individuals and families for projects that deliver community impact.

Saudi Arabia's experience shows how non-financial incentives, including government co-investment, credible project pipelines, and social recognition, can effectively motivate large-scale private giving from ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWIs), defined as individuals with a net worth exceeding $30 million. This is most relevant for jurisdictions seeking to learn from alternative approaches to tax incentives for cultivating UHNWI-led philanthropy.

Overview of community impact partnerships in Saudi Arabia

In 2023, the Saudi Arabian government launched the national Sakhaa ("Generosity") Program to support the community by channelling philanthropic funding from wealthy individuals into high-impact development projects. Sakhaa has an initial ambition to deliver SAR 20 billion ($5.3 billion) in development project financing within five years of implementation, setting a minimum contribution of SAR 30 million ($8.0 million).


Curation of development projects that meet real community needs is an important element of the approach. It involves more than 60 government agencies, presided over by the Minister of Human Resources and Social Development. The Community Development Agency within the ministry leverages the Heat Map Project, which shows place-specific needs and priorities informed by multiple datasets: such as a town needing a dialysis centre, a suburban area requiring a disability rehabilitation centre, a neighbourhood needing an elder community centre, or a village requiring a middle school.[105]

Government co-investment and social recognition further motivate wealthy individuals to contribute. For example, the government committing to operate health facilities over the long term once initial costs were covered by donations has reinforced trust that these projects are valuable and sustainable. Social recognition takes several forms, including a tribute from the Crown Prince, a medal named after King Salman, and honorary doctorates.[106]

By August 2023—within three months of its launch—the Sakhaa Program had delivered projects with a development value of SAR 2.7 billion ($0.7 billion).[107] By the end of 2025, it had reached a cumulative total of SAR 14.3 billion ($3.8 billion) with contributions from 38 UHNWIs (Exhibit A6), representing 154 percent of its 2025 interim target.[108] By that point, the Sakhaa Program had contributed to 63 projects (22 of which are completed), benefited more than 483,000 people, and created more than 10,000 job opportunities in coordination with 60 public and private entities.[109]

Exhibit A6

Substantial growth in cumulative project development value for the Sakhaa Program



Source: "'Sakhaa' Program Enables Benefactors to Implement Development Projects in the Kingdom's Regions at a Cost Exceeding SAR 14 Billion by the End of 2025," Saudi Press Agency, January 26, 2026; and "Sakhaa Program Contributes to Implementing SAR 2.7 bln Projects in 3 Months," *Argaam*, August 26, 2023.

Enabling conditions

A key enabler for this playbook is a substantial pool of wealthy individuals interested in philanthropic giving. In 2022, Saudi Arabia had an estimated 11,000 UHNWIs with combined wealth of about SAR 1,369.1 billion ($364.6 billion).[110] The presence of this private wealth presented an opportunity to complement public budgets in support of large-scale projects, such as infrastructure development, the need for which increased in the context of Vision 2030's ambitions.[111]

A second enabler is the government's data integration and consolidation efforts, which have enabled data-driven identification of community needs. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, which oversees the Sakhaa Program, is responsible for creating the heatmap mentioned earlier to identify priority regions lacking social protection services, an initiative under the National Transformation Plan for Vision 2030.[112] Institutional accountability reinforces these efforts: the Community Development Agency within the ministry has an explicitly stated responsibility to meet development needs across Saudi Arabia.[113]

Lessons learned

1. **Official endorsement and support at inception helped build trust and legitimacy.** The Sakhaa Program was spearheaded and supported by Saudi Arabia's political leadership, from the King and the Crown Prince to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.[114]

2. **Government co-contribution with UHNWIs as partners can accelerate project implementation and improve sustainability.** The government in Saudi Arabia brings complementary resources to projects, some of which only it can offer, to be used in conjunction with donations from UHNWIs. For example, the government provided project support in the form of enabling funds to reduce resource and administrative barriers to implementing projects, supporting feasibility studies for development opportunities, helping projects obtain legal licences, providing subsidised land free of charge, and tax and customs relief on project costs.[115] The government also committed from the outset to bear long-term operational responsibility for completed projects, providing a clear path to sustainability. For example, local health authorities are committed to operating any health facility built through the programme.

3. **Matching donors to projects aligned with their specific interests is effective in increasing willingness to contribute.** The comprehensive heatmapping of development and national priorities surfaces real demands across diverse locations and causes. This makes it possible to cater to donors' specific desires to support a certain locality or cause, which serves as an explicit consideration in the matching mechanism.[116] For example, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development signed seven memoranda of understanding under the Sakhaa Program with the Abdullah Bin Saleh Al Othaim and Sons Charities Establishment. The agreements support the development and expansion of multiple facilities across Saudi Arabia, including the Sheikh Abdullah Al Othaim Center for Liver and Organ Transplantation at King Fahd Specialist Hospital in Buraidah.[117]

Future directions

Three years since its launch, the Sakhaa Program remains in its first phase. It has already surpassed its 2025 interim target and continues to expand both the volume of giving mobilised and the scope of its supported projects.

Although the bulk of current Sakhaa projects focus on medical facility construction, identified development opportunities suggest increasing contributions to develop broader community-based infrastructure, including elderly care facilities and specialised centres offering services for people with disabilities, Down syndrome, and autism.[118] Projects are also shifting from building within government complexes to developing and expanding non-profit facilities, such as early cancer detection centres, autism centres, and organisational development centres that provide NGOs with training and operational support. These expansions indicate Sakhaa's longer-term ambition to contribute to a wider range of development priorities.

Six growth playbooks are emerging with proven potential

7. State-led: Dormant deposits

Why this playbook matters

Dormant deposits are funds held in dormant bank accounts and other eligible savings instruments that have remained unclaimed by account holders or legal heirs for a statutory period defined by law. As such, they represent a source of funding that governments can redirect towards public-benefit purposes.

Dormant deposit schemes exist in at least 10 jurisdictions around the world where funds are typically channelled via the state treasury or other government-controlled mechanisms for public good.[ix] This playbook focuses on Japan's dormant deposit system, which offers an alternative, distinctive approach by allocating resources through an independent, private intermediary for public-benefit purposes.

Overview of dormant deposits in Japan[x]

Japan enacted legislation in December 2016 (it came into force in January 2018) stipulating that bank deposits that had been inactive for 10 years or more be used to "promote public interest activities by the private sector".[119] Japan has favourable conditions for this policy: a strong savings culture and large base of financial assets, with a disproportionate share of that wealth in the hands of those aged 55 and older. A household survey conducted by the government in 2019 found that this age group held more than 70 percent of total financial assets. Deposits accounted for 60 to 70 percent of financial assets across all age groups.[120]

Japan describes dormant deposits as "public funds" that "should be returned to society" once they become dormant.[121] The legislation acknowledged that some social problems are "difficult for the national and local governments to cope with amid rapid changes expected in socioeconomic conditions, such as population decline and aging", and that therefore dormant deposits should be used for priority issues.[122] These issues include supporting children and young

ix The 10 jurisdictions include Australia, the Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

x In this playbook, unless otherwise specified, any reference to a full year refers to the start of a fiscal year.

people, assisting people who have difficulties in their daily and social lives, and addressing areas of social difficulty caused by a decline in social vitality in local communities (such as limited local job opportunities).[123] The Japan Network for Public Interest Activities (JANPIA), established in 2018 through initiatives led by the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), was selected as the Designated Utilization Organization in January 2019 to distribute the funds, recognising "the flexibility and mobility in operations that only the private sector can achieve" and the sector's "unique creativity and innovation".[124]


In 2019, the amount reserved for grants via JANPIA was JPY 67.3 billion ($0.6 billion), and this amount increased to JPY 79.8 billion ($0.5 billion) in 2024 (Exhibit A7; the decline in US dollar terms reflects the depreciation of the JPY against the USD during this period).

Exhibit A7

Trends in dormant deposit reserved for grants via JANPIA

Annual amounts of dormant deposits reserved for grants via JANPIA

JPY billion ($ billion); years denote start of fiscal years



Note: The decline in US dollar terms reflects the depreciation of the JPY against the USD during this period.
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, "Financial Statements," DICJ (FY2019–24).


Lessons learned

1. **An independent, private intermediary organisation can offer unique strengths in enabling non-governmental players to help solve social issues.** Japan's system created the Designated Utilization Organization (DUO) role that acts as both a funder and system builder to "promote privately run public interest activities".[125] At inception, a decision was made that government involvement in the utilisation of dormant deposits should be "kept to a minimum", to leverage the "ingenuity and resourcefulness of the private sector".[126] This was the context in which JANPIA was selected as the DUO to facilitate the development of innovative and scalable solutions for complex social challenges, drawing on the flexibility, creativity, and innovation of private organisations, and complementing government efforts.[127] As of April 2026, JANPIA had supported 269 projects by Fund Distribution Organizations (FDOs) and Activity Supporting Organizations (ASOs), and 1,601 projects by Implementation Organizations and other organisations engaged in public-interest activities.[128]

2. **Clarity and transparency in governance and operational structures are critical to building and maintaining public trust.** Given the nature of funds originally owned by account holders (the public) and the choice to leverage private players, a clear governance system was created from the beginning to earn public trust (Exhibit A8). The government provides the legal framework, oversight, and accountability mechanisms, while JANPIA, Fund Distribution Organizations, and Implementation Organizations play leading roles in identifying social issues and delivering solutions on the ground.[129] At the top level, the Prime Minister provides overall oversight, approving JANPIA's operating rules, the appointment of its officers, and its business plans. The Prime Minister is advised by the Council for the Utilization of Dormant Deposits sitting within the Cabinet Office, which deliberates on significant matters concerning the utilisation of dormant deposit funds and advises on the strategic direction of the scheme.[130] The Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan is the entity responsible for managing Japan's deposit insurance system. It collects dormant deposit funds from financial institutions, manages reserves for reclaims, and transfers funds to JANPIA.[131] JANPIA allocates funds and supervises FDOs, which primarily select, fund, and support the Implementation Organizations responsible for delivering projects on the ground. In addition, transparency and public disclosure were built into the system from the outset. For example, through JANPIA's website and the Dormant Deposits Utilization Platform (Kyu-Plat), information on selected organisations, funded projects, and resource allocation is made widely available to the public. The centralised digital reporting system gives the public a clear view of the entire lifecycle of projects funded by dormant deposits.[132]

Exhibit A8

The dormant deposits governance and management system



Note: The basic policy includes the significance and goals of dormant deposit fund utilisation, basic matters concerning such utilisation, related standards and procedures, and implementation of outcome evaluation. Based on the basic policy, the basic plan includes annual funding estimates, utilisation goals, standards and procedures for the selection of Implementation Organizations, FDOs, and ASOs, and outcome evaluation standards.

Source: Government of Japan, Ministry of Justice, *Act on Utilization of Funds from Dormant Deposits to Promote Privately-Run Public Interest Activities* (Act No. 101 of 2016), Japanese Law Translation; Japan Network for Public Interest Activities (JANPIA), Utilization of Dormant Deposits, PDF brochure; and Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, "Q&A Regarding the Dormant Deposit Utilization System".

3. **A more conservative approach may be warranted to reserve funds for potential reclaims, before allocating them for philanthropic purposes.** In the initial stages, when reclaim rates were unknown, a more cautious approach was adopted, with approximately half of collected funds set aside as a reserve for potential reclaims. The remaining funds were reserved for allocation to JANPIA for grants after accounting for operating expenses. In 2019, for example, the total amount of dormant deposits collected was JPY 145.7 billion ($1.3 billion). Of that total, 48 percent—JPY 70.6 billion ($0.6 billion)—was reserved for reclaim payments and 46 percent—JPY 67.3 billion ($0.6 billion)—was reserved for grants via JANPIA as philanthropy.

4. **Impact investments have the potential to crowd in private market capital and leverage market-based solutions to fill financing gaps.** In June 2023, Japan began allowing the use of dormant deposits to invest in entities promoting public-interest activities in recognition of the ability of impact investments to act as "catalytic capital for social impact".[133] Offering an alternative funding mechanism to grants is seen as a way to attract private capital while improving the efficiency of fundraising and promoting the self-reliance of organisations.[134] JANPIA can either enter into a co-investment structure in a limited partnership with at least one institutional investor, typically a bank, or invest directly in an approved FDO.[135] Announced investments include, for example, JPY 500 million ($3.3 million) in taliki Co., Ltd based in Kyoto Prefecture, with participating private-sector stakeholders such as Seibu Shinkin Bank and Ōhiro Co., Ltd.[136] The fund focuses on projects that would otherwise find it difficult to attract funds via conventional means, such as venture capital, and on investing in startups and social enterprises to address issues related to social minorities, such as economic hardship and discrimination.[137]

Future directions

JANPIA aims to develop the sector and build a pipeline of quality projects that could merit additional disbursements of the amount reserved for grants (shown in Exhibit A7). Currently, the actual grant disbursement amount each year is a portion of the reserved amount, guided by the annual ceilings set in the basic plan by the Prime Minister, and dependent on specific projects and grant proposals accepted by JANPIA (for more details, see Exhibit A8). For instance, in 2024, the amount reserved for grants was JPY 79.8 billion ($0.5 billion) and the actual disbursement was JPY 5.0 billion ($33.2 million).[138] The lower disbursement levels to start with were a deliberate choice, considering the need for implementation and evaluation systems to develop and mature, and for more high-quality projects in terms of the social outcomes they could achieve.[139]

Going forward, JANPIA plans to target three related opportunities.

First, to strengthen system-wide learning, evaluation, and knowledge sharing on topics such as social-impact evaluation, lessons learned, and the use of evidence to improve future programme design.

Second, to strengthen the capacity and diversity of ecosystem actors, including current and aspiring FDOs, Activity Supporting Organizations, and Implementation Organizations.[140] For example, JANPIA's 2025 evaluation report revealed that public relations and fundraising, accounting and bookkeeping, and opportunities for mutual learning were the most frequently requested support needs by Implementation Organizations.[141] Talent development will also target Program Officers at FDOs, who are responsible for designing and managing programmes, providing hands-on support to grantees, and coordinating resources.[142]

Third, to build on existing momentum to scale up impact investment as a funding mechanism. The value of investments for approved projects grew from JPY 0.8 billion ($5.7 million) in 2023 to JPY 1 billion ($6.6 million) in 2024, indicating trends in increasing participation.[143] A key enabler for further expansion will be increasing public acceptance of using dormant deposits for impact investment.

8. State-led: Non-profitisation of government assets

Why this playbook matters

Non-profitisation is an approach of transferring organisations or assets from government ownership to the non-profit sector. This playbook profiles the efforts in Saudi Arabia to non-profitise large assets in the education, healthcare, and culture sectors that had previously been under government stewardship.

Saudi Arabia's non-profitisation has two related aims, making it potentially relevant for other jurisdictions pursuing similar objectives.

First, it aims to improve the delivery of social and welfare services and outcomes. Choosing to non-profitise instead of retaining a traditional government model reflects the state leadership's expectation that independent, non-profit operations can "improve quality of services, efficiency, and innovation in health and education".[144] Choosing non-profitisation over privatisation reflects the belief that these sectors are core to social and welfare provision and therefore should not operate primarily under a profit-maximising structure.

Second, it seeks to expand the role and absorptive capacity of the non-profit sector. These large, professionally governed assets can deploy philanthropic resources at scale, mobilising public discretionary giving as well as endowment-based giving, such as *awqaf* from mass individuals and corporates.

Overview of non-profitisation in Saudi Arabia

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has non-profitised major assets, especially in Riyadh, including the King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Centre (KFSH&RC) and the King Saud University (KSU), which started their transition into non-profit institutions in 2021 and 2022 respectively.

Saudi Arabia leverages place-based institutions to coordinate and maximise the value of these non-profitised assets. The Royal Commission for Riyadh City (RCRC) has overall governance responsibility for all the non-profitised assets mentioned that are headquartered or located in Riyadh.[145] RCRC is mandated to manage the transfer of assets, coordinate government bodies, and oversee strategic planning for the city overall.[146] In 2024, the Riyadh Foundation was set up to "establish and manage social assets in Riyadh city" for sustainable operations as part of its role in serving the city across four key pillars: inclusiveness and empowerment, health and happiness, sustainability, and connectedness and sense of belonging.[147] For example, RCRC partnered with KSU to advance scientific studies and research to support Riyadh's long-term Sustainability Strategy, which aims to transform the city into "one of the most sustainable cities in the world".[148]

The changes in non-profit sector revenue indicate the contribution of non-profitisation. In 2024, the total revenue of the non-profit sector was SAR 73.1 billion ($19.5 billion). The key sub-sectors for non-profitisation—"education and research", "health", and "culture and recreation"—were the top three contributors, with a collective 72 percent of the total.[149] This represents an overall growth of 175 percent since 2019, when total revenues were only SAR 26.5 billion ($7.1 billion). This was largely driven by the three sub-sectors' collective revenue growth of 270 percent. Of these, revenue growth was largest in health at 857 percent.[150]

Lessons learned

1. **Non-profitisation has proven potential to deliver efficiency and other social outcome gains.** KFSH&RC is a key illustration of this. When it was non-profitised in 2021, it was charged with striving to improve efficiency and productivity, expand research, open more branches, and provide services to more people.[151] Non-profitisation gave KFSH&RC the autonomy and flexibility that it needed to optimise spending and maximise value.[152] Its delivery of services improved cost effectiveness and reduced fiscal pressure on state budgets. In 2023, KFSH&RC netted savings of SAR 6.2 billion ($1.7 billion) by, for instance, shortening inpatient stays and performing complex tests in Saudi Arabia rather than overseas.[153] In 2024, its Home Hemodialysis programme received the tech impact award at the Value-Based Health Care (VBHC) Prize for its innovation and tangible outcomes.[154] Further, KFSH&RC implemented new financial and procurement bylaws in the same year, which provided "greater flexibility in procurement processes" to reduce costs, enhance the quality of purchased goods, and help "strengthen relationships with partners".[155]

2. **Place-based coordination can facilitate partnerships to advance social outcomes.** Being part of the RCRC network provides institutional linkages to consolidate efforts to address common issues that go beyond the operations of individual organisations.[156] For example, in October 2025, KFSH&RC and KSU formed a partnership to strengthen preventive health, covering disease prevention and control as well as the exchange of scientific and research expertise.[157]

3. **Non-profitised assets can leverage more diverse funding models and philanthropic sources.** In 2023, KFSH&RC remained largely funded by the Ministry of Finance, but its funding model is expected to shift towards one based on the number of patients treated rather than a general operating budget, strengthening accountability.[158] Efforts are also underway to leverage *awqaf*, given the longevity and sustainability of such giving. The King Faisal Specialist Hospital Charity Foundation (Wareef Charity), the charitable arm of KFSH&RC, runs the Alinma Wareef Endowment Fund, the first publicly offered open-ended endowment fund in Saudi Arabia.[159] It is recognised by the General Authority for Awqaf as one of the largest endowment funds in Saudi Arabia, with assets of more than SAR 87 million ($23.2 million) in 2025.[160]

Future directions

Non-profitisation in Saudi Arabia is ongoing and expanding to more assets. In many cases, the process is in transition: for example, while KFSH&RC is owned by RCRC (as of March 2025), its leadership has stated that it will eventually transition to being "wholly owned by a foundation", which "ensures long-term sustainability and shields the hospital from external influences that could compromise its mission".[161]

The place-based development and coordination model, supported by the Royal Commission for Riyadh City and the Riyadh Foundation, could serve as an example for other cities in Saudi Arabia once the operating model matures.

9. Corporate-led: Core assets and capabilities giving

Why this playbook matters

Core assets and capabilities giving by companies, beyond cash donations, has long been present in Asia and is gaining traction in jurisdictions such as China and India. Government expectations and encouragement have reinforced this momentum. This playbook focuses on the experience of corporates in China and India, but we note that this trend is also present in other jurisdictions, including Japan (see Playbook 11) and the UAE.

Overview of core assets and capabilities giving in China and India

In both China and India, companies' core capabilities contributions are evolving to become more strategically aligned with national priorities.

In China, the government has encouraged companies to align commercial operations with national priorities to generate both economic returns and social value. In response, leading enterprises have been exploring "tri-value creation"—combining social value (for society), business value (for customers), and capital value (for shareholders). Similarly in India, the government's consistent focus on inclusive growth has prompted firms to look beyond statutory financial CSR giving to explore how to deploy business supply chains, technology stacks, and human capital to address systemic bottlenecks and accelerate inclusive growth towards the aims of Viksit Bharat.

Using examples from these two jurisdictions, six categories of core assets and capabilities, and four distinct societal outcomes emerge (Exhibit A9).

These contributions can include any combination of capabilities and assets for various societal outcomes. Here are examples that demonstrate the potential of this playbook across four societal outcomes:

1. **More inclusive businesses.** Corporations are embedding inclusivity into their value chains to empower marginalised stakeholders. In China, COFCO Group leveraged its e-commerce platform (Womai.com) to introduce consumers to 579 products sourced from 63 "national poor counties" in 27 provinces, incorporating these counties into the company's formal supply chain.[162] In India, the Tata group has transformed its group-wide employment, procurement, and skills-development capabilities into an inclusion platform through the Tata Affirmative Action Programme. Adopted in April 2007, the platform aims to "to encourage positive discrimination for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities [constitutionally recognised groups of historically disadvantaged and indigenous people] across employment, employability, entrepreneurship and education".[163] By establishing CEO-


Exhibit A9

Six categories of core assets and capabilities can contribute to four societal outcomes

Relational assets
- Supply chain partners
- Other institutional partners: government, NGOs, other industry leaders
- Public and community reach: local community relationships, residents, and customers

Intellectual and human capital assets
- Subject area expertise and knowledge
- Business expertise and knowledge, e.g. product expertise, business model development
- Professional/highly skilled people

Brand assets
- Consumer recognition, corporate reputation, brand exposure



Products and services
- Direct donation of products/services
- Adaptation of existing products/services

Physical and infrastructure assets
- Supply chain footprint
- Logistics network
- Land/property space

Technology assets
- Social media platforms
- 5G and Internet of Things
- Digital tools and applications, e.g. for operations management or conferencing

Four societal outcomes to leverage corporate assets and capabilities

1 More inclusive businesses
- Inclusive business model, e.g. sourcing
- Inclusive talent practices (hiring/employee wellbeing)
- Mitigation of environmental externalities

2 Improved last-mile access to services and products
- Availability of product and service models that address social issues
- Accessibility
- Affordability

3 Higher public awareness
- Awareness and knowledge on social issues
- Call-for-action for self care/mutual help, e.g. in elderly care, preventative health

4 Stronger philanthropy models
Improving the below for 1 or more of the 5 philanthropy models
- More funds and resources
- Quality institutions
- Quality talent
- Better coordination and supply-demand matching
- Better data visibility
- More public trust

led Affirmative Action committees within each Tata company and a Group Affirmative Action Forum to recognise performance, the Tata group has embedded inclusion into business decision-making. For example, at Tata Steel, business volume from Affirmative Action suppliers amounted to INR 254 crore ($29.2 million) in the 2026 financial year, accounting for 19 percent of addressable spending.[164]

2. **Improved last-mile access to services and products.** Companies are deploying their operational infrastructure to enhance last-mile access to services and products. In India, ITC's e-Choupal used the company's agricultural commodities supply chain and digital infrastructure to create a network of village internet kiosks. By providing more than four million farmers in 35,000 villages with real-time price information, weather updates, and agronomy advice, ITC fundamentally improved the last-mile accessibility of crucial agricultural services while linking smallholders to more efficient procurement channels.[165] In China, Fosun leveraged its network of private hospitals, medical expertise, and free insurance for doctors to develop rural doctor training and empowerment programmes. The project covered about 25,000 rural doctors in 16 provinces.[166]

3. **Higher public awareness.** In India, through its Lifebuoy soap brand, Hindustan Unilever Limited used its marketing capabilities and distribution reach to promote handwashing with soap at key moments to curb diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases, the leading causes of child mortality. The "Help a Child Reach 5" programme has reached hundreds of millions of people across India and other developing markets, embedding a public-health message into commercial brand-building rather than treating the two as separate.[167]

4. **Stronger philanthropy models.** Innovations in digital giving platforms by large technology companies such as Tencent and Ant Group (the parent company of Alipay) expanded participation in giving by ordinary citizens, strengthening the community-led model as discussed in Playbook 1. Tencent leveraged its platform capabilities to set up one of the largest digital giving platforms in China, Tencent Charity. The platform's major annual campaign, the 99 Giving Day, facilitated 700 million public interactions and nearly 46 million donations in 2024.[168] Alipay, Ant Group's third-party mobile and online payment platform, launched Ant Forest in 2016, leveraging its vast user reach and payment capabilities. Ant Forest converts daily user behaviours, such as walking, using public transit, or opting for paperless tickets, into virtual green energy points. Once enough points are collected, a virtual tree is generated in the app, and Ant Group and its partners plant a real tree in arid regions. By 2025, Ant Forest had recorded 700 million users adopting low-carbon lifestyles and had planted 600 million real trees.[169]

Lessons learned

1. **Clear government expectations can inspire momentum for companies to increase their contributions of core assets and capabilities.** National development frameworks can help firms identify the intersections of their unique capabilities with urgent public needs and national priorities. China encourages and guides private enterprises to actively contribute to the national vision of common prosperity, and to specific national development priorities such as rural revitalisation, ecological protection, and ensuring and improving people's livelihoods, providing key directions for enterprises to leverage their core strengths and create social value.[170] In response, tech giants Lenovo and Tencent (through the Tencent Foundation), and Yili, one of China's largest dairy producers, initiated the Sustainable Social Value Ecosystem in 2025 to champion core capability giving and cross-corporate collaborations for social value innovation.[171] In May 2026, this was upgraded to the Corporate Philanthropy Action Network to foster greater action orientation. It now includes more than 40 Chinese companies and organisations from diverse industries.[172]

2. **Improvements in disclosure frameworks help enable formal recognition of these contributions.** The giving of corporate capabilities is harder to quantify than cash donations. Policymakers could design reporting standards that explicitly value such giving, even if not quantifiably. In India, Business Reporting and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) is already in place as a foundational standardised framework instituted by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The framework enables companies to comply with and report business practices that create public good beyond CSR. In the 2023–24 financial year, SEBI introduced "BRSR Core", a streamlined and mandatory subset of the BRSR framework. BRSR Core introduces two central obligations: listed companies must obtain mandatory reasonable assurance on their BRSR core indicators; and they must extend disclosures and assurance to upstream and downstream value chain partners cumulatively accounting for 75 percent of the company's purchases or sales. SEBI is continuing to refine BRSR to both expand and ease reporting and compliance. By beginning to make non-monetary contributions visible to investors and regulators, BRSR points towards the kind of recognition system that the donation of capabilities and assets needs.

3. **Partnerships with government and public infrastructure facilities can make deployment of corporate capabilities more meaningful and scalable.** Local governments naturally take ownership of planning and implementation for national priorities, often through public infrastructure. Partnering with these stakeholders can significantly increase the value of corporate capability giving by contributing to larger-scale projects that align with government goals. Taikang Yicai Foundation, the charity foundation of Taikang Insurance

Group, one of China's largest insurance and healthcare groups, illustrates this in its work on community-based elderly care, a key priority of the "proactive national strategy in response to population aging".[173] The foundation had already piloted a community-based elderly care model using its healthcare and elderly-care capabilities and leveraging other corporates such as Beijing Mingyifang Hospital and Tianyuan Home to provide free healthcare services and daily life assistance.[174] The aim is to ensure that all essential services in the community are available and accessible, including housing, healthcare, rehabilitation, insurance, and social services, enabling older people to remain in the community as these needs emerge. This evolved into a project partnership with the government in Beijing as the municipal government announced plans to implement a three-tier care model, including an integrated management platform, street-level regional service centres, and service sites in the community.[175] The Taikang Yicai Foundation contributes its platform building capabilities to support street-level centres in their efforts to coordinate the supply and demand of elderly care services in the community and offers elderly care expertise in the form of capacity building for talent in government service units, accelerating the expansion of the government's service model to cover more communities.[176]

Future directions

The Corporate Philanthropy Action Network in China continues to champion the belief that greater impact can be achieved when multiple companies pool complementary competencies to jointly address systemic social challenges. A key opportunity identified by the group is to better measure and recognise assets and capabilities contributions.

Standardised valuation would help on two fronts. For multi-corporate collaboration, common metrics would provide a shared language for structuring partnerships, setting shared objectives, and assessing collective outcomes. More broadly, they would make these contributions visible to governments, investors, and the public, enabling policymakers to properly incentivise or reward contributions that are currently treated as invisible off-balance-sheet donations.

In India, SEBI continues to expand and refine the BRSR framework and mandate. In the 2026–27 financial year, this mandate is expanding to the top 1,000 listed companies—up from 500 companies in the 2025–26 financial year—while easing compliance requirements related to companies' upstream and downstream value-chain partners.[177]

10. Corporate-led: Collaboration platforms for government-linked companies

Why this playbook matters

Every jurisdiction in the Commission has companies that are partly or fully state-owned. In Malaysia—the focus of this playbook—they are called government-linked companies (GLCs) and government-linked investment companies (GLICs). These entities are natural role models for corporate philanthropy, as they are expected to serve national development goals while generating commercial returns. GLICs, as investors, can also influence the companies they back.

This playbook draws on Malaysia's experience leveraging and coordinating giving in alignment with national development goals across GLCs through the GLC Demi Rakyat dan Negara (GDRN) network, previously named The GLC/GLIC Disaster Response Network (with the same acronym, GDRN). Coordinating giving through a shared platform offers philanthropic initiatives a faster route to scale and channels resources towards agreed national priorities, expanding their reach.

Overview of collaboration platforms for GLCs and GLICs in Malaysia

Malaysia's use of GLCs for coordinated social investment began in 2004 with the launch of the GLC Transformation Programme, a performance-management and governance regime for GLCs and GLICs to instil private-sector discipline while ensuring alignment with national development priorities.[178] The Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance was established the following year to oversee its implementation.[179]

As the GLC Transformation Programme matured, the committee began building collaborative platforms for GLCs and GLICs collectively to address national priorities. One of these platforms was the GDRN, established in 2013 to coordinate relief efforts following natural disasters, such as the major floods experienced between 2013 and 2016.

In 2020 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, GDRN coordinated more than MYR 95.4 million ($22.7 million) in funding and, in under a week, developed Bantu, a digital coordination and tracking platform for aid distribution, to support the government's response.[180] The government's PERMAI economic recovery package strengthened GDRN's role through a MYR 25 million ($6.0 million) matching grant under the "Strengthening Welfare Programmes" initiative, matching contributions from GLCs and GLICs.[181]

Building on this foundation, the network was renamed GLC Demi Rakyat dan Negara in 2022 and its remit was expanded to include three pillars: education (*Jalinan Ilmu*), humanitarian response (*Jalinan Kemanusiaan*), and community wellbeing (*Jalinan Sejahtera*).[182] The Ministry of Finance continues to support GDRN through matching grants of at least MYR 100 million ($23.5 million) annually from 2024 to 2026, with additional grants provided for specific needs.[183]

By 2024, GDRN's track record positioned it to contribute to the "Raising the Floor" thrust of the Ministry of Finance's GEAR-uP Initiative (Government-Linked Enterprises Activation and Reform Programme), the social and community wellbeing dimension of the Ekonomi MADANI framework that focuses on improving Malaysians' quality of life and inclusiveness of opportunity.[184]

GDRN supports GEAR-uP as a collaboration platform: a shared mechanism through which government, GLICs, GLCs, community-based organisations, and implementation partners align their efforts around common national priorities.[185] As the scale and complexity of national challenges grow, coordinating contributions through a common platform—with shared data, tracking and reporting—enables members to pool resources and reinforce one another rather than run parallel efforts, so their combined expertise and implementation capacity achieves more than each could alone.

GDRN's role shows how a platform originally built to coordinate disaster response can evolve into a mechanism to mobilise broader GLC commitments once trust and coordination capacity have been established. The network's original humanitarian focus remains active. In late 2025, for example, Yayasan Hasanah mobilised RM 1.1 million ($0.3 million) in flood relief and recovery to communities affected by the Northeast Monsoon via the GDRN Bantu Fund, alongside two pillars added under its broadened remit.[186] Under education, members provide tuition and support for students coping with pandemic-era learning loss through Program Anak Kita.[187] Under community wellbeing, GLCs adopt villages and support their basic infrastructure and community development needs via the Kampung Angkat Madani programme.[188]

These efforts have translated into measurable reach: in 2023, 13 GDRN partners collectively contributed MYR 226.3 million ($49.7 million) across the three pillars, reaching more than 500,000 individuals, according to Yayasan Hasanah's reporting as co-secretariat.[189]


Lessons learned

1. **A co-secretariat structure offers a coordination network the flexibility to take on new mandates without building new institutions.** GDRN is jointly coordinated by Yayasan Hasanah, the foundation of Khazanah Nasional, Malaysia's sovereign wealth fund, and Yayasan TM, the foundation and corporate responsibility arm of Telekom Malaysia, as co-secretariat.[190] By drawing on existing governance, staff, and operational capacity, GDRN was able to expand its mandate quickly rather than setting up new institutions. Its evolution illustrates this adaptability and a clear arc from crisis coordination to broad-based development collaboration: from disaster response in 2013, to broader development priorities around three pillars in 2022, to a role supporting the GEAR-uP initiative's "Raising the Floor" agenda in 2024.

2. **Trust is easier to build around a shared priority.** In complex multi-actor environments, shared protocols, rapid decision-making, willingness to pool resources, and confidence in counterpart execution all depend on trust. Disaster response served as the initial shared priority—one with self-evident value and urgency, making it a natural point of alignment for the more than 20 GLCs and GLICs that had previously pursued their social initiatives largely independently. GDRN's disaster response and later pandemic-era efforts helped build trust by bringing these actors together under a shared governance arrangement. The working relationships, mutual accountability mechanisms, and shared operational protocols built through those efforts later enabled faster and more effective coordination and implementation.

3. **Matching grants are an effective lever for directing philanthropic giving towards national priorities.** As noted, the Ministry of Finance has been allocating annual matching grants of at least MYR 100 million ($23.5 million) from 2024 to 2026, with additional grants for specific priorities (one such grant was MYR 20 million [$5.0 million] to support disaster response efforts in 2026).[191] The effectiveness of matching grants was demonstrated in the collective response to floods in December 2021, when GDRN drew on the MYR 25 million ($6.0 million) PERMAI matching grant established earlier that year. This catalysed MYR 58 million ($14.0 million) in philanthropic donations within a week—equivalent to MYR 2.32 ($0.6) for every Malaysian ringgit of matching grant (Exhibit A10).[192]

Exhibit A10
Success of resource mobilisation for 2021 floods



Source: Government of Malaysia, Ministry of Finance, "RM83 mln Set Aside Through GDRN to Help Flood Victims – Tengku Zafrul," press release, December 23, 2021.

Future directions

Looking ahead, GDRN is well positioned to expand its contributions to Malaysia's national development priorities. Building on its coordination track record, opportunities exist to:

- strengthen shared outcome-measurement frameworks across partners
- deepen multi-sectoral partnerships, including with government agencies, community-based organisations, communities themselves, and other implementation partners
- expand knowledge-sharing so successful models in education and community development can inform government programmes and wider corporate-led philanthropy
- mobilise diverse forms of capital, for example, blended finance

Beyond programme delivery, GDRN's expanding scale and public remit position it to advance transparency and outcome reporting of GLC and GLIC social programmes—building on a stated GDRN goal since its 2022 renaming and mandate expansion—and to inform regional learning on collaborative, corporate-led social investment.[193]

11. Corporate-led: Corporate hometown tax

Why this playbook matters

Conventional tax incentives often adopt a broad definition of eligible donations, commonly covering donations made to any registered charitable organisation.

Japan's corporate hometown tax scheme showcases a different approach, using tax incentives to guide resources towards the national priority of regional revitalisation. The scheme retains flexibility for corporates to decide how they donate and which specific projects they wish to contribute to, but has strict requirements for donations to go towards the national priority in order to be eligible.[xi]

Overview of the corporate hometown tax in Japan

Japan's government has been consistent in its view that regional revitalisation cannot be achieved by the state alone. To address the pressures of an ageing population, a declining birthrate, and uneven regional growth, it is "necessary to utilise the power of business [private sector] towards regional revitalisation".[194] The government introduced the corporate hometown tax in 2016 to advance this goal as part of its Regional Revitalisation System that came into effect in April 2005.[195] Under the governance of the central Cabinet Office, the scheme enables businesses to partner with local governments to tailor regional revitalisation projects.

In its initial phase, corporates contributing more than JPY 100,000 ($633) to these projects received tax incentives of up to 60 percent of their donation.[196] Since 2020, available tax incentives have increased to up to 90 percent of the donated amount, including a 30 percent taxable income base deduction and 60 percent in direct tax credits.[197] These credits are applicable if donations are made to projects within a local government's regional revitalisation plan.[198] Approved by the Prime Minister, these plans typically align eligible projects with specific Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[199]

There has been a steady expansion in corporate donation amounts and participation since the scheme's launch. Between 2016 and 2024, corporate donations grew from JPY 0.7 billion ($0.01 billion) to JPY 63.1 billion ($0.4 billion), a compound annual growth rate of 74 percent (Exhibit A11). In terms of participation, the number of local governments receiving donations rose from 118 to 1,590, and the number of participating companies grew from 459 to 8,464. Notably, donation amounts grew by a remarkable 224 percent year-on-year from 2019 to 2020, reflecting the impact of the expanded tax incentives.[200]


xi In this playbook, unless otherwise specified, any reference to a full year refers to the start of a fiscal year.

Exhibit A11

Substantial growth in corporate hometown tax donations

Annual corporate hometown tax donations

JPY billion ($ billion); years denote start of fiscal years



Source: Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, Secretariat for the Headquarters for Regional Revitalization, "Results of Donations to the Regional Revitalization Support Tax System (Corporate Hometown Tax), FY2016–FY2024," Corporate Hometown Tax Portal Site, 2026.

Lessons learned

1. **Tax incentives attached to national missions have the benefit of concentrating resources where they are most needed.** Regional revitalisation has been a key policy focus of the government and has been regularly addressed in annual budgets and policy frameworks, most recently in the Cabinet's Comprehensive Strategy for Regional Revitalisation for 2025–30.[201] The corporate hometown tax was explicitly a tool to "dramatically increase" the flow of funds to local areas and strengthen regional revitalisation, as stated by the Cabinet Office.[202] Focusing tax incentives, and thus resources, on this priority provides much-needed support to realise local regional revitalisation plans approved by the national government.

2. **Tax incentives can go beyond cash donations to include other capabilities and resources.** After the initial launch, regulatory amendments broadened the forms of support eligible under the scheme. Since 2020 and 2021, companies can also contribute through employee secondments and in-kind contributions respectively, or a combination of these. Employee secondments were introduced to allow companies to temporarily deploy staff to municipalities, providing specialised expertise to support project delivery, local economic development, and community initiatives.[203]

3. **Corporate involvement in design and planning encourages more diverse and complementary usage of corporate assets and capabilities.** The government recognises the scheme's role in driving effective project development through collaboration among corporates, communities, and local governments, using both financial and non-financial means.[204] Earlier involvement in co-creation and planning shapes the extent of engagement based on regional needs and corporate capabilities, such as the nature of support and resources required. For example, transcosmos, a customer experience and digital transformation solutions company, proposed a project to Sapporo City in Hokkaido, leveraging its digital transformation expertise to address IT sector labour shortages, a need identified by the local government. The proposal eventually led to a co-created job assistance programme, where transcosmos designed and funded a training course for people with disabilities, providing training in advanced ICT skills such as creating websites and programming.[205] Moreover, in many cases, multiple corporates contributed resources towards the same regional revitalisation plan, covering different issue areas. For example, 40 corporates supported Kitahiroshima City's plan in 2024 with a total of JPY 210.4 million ($1.4 million), including automotive company Sapporo Toyota Motor's donations to support zero-carbon and traffic safety initiatives; insurance company Daiichi Life Group's employees were dispatched to support a local tourism promotion strategy.[206]

4. **Trust and relationships built between local governments and corporates through initial projects can develop into larger and more strategic partnerships.**[207] One example is Ōtsuka Shōkai, an IT solutions provider.[208] The company began its participation in the corporate hometown tax scheme in 2020, donating disaster relief equipment to a few municipalities.[209] Given more frequent and severe natural disasters, the company saw the need for inter-regional mutual coordination, building on earlier project relationships to engage with local governments.[210] In 2023, Ōtsuka Shōkai had expanded its support to 20 municipalities, of which 12 signed a "Mutual Aid and Support Cooperation Agreement for Disaster Situations" to formalise a regional equipment-sharing relationship.[211] As a result, equipment was rapidly mobilised across municipalities in response to the Noto earthquake in January 2024. The mayor of Uwajima City thanked the company and reaffirmed their commitment to working together to strengthen coordination and disaster resilience.[212] As of January 2024, Ōtsuka Shōkai had donated a total of JPY 410.0 million ($2.7 million). Such partnerships continue to evolve, with Ōtsuka Shōkai, for example, considering a centralised evacuation shelter-management platform.[213]

Future directions

Regional revitalisation remains a policy priority going forward. In 2025, the Cabinet Office laid out the Regional Revitalization 2.0 framework setting out directions through to 2034, which included promoting further utilisation of corporate hometown tax donations. The corporate hometown tax scheme is part of broader efforts to provide financial and monetary support, through the creation of "new flows of private funds aimed at solving regional issues and encouraging proactive efforts by companies".[214]

In the same year, the scheme was granted a three-year extension to March 2028, and refinements in governance and implementation procedures were adopted to improve transparency and fairness over the extension period. For example, mandatory checklists and monitoring of expected activities at each implementation stage were introduced to strengthen local governments' oversight.[215] The Cabinet Office continues to evaluate and introduce necessary improvement measures for the system overall, including periodic updates to the application requirements for the certification of regional revitalisation plans.[216]

12. UHNWI-led: Financial hubs for family offices

Why this playbook matters

Family offices—privately controlled organisations that manage the investments, wealth planning, governance, and related affairs of a wealthy family or families—can mobilise resources and expertise in ways that complement both traditional philanthropy and commercial investment.[xii] This playbook explores emerging approaches through which governments are building enabling ecosystems to unlock this potential, drawing on examples from Hong Kong SAR, China (henceforth referred to as HKSAR) and Singapore.

Overview of financial hubs for family offices in HKSAR and Singapore

HKSAR and Singapore are the leading hubs for wealth management and family offices in Asia. In HKSAR, more than 3,380 single-family offices were already operating at the end of 2025. Recent figures for assets under management (AUM) indicate that family offices and private trust clients of licensed corporations and registered institutions collectively accounted for HKD 2 trillion ($256.4 billion) at the end of 2024.[217] Singapore had more than 2,000 family offices at the end of 2024, a tenfold increase in five years.[218]

Both HKSAR and Singapore have built tailored policy frameworks and ecosystems to attract family offices, building on the foundations of a robust rule of law, efficient regulation, and the ease of doing business. They offer targeted tax concessions for family-owned investment holding vehicles and leverage investment-based immigration programmes. To facilitate market entry, both jurisdictions have established dedicated support units—FamilyOfficeHK in HKSAR and the Family Office Development Team in Singapore—that offer one-stop support services, such as regulatory and administrative guidance, and aim to enhance the operating environment for family offices.[219] Furthermore, both jurisdictions actively foster industry networking, knowledge sharing, capacity building, and talent development through specialised ecosystem builders like the Hong Kong Academy for Wealth Legacy and Singapore's Wealth Management Institute and Global-Asia Family Office Circle.[220]

Philanthropy is one of the key offerings for family offices in these jurisdictions. Tax incentives that encourage charitable donations are already available in both jurisdictions: deductions of up to 35 percent of assessable income or profits in HKSAR, and deductions of up to 250 percent of qualifying donations to local institutions to be deducted from statutory income in Singapore.[221] In addition, they have introduced measures to make participation in philanthropy simple and

xii Family offices fall into two categories. A single-family office is a privately owned and managed organisation created to serve one family's financial, administrative and strategic needs. This is different from a multi-family office that delivers similar core services, but through a shared infrastructure that supports several families.

easy for family offices, including targeted and financial incentives and support of intermediary development in the ecosystem. An indicator of progress is that, in HKSAR, projected engagement by family offices is expected to rise to 64 percent for philanthropy and 43 percent for impact investing over the next three years.[222] In Singapore, family offices acknowledge that clear regulatory frameworks for giving, tax incentives for donations, strong government support, and robust wealth management infrastructure are "conducive to doing good".[223]

Lessons learned

1. **Tailored financial incentives that complement pre-existing tax incentives can strengthen the economic rationale for philanthropy participation.** Singapore's Philanthropy Tax Incentive Scheme (PTIS), effective from January 1, 2024, offers family offices a 100 percent tax deduction on overseas donations made through qualifying local intermediaries. This directly addressed the previous limitation that only donations benefiting the Singapore community qualified for deductions.[224] Furthermore, family offices under Singapore's tax incentive schemes are required to meet minimum local spending thresholds equal to or greater than SGD 200,000 ($156,400) each year; the thresholds vary according to AUM. The government also allows grants to blended finance structures with substantial involvement of Singapore-based entities to count double towards this requirement, creating a direct economic incentive for social impact investment.[225] HKSAR adjusted details in its tax concession policy for family-owned investment holding vehicles in 2023 after announcing its ambition to become a philanthropic centre for global family offices. This adjustment allows a charitable entity to hold up to a 25 percent beneficial interest in a family-owned investment holding vehicle or single-family office (compared with the general 5 percent limit) while remaining eligible for the tax concession.[226] This provision creates an incentive for family offices to integrate philanthropy more directly into their long-term wealth management.

2. **Dedicated intermediaries can address the operational barriers that may deter family offices from participating in philanthropy.** In HKSAR, the Hong Kong Academy for Wealth Legacy (HKAWL), established by the Financial Services Development Council (FSDC), provides training development and networking activities for the family office sector.[227] It also coordinates with strategic partners to vet and surface high-impact, scalable projects through its online Impact Link portal to accelerate the identification of opportunities and support the due diligence processes, which are challenges cited by practitioners.[228] Established anchors in the broader philanthropic ecosystem add to efforts by dedicated intermediaries. Most notably, The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust convenes cross-sectoral partnerships and establishes trusted implementation networks, enabling evidence-led approaches to be adopted more widely in response to HKSAR's evolving social needs. It is also a founding funder of the Institute of Philanthropy (IoP),

which convenes key actors and builds capacity in the sector, including among family offices. In Singapore, Temasek Trust invests in establishing specialised entities that can support family offices to engage in philanthropy in line with the direction of government strategy. One example is Co-Axis, which directly connects funders, including family offices and high-net-worth individuals, with beneficiaries through a digital marketplace for catalytic capital.[229] Another example is the Philanthropy Asia Alliance, which convenes different actors including but not limited to family offices, to provide the platforms and opportunities for the community to collaborate and catalyse solutions to address challenges in Asia.[230]

3. **Standardised measurement systems can bridge the trust gap between family offices and social organisations.** Family offices accustomed to high-quality due diligence may find that it is challenging for social organisations to meet the same standards. Shared measurement frameworks, such as GIIN's IRIS+ metrics, a global framework used in Singapore, help both sides find common ground.[xiii] IRIS+ provides a catalogue of standardised performance indicators across sectors and themes, and the Impact-Weighted Accounts Framework translates social and environmental outcomes into monetary equivalents. Such tools offer both parties a common language for due diligence, accountability, and performance benchmarking, lowering transaction costs and enabling more resources to flow from family offices to the social sector.[231]

Future directions

Philanthropic participation by the next generation is the main opportunity. Family offices in the Asia–Pacific are on the cusp of the region's largest intergenerational wealth transfer, estimated at $5.8 trillion by 2030.[232] The younger leaders increasingly see the integration of purpose with profit as an expectation: PwC's Global NextGen Survey 2022 suggests that 72 percent of next generation family business leaders expect to be personally involved in increasing the business's focus on investments for sustainability and impact in the future, which could create more openness to philanthropy too.[233] Governments are already targeting this opportunity. HKSAR's 2026 Wealth for Good Summit, themed "Building Lasting Legacies", convened next-generation wealth owners alongside family office decision-makers to discuss topics including philanthropy, wealth legacy, and cross-generational planning.[234]

xiii GIIN is the Global Impact Investing Network, an international non-profit organisation that developed and maintains the IRIS+ system. IRIS originally stood for Impact Reporting and Investment Standards but as the framework evolved, the GIIN stopped treating IRIS as an acronym and now brands it IRIS+.

Annex 2: Quantification methodology, jurisdiction estimates, and recommendations

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1. Overview of the annex

Purpose of the annex

This annex is the technical companion to the interim report's major findings and its quantification estimates of domestic philanthropic monetary giving across Commission jurisdictions. It provides transparency on the data sources, methodology, assumptions, and limitations behind the Commission's 2024 quantification estimates. Reflecting on the current state of data visibility, this annex concludes with opportunities to develop shared principles and practices to make philanthropic data more visible, granular, interoperable, and ultimately more actionable and insightful for policymaking.

Scope of the annex and relationship to the interim report's major findings

This annex covers three resource streams to quantify domestic philanthropy:

- New philanthropic monetary inflows
- Voluntary time contributions
- Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

The interim report presents selected headline findings from the quantification with an emphasis on new philanthropic monetary inflows. This annex provides supporting technical details and adds broader available estimates for voluntary time contributions, as well as estimates for income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems where available.

The estimates should be interpreted as best-available 2024 snapshots rather than definitive or fully comparable measures of domestic philanthropic resources across jurisdictions because data availability, definitions, reporting practices, and coverage vary considerably.

How to read the annex

This annex is structured into six sections. Section 1 sets out the purpose of the annex. Section 2 defines the research objective and scope. Section 3 explains the methodological framework, including the selection of data sources and, where applicable, approaches to extrapolation and triangulation—and corresponding limitations. Section 4 details the scope, definitions, and types of data sources used for each resource stream and the source of giving. Section 5 presents jurisdiction-specific estimates, data sources, methodological notes, and limitations. Section 6 concludes with recommendations on improving the visibility, granularity, and interoperability of philanthropy data and data infrastructure across Asia.

2. Research objective and scope

Research objective

The objective of this research is to develop a structured, best-available quantification of domestic philanthropic resources across Commission jurisdictions in Asia. The exercise seeks to map the scale and composition of domestic philanthropic resources using the most relevant data available for each jurisdiction and resource stream, while making transparent the methodological choices, data gaps, and limitations that shape the estimates.

Resource streams covered

Three resource streams are covered to quantify domestic philanthropy: new philanthropic monetary contributions, voluntary time contributions, and income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems (Exhibit B1).

Exhibit B1

Summary of three resource streams to quantify domestic philanthropy

Resource stream	What it captures	Why included	How to interpret	Methodological implication
New philanthropic monetary inflows	Monetary resources newly contributed to philanthropic purposes, including giving by mass individuals, corporates, ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWIs), and public discretionary sources	Monetary giving is the most standardised and measurable across jurisdictions	Indicates the scale and composition of new monetary giving for domestic philanthropic purposes	Estimated at the source of injection (not expenditures or disbursements) to avoid double-counting resources that pass through multiple actors before reaching their destination
Voluntary time contributions	Time contributed voluntarily without the expectation of direct personal benefit, and directed towards organisations, communities, or individuals outside one's own household or family	Voluntary labour is a significant non-monetary philanthropic resource, especially in community-based and informal ecosystems	Indicates the scale of civic participation, community capacity, and non-monetary support for social outcomes	Estimated separately from monetary giving through participation and hours rather than monetised volunteer hours in wage value
Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems	Income generated by endowments or assets already held within philanthropic ecosystems, including assets of charitable organisations and faith-based assets where data are available	Philanthropic ecosystems may generate recurring resources from accumulated assets in addition to receiving new contributions	Indicates the productivity and sustainability of existing philanthropic asset bases	Used reported annual income where available and applied multi-year averaging or asset-return assumptions where appropriate

How the Commission defines philanthropy and why public discretionary sources are included

The Commission defines philanthropy as the giving of private or public resources, with discretionary allocation for the benefit of others, beyond fiscal or commercial obligation.

This definition recognises that all three societal engines—state, market, and community—participate in philanthropy. This broadens the definition often used outside Asia, namely "private, voluntary giving for public good", by recognising two differences commonly found in jurisdictions in Asia. First, the Commission recognises that the state plays a major role in shaping philanthropic ecosystems in Asia and through its direct contribution of public discretionary giving at the sources-of-giving tier. This is distinct from mainstream fiscal government spending.

Second, the Commission recognises that the voluntary criterion is not universally shared. In some jurisdictions, giving mandated by law or faith is still widely understood in those contexts as an expression of acting philanthropically. In these cases, the actors retain discretion over how to deploy or allocate the resources for the benefit of others. Requiring the decision to give to be voluntary would exclude forms of giving that many communities themselves would consider philanthropic by nature.

Therefore, for the quantification of philanthropic resources by sources of giving, we include all forms of private resources for public good and include public discretionary giving that meets the Commission's definition.

Public discretionary giving is defined by its mandated usage (for the benefit of the public beyond fiscal mandates) and the existence of a strong governance structure for the allocation of funds.[i] It includes matching funds whose primary purpose is to crowd in non-state philanthropic resources, lottery funds, dormant deposits, special funds or endowments, and ring-fenced levies. It excludes government spending in the delivery of fiscal mandates and services such as general education, health, welfare, or development spending.[ii]

i Governance structures vary by jurisdiction; examples include structures separate from line ministries with discretionary power to allocate the resources, structures governed by central and/or coordinating ministries such as Ministries of Finance or Cabinet and Presidential Offices, and structures representing multiple ministries.

ii Tax incentives and other foregone public revenue are not counted as public discretionary giving. They subsidise private giving that is already counted as philanthropy, so counting the foregone revenue in addition would lead to double counting. These types of incentives represent choices as part of the enabling environment tier, for example, the extent to which to incentivise versus obligate giving.

Domestic and cross-border giving

The current quantification of monetary giving focuses on domestic philanthropic giving: domestic resources contributed and directed towards domestic philanthropic purposes.[iii] Cross-border giving is far smaller than domestic giving, estimated at approximately $1.4 billion in 2024.[iv] However, the Commission recognises that quantifying only domestic giving does not reflect the importance of cross-border giving for all jurisdictions. For some, cross-border giving is a defining feature of their philanthropic profile and regional or global contribution. The exclusion of cross-border giving from the current estimates should therefore be understood as a methodological choice rather than a judgement on the importance or generosity of any jurisdiction.

Reference year of 2024

The quantification estimates are annual figures, using 2024 as the reference year for consistency. However, because data availability differs by jurisdiction, resource stream, and source of giving, not all underlying data are from 2024. Where the data source did not provide 2024 observations, monetary values were adjusted to the 2024 price level for each jurisdiction. Annualisation or multi-year averaging was applied where appropriate, as detailed in section 3 and section 5 under relevant jurisdictions.

iii In some cases, where income data from organisations may not indicate where givers were located, giving from a foreign source for domestic philanthropic purposes (e.g. diaspora giving) may be partially included and cannot be disaggregated.

iv The estimate is based on available data—it includes the largest jurisdictions in the Commission (China and India), as well as Japan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Cross-border data were unavailable for Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

3. Methodological framework

Overview of the estimation approach

This research is a multi-source quantitative synthesis, integrating and reconciling disparate cross-jurisdiction datasets to arrive at as comprehensive a view as possible. It applies a structured, best-available-evidence approach across Commission jurisdictions.

This section sets out the common methodological framework across the quantification; the scope, definitions, and types of data sources for each resource stream, as well as the detailed methodology for each jurisdiction, are presented in the following sections.

Data source assessment and inclusion criteria

The Commission reviewed multiple data sources for each jurisdiction and included those judged to be most suitable for the relevant estimate. Three criteria were considered—quality, comprehensiveness, and recency:

- **Quality** refers to the credibility, rigour, and transparency of the data source. Official government sources such as national statistics, administrative records, government-published surveys, and government-endorsed data were prioritised where available. Where official data were incomplete or unavailable, credible sources were considered, including academic studies and sector reports, private market data, and organisation-level reporting. Particular attention was paid to sampling and weighting approaches, sample size, survey design and administration, and reporting coverage, as these factors determine the relevance and representativeness of the data. Data sources with transparent disclosure of underlying methodologies were therefore prioritised.

- **Comprehensiveness** refers to the extent to which a data source captures the full spectrum of philanthropic giving within a given source of giving. Priority was given to data sources that provided broad coverage across giving channels (such as formal and informal giving) and donor segments (by religion, nationality, or other demographic characteristics). Where available, high-coverage aggregate data from a single source were preferred to bottom-up estimates. This approach was intended to ensure more comprehensive coverage while reducing the risk of double-counting within each source of philanthropic giving.

- **Recency** refers to the proximity of a data year to the year 2024. Priority was given to data sources with observations closest to 2024.

Data adjustment, annualisation, and extrapolation

Where selected data sources did not provide 2024 observations, monetary values were adjusted to the 2024 price level of each jurisdiction where appropriate, as documented in the jurisdiction-specific methodology in section 5. Data reported for only part of a year, such as one- or three-month periods, were annualised where the data source design supported such treatment. For income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems, multi-year averaging was used where data were available to reduce the effect of short-term volatility in returns.

Extrapolation was used where available data covered only part of a resource stream or population. The preferred approach was to use partial local aggregate data together with locally relevant benchmark ratios. Where this was not possible, sampled local bottom-up data were extrapolated to the relevant population using official population, household, corporate, or wealth data. Cross-jurisdiction benchmarks were used only where local data were insufficient.

Extrapolation was not applied to income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems as variations in asset composition, income definitions, and investment returns within or across jurisdictions limit the transferability of assumptions from one context to another.

Iterative review and stakeholder engagement

The quantification estimates were developed through an iterative process of data source gathering, assessment of data sources and estimation methodologies, and triangulation. Commissioners and local stakeholders, including policymakers, philanthropic organisations, sector experts, and academics, contributed throughout the process by providing non-public data, identifying new relevant data sources, reviewing methodologies, challenging assumptions, and assessing preliminary estimates.

Stakeholder engagement was particularly important where data were not publicly available, data were partial, definitions and scope were locally specific, or inclusion required judgement, such as for public discretionary giving and mass individual informal giving. The process helped ensure that assumptions were contextually informed and strengthened the robustness of estimation methodologies, even if it could not eliminate data limitations completely.

Methodological limitations

Using multiple data sources across resource streams and jurisdictions creates challenges for direct comparability. Data sources vary in quality, coverage, estimation method, data year, and underlying assumptions. As a result, cross-jurisdiction differences may partly reflect variations in data availability, definitions, and methodology rather than differences in actual philanthropic behaviour. The estimates should therefore be interpreted as structured, best-available approximations.

The main limitations relate to two recurring issues. First, the precision of measurement varies by source. Survey-based estimates are affected by survey design and administration (sampling and weighting method, sample size, recall period, response format, survey mode, etc.) and data processing procedures (treatment of outliers, imputation of missing values, adjustment or calibration, etc.). Administrative and reported data may be more precise for the flows they capture, but often exclude informal, non-tax-deductible, or unreported giving. As this quantification relies primarily on secondary data sources, many of the underlying methodological differences fall outside the Commission's control but nonetheless influence the precision and reliability of the resulting estimates.

Second, definitions and coverage differ across jurisdictions and data sources. Although the definitions and inclusion criteria were aligned wherever possible, local data sources do not always correspond precisely to the resource streams and source-of-giving categories measured in this annex. For example, some sources include components that fall outside the intended scope of monetary giving, such as in-kind donations, while other sources exclude relevant categories such as informal giving. Where components could not reliably be disaggregated, they were either retained, with a clear note regarding limitations, or excluded from the estimates where inclusion would materially distort the estimate.

4. Scope, definitions, and types of data sources by resource stream

This section explains the scope, definitions, and types of data sources used for each resource stream and source of giving.

New philanthropic monetary inflows

Mass individual giving

Scope and definitions

Mass individual giving covers cash donations from the general public that are given both formally (as donations to formal organisations or entities) and informally (donations not made through formal organisations or entities, including giving directly to those in need or through communal entities or places of worship that may not be registered). Consistent with the Commission's definition of philanthropy, activities undertaken primarily for reciprocal benefits or to meet fiscal obligations (e.g. tax requirements) are excluded from the scope.

In-kind giving is excluded from the monetary mass individual giving estimate but was noted when reported in monetised form and could not be disaggregated.

Types of data sources

Relevant data sources for mass individual giving include individual or household surveys, administrative tax records on individual tax-deductible donations, and aggregated reports or databases of non-profit organisations or charitable organisations (see Table 1).

Table 1
Data sources for mass individual giving

Data source categories	Relevant data available and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government/public-sector data sources	
National statistics publications	• Household expenditure survey: average household expenditure, including philanthropic donations (Japan, Thailand)
Tax system administrative records	• Total individual tax-deductible donations (Hong Kong SAR, China)
Other administrative data	• Tax-deductible and non-tax-deductible donations received by registered charities (Singapore) • *Zakat* collection statistics reported by State Islamic Religious Councils (Malaysia)
Government-published surveys	• Household/individual survey: average household or individual donations (Indonesia)
Non-government local data sources	
Academic surveys	• Household/Individual survey: total individual donations (China), median individual donations (India)
Sector-published surveys	• Individual survey: median individual donations (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Sector-based research/consolidation reports	• Annual publication on philanthropic organisation revenue data and/or sector trends, consolidating multiple data sources (China)

Corporate giving

Scope and definitions

Corporate giving covers monetary and monetisable contributions by companies for external public-benefit or social-impact purposes. This includes cash, cash equivalents, and shares donated or granted to non-profit organisations or foundations, as well as direct corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending on external programmes. The estimate excludes internal corporate spending on items such as employee welfare, governance, compliance, or ordinary business operations.

Corporate capabilities and in-kind support were not comprehensively quantified in the core monetary estimate but were noted when reported in monetised form and could not be disaggregated.

Types of data sources

Relevant data sources for corporate giving include both those capturing outgoing contributions from corporates and those capturing incoming donations received by non-profit or charitable organisations from corporates. Data sources for outgoing corporate giving include administrative tax records for corporate tax-deductible donations, mandatory corporate reporting, and government surveys on corporates. Data sources for incoming donations received by non-profit or charitable organisations from corporates include government surveys and aggregated reporting on organisational revenues. Where the above types of data sources were unavailable, individual reporting by large corporates was considered for extrapolation (see Table 2).

Table 2
Data sources for corporate giving

Data source categories	Relevant available data and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government data sources	
Tax system administrative records	• Total corporate tax-deductible donations (Hong Kong SAR, China)
Other administrative data	• Mandatory CSR records (India) • Tax-deductible and non-tax-deductible donations received by registered charities (Singapore)
Government-published surveys	• Corporate survey: corporate donation expenditure (Japan) • Non-profit organisation survey: revenue of non-profit organisations by giving source (Thailand)
Government-reported or -quoted figures	• Government announcement of private-sector contribution to social spending (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) • Research report on financial contributions by corporates (United Arab Emirates)
Non-government local data sources	
Sector-based research/consolidation report	• Annual publication on philanthropic organisation revenue data and/or sector trends consolidating multiple data sources (China)
Bottom-up estimates from each organisation reporting	• Annual reporting on social contributions by largest corporates (Indonesia, Malaysia)

UHNWI giving

Scope and definitions

UHNWI giving refers to philanthropic monetary contributions from ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWIs).[v] This captures giving in a personal or family philanthropic capacity and excludes donations made through corporate entities to avoid overlap with corporate giving estimates.

In this research, UHNWI giving is measured based on giving size above certain thresholds rather than by each donor's net worth, as available UHNWI giving data are based on reported giving or receipts by organisations that do not map to donors' net worth data. The China and India data—used as benchmarks to estimate giving in other jurisdictions where extrapolation was required—capture giving by donors with minimum annual giving estimates of $1.4 million and $2.1 million per single person or family unit, respectively. These thresholds reflect the scope of the underlying datasets rather than thresholds established for this research.

UHNWI giving is often concentrated in large pledges or one-off gifts, resulting in substantial year-on-year volatility in reported giving amounts. Therefore, data for a given year have limited reference value for what annual giving amounts might be in other years.

Types of data sources

Aggregate UHNWI giving data are currently available for only three jurisdictions: China, India, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Data sources identified include government-reported figures and sector reports capturing large-value philanthropic contributions by individuals (see Table 3).

Table 3
Data sources for UHNWI giving

Data source categories	Relevant available data and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government data sources	
Government-reported or -quoted figures	• Contribution to UHNWI giving platform (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Non-government local data sources	
Sector-based research/consolidation report	• Consolidated list of top UHNWI giving based on organisational reporting, surveys, or publicly available figures (China, India)

v An UHNWI is defined as an individual with a net worth exceeding $30 million.

Public discretionary giving

Scope and definitions

Public discretionary giving refers to public or state-enabled monetary resources with a mandated usage (for the benefit of the public beyond fiscal mandates) and strong governance structure for the allocation of funds. Exhibit B2 highlights the approach for screening and inclusion of public discretionary giving.

Exhibit B2

Inclusion criteria for public discretionary giving

Types of public discretionary funds[1]

- Lottery/gaming funds
- Dormant deposits
- Special funds/endowment from sovereign wealth fund or state leadership[2]
- Ring-fenced levy/cess/excise tax or penalty for specific activities or goods generating negative externalities or consequences/mandatory contribution by corporates

Matching funds

Criteria 1: Mandated usage

Mandated usage includes allocation for the benefit of the public beyond government's fiscal mandate, as indicated by:

- Fund allocation to entities or initiatives that are:
  - Explicitly mentioned as going "beyond government's mandate or capability"
  - Explicitly mentioned as being "philanthropic"
  - Charitable, as defined by the government/law
  - Non-duplicative and/or additive to existing government services or functions (e.g. innovative or experimental in approach, targeting specific segments that are excluded by the government's fiscally mandated spending)
- Fund allocation to individual beneficiaries for the improvement of their welfare, or public benefits not covered under fiscally mandated spending

Funds are to crowd in non-state philanthropic resources

Criteria 2: Governance structure

Fund allocation has a strong governance structure; examples include:

- Structures separate from line ministries, with discretionary power to allocate resources
- Structures governed by central and/or coordinating ministries such as Ministry of Finance or Cabinet and Presidential Offices
- Structures representing multiple ministries

Notes: 1. This is a non-exhaustive list covering mechanisms that have been observed in the Commission jurisdictions and could be enriched further. It excludes government spending in the delivery of fiscal mandates and services such as general education, health, welfare, or development spending. 2. State leadership is defined as top-level officials at the federal government or regional government level.

Types of data sources

Public discretionary giving estimates were based on bottom-up research into identified public discretionary resource-allocation mechanisms. Data sources directly associated with these mechanisms, including government and organisation reports, budgets and financial statements, relevant legislation and regulations, and secondary publications referencing these sources, were used (see Table 4).

Table 4
Data sources for public discretionary giving

Data source categories	Relevant available data and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government/public-sector data sources	
Government/public-sector-reported or -quoted figures	• Fiscal budgets, relevant legislation, regulations and guidelines, government websites, announcements, annual reports, interviews, etc.
Non-government local data sources	
Publications referencing government figures	• Academic publications, media articles, etc.
Organisational reporting	• Annual reports, budgets, financial statements, etc.

Voluntary time contributions

Volunteering

Scope and definitions

Volunteering includes work or activities undertaken voluntarily without expectation of direct personal benefit, and directed towards organisations, communities, individuals, or causes outside one's own household or family. This includes volunteering conducted through formal organisations as well as in informal or community-based settings.

Each jurisdiction's data source for volunteering estimates has its own specific definition, and data based on survey responses may be further subject to each respondent's interpretation of the definition.

Types of data sources

Relevant data sources for volunteering participation and hours include individual or household surveys specifically on volunteering, as well as broader giving or time-use surveys with volunteering components and relevant sector reports (see Table 5).

Table 5
Data sources for volunteering

Data source categories	Relevant data available and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government/public-sector data sources	
National statistics publication	• Survey on time use (India, Japan) • Survey on volunteer work (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Government/public-sector-published surveys	• Survey on giving, including volunteering (Singapore, Indonesia)
Non-government local data sources	
Academic surveys	• Survey on giving, including volunteering (China)
Sector-published surveys	• Survey on giving, including volunteering (Hong Kong SAR, China; Malaysia, Thailand)
Sector-based research/consolidation reports	• Annual publication on philanthropic and/or charitable sector trends consolidating multiple data sources (China)

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems measures the income generated by existing assets in the ecosystem, rather than new inflows from donors. This includes income generated from assets owned by charitable organisations and from faith-based assets, one example being *awqaf* (also spelled *awkaf*, singular *waqf/wakaf*) assets.

For this resource stream, priority was given to data sources reporting aggregate income from assets held by charitable organisations or *awqaf*, where such data were available. Where aggregate income data were unavailable, estimates were produced only when sufficiently robust local data on asset values and return rates could be identified. No further extrapolation was undertaken for unreported geographic segments (e.g. states or provinces), organisational segments, or types of income from assets. Consequently, these estimates reflect only the income captured in the available data and may not comprehensively cover the full extent of income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems.

Income from assets can exhibit substantial year-on-year volatility. To reduce the influence of short-term fluctuations that may not be representative of underlying philanthropic activities, a multi-year average (up to five years, subject to data availability) was used. Where cross-year data were unavailable, an annual figure from or closest to 2024 (adjusted where necessary) was used.

Income from assets owned by charitable organisations

Scope and definitions

Definitions of charitable organisations vary widely across jurisdictions and consequently the scope of the underlying data also varies. Depending on the jurisdiction, data sources may cover only specific types of organisations (for example, foundations, social service organisations, or charitable trusts) or a broader range of non-profit organisations including religious organisations, universities and schools, clinics and hospitals, ethnicity- and community-based organisations, and government-linked organisations. The estimations preserve the coverage of the original data source to reflect each jurisdiction's context, excluding only categories that are inarguably outside the scope of philanthropy—such as business and trade associations and labour unions, which serve their own and their members' interests.

Income-generating assets owned by charitable organisations may include, but are not limited to, bank deposits, financial assets (such as stocks and bonds), and immovable assets (such as land and buildings). Income from these assets therefore may include, but is not limited to, interest, dividends, rent, and proceeds from sales of assets.

Types of data sources

Data on income from assets of charitable organisations are not widely available. Where they are available, they usually come in the form of aggregated data derived from charitable organisations' reporting, whether reported to government administrative systems or channels or through surveys (see Table 6).

Table 6
Data sources for income from assets owned by charitable organisations

Data source categories	Relevant data available and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government data sources	
Other administrative data	• Publicly available data for registered charities or charitable trusts' reported revenue by source, including income generated from assets (India, Singapore)
Government-published surveys	• Non-profit organisation survey: revenue of non-profit organisations by source (Thailand)
Non-government local data sources	
Sector-based research/consolidation reports	• Annual publication on philanthropic and/or charitable sector trends consolidating multiple data sources (China)

Income from faith-based assets

Scope and definitions

Awqaf assets are Islamic endowment assets that are typically permanently set aside for religious, charitable, or public-benefit purposes. In general, the endowment is intended to be perpetual, with the assets held in trust. Income and returns generated from the assets can be used for charitable purposes or allocated to beneficiaries as specified in the *waqf* deed.

Depending on the jurisdiction's context, *awqaf* assets can take various forms, including immovable physical assets (such as land, commercial buildings, mosques, schools, hospitals, and agricultural estates), movable assets (such as livestock and equipment), and/or financial assets (such as cash and shares). Thus, income and returns generated from *awqaf* assets can come from different sources, such as rental income, operational activities, and investments.

Types of data sources

Data sources on *awqaf* assets or returns usually come from *awqaf* authorities of each jurisdiction (see Table 7).

Table 7
Data sources for income from faith-based assets

Data source categories	Relevant data available and jurisdictions (not exhaustive)
Government/public-sector data sources	
Other administrative data	• *Awqaf* authority annual reports and financial statements (Malaysia, Singapore)
Government/public-sector-reported or -quoted figures	• *Awqaf* authority-published research reports and statistics (Indonesia, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Singapore)

5. Jurisdiction-specific estimates, data sources, and methodological notes

This section provides, for each jurisdiction represented on the Commission, 2024 estimates of new philanthropic monetary inflows, voluntary time contributions, and income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems.

A range of estimates are presented where no single estimate could be determined to be clearly superior; available sources provided complementary but incomplete scope or coverage of giving; or the more credible source provided limited coverage of the source of giving, necessitating supplementation from other sources.

This section also outlines the methodology and data sources used to quantify each estimate, including:


- **Data source:** the source of the data points used to derive the 2024 point estimate for the relevant source of giving or resource stream
- **Data source category:** the classification of each data source according to the categories outlined in section 4
- **Data year:** the year or period represented by the data points used to derive the 2024 point estimate[vi]
- **Data scope or definition:** the scope, coverage, and definitions of the relevant data points from the data source used or referenced in deriving the 2024 point estimate
- **Estimation approaches and adjustments:** the methodology, assumptions, and adjustments applied to derive the 2024 point estimate from the underlying data sources
- **Limitations:** methodological limitations of the 2024 point estimate that may affect its ability to capture comprehensively or represent accurately the relevant source of giving or resource stream; these limitations may reduce the comparability of estimates across jurisdictions

Amounts provided in this annex are in each jurisdiction's local currency unit and US dollars (denoted by $).

vi The data year reflects the reporting period covered by the data rather than the publication year. Where a reporting period spans multiple years, the data year is assigned to the year containing the majority of months. If the reporting period is split equally between two years, the latter year is used. For instance, data covering September 2023 to August 2024 are assigned to 2024, as are data covering July 2023 to June 2024. Where only a cumulative multi-year total is available, an annualised average is calculated using the midpoint of the reporting period as the data year, and adjusted to 2024 prices. For example, a reported total of $30 billion over 2023-25 would be annualised to $10 billion, where the midpoint of the reporting period, 2024, is used as the data year.

Exhibit B3

China: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving[1]



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering[6]	77.0–257.9	4,106.0–9,027.4

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
CNY billion ($ billion)[2]

Assets owned by charitable organisations[7] (2023–2024 average)	4.3 (0.6)
Faith-based assets	Not applicable
Total	4.3 (0.6)

Notes: 1. Only includes data from the Chinese Mainland. Data for formal mass individual giving and corporate giving from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) for 2024 are not yet available at the time of this interim report and are to be updated with official MCA data once available. 2. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of CNY 1 = $0.1393. 3. Range is based on two informal giving estimates. Lower range includes formal giving based on Giving China and traceable informal giving through digital platforms, and upper range includes estimated mass informal giving based on survey data from National School of Development, Peking University. 4. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving and corporate capabilities, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 5. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 6. Range is based on formal and informal volunteering estimates. Lower range includes formal volunteering based on Bluebook, and upper range includes informal volunteering based on survey data from National School of Development, Peking University and from World Giving Report, Charities Aid Foundation. 7. Figure includes data of core organisations (as defined by Giving China) with data available.

Table 8
China: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Formal					
Institute of Philanthropy Tsinghua University and YiSHAN Data (2026): *Giving China 2025*[1]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Total donation income of social organisations sourced from individuals (natural persons and limited partnerships) This includes (1) core organisations (from available financial data) and (2) other social organisations (estimated)[vii]	Mass individual giving (formal) = individual giving (from *Giving China*) – UHNWI giving* *See UHNWI giving estimate below	Actual donation income for other social organisations can be different as it is an estimate based on known data Corporate giving from limited partnerships that cannot reliably be disaggregated is reflected in giving from mass individuals instead of corporate; this amount is likely small, according to the data provider
Informal, lower range					
Institute of Philanthropy Tsinghua University and YiSHAN Data (2026): *Giving China 2025*[2]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Informal giving to individuals that is traceable through peer-to-peer crowdfunding platforms; deemed informal as resources are not channelled through social organisations	No adjustment made to data from source	Does not include all informal giving; only includes what is traceable on peer-to-peer crowdfunding platforms
Informal, upper range					
Peking University National School of Development (2025): *China Public Donation Survey Report*[3]	Non-government local data sources: academic survey (n= 17,827 individuals)	2025	Total mass individual giving point estimate, which consists of formal and informal giving	Mass individual giving (informal, upper range) = total mass individual giving point estimate – mass individual giving (formal)* *See mass individual giving (formal) estimate above	Surveys' sampling design could be improved for national representation; currently relies on post-stratification weighting The survey instrument did not clearly specify scope boundaries—what is included or excluded as donations (e.g. giving beyond kin or close friends)—and therefore may include amounts considered to be non-philanthropic based on the Commission's definition of philanthropy, depending on respondents' interpretation

vii Core organisations include foundations, Charity Federation, Red Cross and other social organisations registered as charity organisations. Organisations in the list have financial data available and collectively account for the vast majority of formal donation income; "other" social organisations are non-core social organisations, including those not registered as charity organisations.

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Corporates					
Institute of Philanthropy Tsinghua University and YiSHAN Data (2026): *Giving China 2025*[4]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Total donation income of social organisations sourced from corporates This includes (1) core organisations (from available financial data) and (2) other social organisations (estimated); includes cash and in-kind donations This excludes donation income from limited partnerships	No adjustment made to data from source	The estimate includes in-kind donations that cannot reliably be disaggregated Corporate giving not channelled through social organisations (e.g. direct CSR spending on external programmes) is not reflected due to data limitations; this amount is likely small, based on an understanding validated by expert consultation that most corporates would allocate giving through social organisations Corporate giving from limited partnerships that cannot reliably be disaggregated is reflected in giving from mass individuals instead of corporate; this amount is likely small, according to the data provider
UHNWIs					
YiSHAN Data: *Annual Donation Statistics of the Wealthy*[5]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Reported donations of CNY 10 million ($1.4 million) or more made across one or multiple social organisations by a single identifiable person (named or anonymised natural person) or a family-based joint-decision-making entity (such as a family or a couple); non-familial joint contributions are excluded unless any individual's giving was verified to be above the threshold	No adjustment made to data from source	If a UHNWI anonymously gives multiple times below CNY 10 million, where the aggregate annual total is above CNY 10 million, it will be included under formal mass individual giving If an UHNWI gives through limited partnerships or corporate entities, it will be included in mass individual or corporate giving respectively The data do not include non-reporting social organisations that are not registered as charities, which *Giving China*, a publication co-authored by the data provider and using the same underlying dataset, has estimated to be small relative to total organisational donation income

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Public discretionary					
Ministry of Finance of the PRC (2025): "Notice no. 8 of 2025"[6]	Government data source: tax system administrative records	2024	Lottery Public Welfare Fund	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Locally retained lottery public welfare funds Central special lottery public welfare funds Lottery public welfare funds allocated to MCA and General Administration of Sport The estimate excludes funds allocated to the National Social Security Fund The estimate is calculated based on actual 2024 lottery public-welfare funds collected by the central treasury and stipulated proportions of each fund	N/A

Table 9
China: Voluntary time contributions


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Lower range (formal only)					
Yang Tuan and Wang Chunguang, eds (2026): *Blue Book of Philanthropy*[7]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Data available: Number of active volunteers: individuals aged 15+ who participated in at least 1 hour of volunteer service over past year Average volunteer hours per active volunteer Total time spent volunteering by active volunteers Note: the data were sampled from a set of collaborating volunteer service organisations and extrapolated nationally Definition: Volunteering defined as volunteer service completed through an organisation	No adjustment made to data from source	Sampled organisations might have different volunteer participation rates and hours relative to other organisations that are extrapolated
Upper range (formal and informal)					
Peking University, National School of Development (2025): *China Public Donation Survey Report*[8]	Non-government local data source: academic survey (n= 17,827 individuals)	2025	Data available: % of sample reporting volunteering in past 12 months; includes formal and informal volunteering Definition: Volunteering defined as the donation of one's time (i.e. volunteering service)	Number of volunteers = % of sample reporting volunteering × population size of China (aged between 18 and 64) Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × average annual volunteer hours per volunteer* *Average annual volunteer hours per volunteer = average annual volunteer hours overall ÷ % of population reporting volunteering (both from CAF survey data) Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year)	Survey sampling design could be improved for national representation (e.g. to avoid overrepresentation of urban and more highly educated population) Responses subject to respondents' interpretation of definition
Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[9]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 501 individuals aged 18+)	2024	Data available: Average annual volunteer hours in 2024 overall (including volunteers and non-volunteers) Definition: Volunteering defined as unpaid, voluntary work either in one's community or further afield		
National Bureau of Statistics (2025): *People's Republic of China 2024 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin; China Statistical Yearbook 2025*[10]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Population size by age group		

Table 10
China: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Charitable organisations					
Institute of Philanthropy Tsinghua University and YiSHAN Data (2025): *Giving China 2025*[11]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2023–24	Subset of core organisations with available investment income data; includes equity and debt investment income (n= 2,623 in 2023, n= 2,351 in 2024)	2023 data adjusted to 2024 price level, then averaged across 2 years (2023–24) Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, interest income on deposit and rental income are not extrapolated	Data for social organisations that do not report are not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap

Exhibit B4

Hong Kong SAR, China: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	1.5	42.2

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
HKD billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	Data unavailable
Faith-based assets	Data unavailable
Total	–

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of HKD 1 = $0.1282. 2. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Table 11
Hong Kong SAR, China: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Inland Revenue Department (2025): *Annual Report 2024–25*[12]	Government data source: tax system administrative records	2023 (2024 data unavailable)	Tax-deductible cash donations from individuals to charitable organisations above HKD 100 ($13) and under tax deduction cap (35% of assessable income)	Mass individual giving = tax-deductible formal cash donations from individuals to charitable organisations* + extrapolated informal giving to individuals** – UHNWI giving*** *2023 formal giving data adjusted to 2024 price level **Informal giving to individuals = tax-deductible formal cash donations from individuals to charitable organisations × ratio of direct donation to charity donation (from CAF survey) Assumes CAF reported charity giving is comparable to individual tax-deductible cash donations ***See UHNWI giving estimate below	Non-tax-deductible formal monetary giving—e.g. formal cash giving below HKD 100 ($13) and above tax deduction cap—is not reflected due to data limitations; the amount is likely small based on the assumption that donations below HKD 100 ($13) would be reflected in the informal-giving-to-individuals estimate Informal giving to non-registered organisations or entities (e.g. informal community or mutual-aid groups) is not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of this data gap
CAF (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[13]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 254 individuals aged 18+)	2024	Annual average donation amounts as % of income: To a charitable organisation ("charity donation") Directly to people in need ("direct donation") Where income refers to annual "take-home" income		
Corporates					
Inland Revenue Department (2025): *Annual Report 2024–25*[14]	Government data source: tax system administrative records	2023 (2024 data unavailable)	Tax-deductible cash donations from corporates to charitable organisations above HKD 100 ($13) and under tax deduction cap (35% of assessable profit)	Corporate giving = tax-deductible cash donations from corporates* + donations from The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust** *2023 giving data adjusted to 2024 price level **Removed a large lump-sum donation made in calendar year 2023 from the donations from The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust	Non-tax-deductible monetary giving (e.g. direct CSR spending on external programmes), cash giving below HKD 100 ($13), and above-tax deduction cap (except donations from The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust) are not reflected due to data limitations; the amount is likely small as corporate philanthropic giving is expected to be predominantly channelled through tax-deductible donations
The Hong Kong Jockey Club (2025): *Annual Report for the Year ended 30 June 2025*[15]	Non-government local data source: organisation reporting	2024	Donations from The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust (July 2023–June 2024) as a major corporate donor without tax deduction		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[16]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavailable)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth bracket, estimated by household wealth distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = HKSAR, China UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *HKSAR, China UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket; adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public Discretionary					
Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (2025): *The Accounts of the Lotteries Fund 2024–25*[17]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures	2024	Lotteries Fund	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Proceeds from Mark Six Lottery, representing total funds that could be allocated towards philanthropic usage beyond fiscal budget mandate	N/A

Table 12

Hong Kong SAR, China: Voluntary time contributions


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
CAF (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[18]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 254 individuals, aged 18+)	2024	<u>Data available:</u> % of population who reported volunteering in 2024 Average annual volunteer hours in 2024 overall (including volunteers and non-volunteers) <u>Definition:</u> Volunteering defined as unpaid, voluntary work either in one's community or further afield	Number of volunteers = % of population reporting volunteering × population size of Hong Kong SAR, China aged 18+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × average annual volunteer hours per volunteer* *Average annual volunteer hours per volunteer = average annual volunteer hours overall ÷ % of population reporting volunteering Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year)	N/A
Census and Statistics Department (2026): "Table 110-01001: Population by Sex and Age Group"[19]	Government data source: national statistics publications	2024	Population size by age group		

Exhibit B5

India: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving

Point estimate

New philanthropic monetary inflows
INR billion ($ billion)[1]



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	Data unavailable	20,998.3

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
INR billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations[5]	117.1 (1.4)
Faith-based assets	Data unavailable
Total	117.1 (1.4)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of INR 1 = $0.01195. 2. Figure includes monetised value of in-kind giving, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 3. Figure includes mandatory CSR expenditure. 4. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 5. Figure includes data of Public Charitable Trusts in Maharashtra with digital reported data available.

Table 13
India: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Centre for Social Impact and Philanthropy (CSIP), Ashoka University (2026): *How India Gives 2025–26*; Center for Open Science (2026): "How India Gives 2025–26," based on CSIP dataset[20]	Non-government local data source: academic survey (n=7,225 households)	2025 (2024 data unavailable)	Raw data available for each sampled household: Cash giving participation (cash or both cash and in-kind) in the past 3 months Household giving in the past 3 months Archetype (defined by education and consumption levels) Estimated household size Additional data available: Archetype's share of total Indian population	Mass individual giving = mass individual giving (non-SHGs)* + giving by SHGs** Note: SHGs refer to self-help groups *Mass individual giving (non-SHGs) = sum of giving by each donor archetype, calculated as population size of India aged 18+ × archetype's share of total Indian population × archetype cash giving participation rate × archetype median giving per giver*** ***Household giving data annualised and converted to individual-level estimates by dividing by estimated household size 2025 data adjusted to 2024 price level Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year) **Giving by SHGs = number of SHG members × % of SHG members making contribution × average annual value of contribution per member Note: SHG giving is added as SHG members may be under-represented in the *How India Gives* (2026) survey	The estimate of non-SHGs mass individual giving includes some in-kind giving that cannot reliably be disaggregated The estimate of voluntary giving by SHGs draws on expert knowledge based on interviews with State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs) and can differ from the actual figure, as this metric is thus far not available in SRLM / NRLM (National Rural Livelihoods Mission) reporting
National Commission on Population (2019): *Population Projections for India and States 2011–2036*[21]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Total population size		
National Statistics Office (2024): *Women and Men in India 2023*[22]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2021, 2026 (2024 data unavailable)	Population size by age group, as % of total population		
DAY-NRLM: "e-Governance Application"[23]	Government data source: other administrative data	2025 (2024 data unavailable)	Number of SHG members		
Interviews with officials from: Bihar State Rural Livelihoods Project (JEEViKA) Chhattisgarh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (BIHAN) Madhya Pradesh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-SRLM) Uttar Pradesh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (PRERNA)	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures—Interviews	N/A (interviews conducted in 2025–26)	Validated assumptions on: % of SHG members making philanthropic contributions Conservative annual value of contribution per member based on group maturity		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Corporates					
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (2026): *Annual Report 2025–26*[24]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2023 (2024 data unavailable)	CSR expenditure reported, including spending on execution of approved projects, transfers to registered Section 8/public trust/society, and contributions to specific government funds (e.g. Prime Minister's National Relief Fund) Note: giving to approved government funds can either be counted as CSR spend (currently captured) or tax-deductible donations, but not both	As-reported figure retrieved from the source 2023 data adjusted to 2024 price level	Tax-deductible corporate donations outside of mandatory CSR spending is not reflected due to data limitations; this amount is likely small relative to mandatory CSR, based on the local understanding that corporate giving is largely recorded under CSR expenditure and due to the new tax regime that does not permit tax deductions for charitable donations[viii]
UHNWIs					
EdelGive Foundation and Hurun India (2025): *EdelGive and Hurun India Philanthropy List 2025*[25]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2024	Published list of top UHNWIs' giving based on survey, cross-referencing media reports, and data from charitable foundations The Hurun List states that 31 individuals "gave in personal capacity" but only identifies and provides personal donation amounts for top 10 Full list amount includes 192 UHNWIs' giving in "cash and cash equivalents pledged with legally binding commitments" (as classified by Hurun), with total donation amount and the primary entity they represent (either a corporate or foundation) Listed UHNWIs are "individuals born and raised in India, regardless of their current passport" and with donations of INR 5 Crore ($0.6 million) or above	Used top 10 individuals' giving in personal capacity The remaining 21 individuals' giving in personal capacity was estimated by the following steps: Based on the full list of 192, the 10 that are already included were removed, and 153 who were represented by corporate entities were also removed The remaining individuals' giving in their personal capacity was estimated based on primary giving entity types, informed by available data, with the assumption that the amount given by each of the remaining 21 cannot be greater than the 10th giver in the top 10	The estimate includes pledges with legally binding commitments that may not necessarily lead to actual injections in the same year, which cannot be reliably disaggregated Giving by UHNWIs who are unwilling to disclose giving amounts publicly or via surveys may not be reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap

viii The new tax regime under Section 202 of the Income Tax Act, 2025 (the successor to Section 115BAC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, introduced with effect from 1 April 2020) does not permit deductions for charitable donations eligible under Section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Public discretionary					
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) (2025): *Annual Report 2024–25*[26]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures—annual report	2024	Seven NABARD funds/ windows	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Sum of total new injections in FY24/25 across seven NABARD funds/windows, with (1) clear inclusion or sustainability mandates going beyond a single line ministry's mandate and (2) governance structures coordinating across multiple ministries[ix]	The estimate may include a small amount of interest income from funds' corpus (rather than new injection of public resource) that cannot be reliably disaggregated from publicly available data
Ministry of Mines (2025): "District Mineral Foundation (DMF)"[27] Ministry of Mines (2023): "District Mineral Foundation Funds Transforming Lives of Mining Affected Areas/ People"[28]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—press release	2024	District Mineral Foundation funds	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Total annual amount of funds collected under DMFs* × % of funds spent on high-priority areas[x] Only cumulative total for funds collected under DMFs were available; the estimate annualised the increase between August 2023 and November 2024	N/A
Ministry of Labour and Employment (2022): "Financial Condition of Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Boards"[29] Ministry of Labour and Employment (2024): "Utilization of Labour Cess Funds"[30]	Government data sources: government-reported or -quoted figures—answers to parliamentary question	2022–2023 (2024 data unavailable)	Building & Other Construction Workers' Cess Fund (BOCW Cess Fund)	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Total annual cess (special tax) collected under BOCW Welfare Boards Only cumulative totals were reported; annual estimates were derived by annualising the increase between available cumulative data points for each state/union territory (reported between 2022 and 2024), adjusting to the 2024 price level, and aggregating them to the national level	N/A
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (2025): *Report No. 3 of the Year 2025: State Finances Audit Report for the Year 2023–24, Government of Kerala*[31]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—annual report	2023 (2024 data unavailable)	Kerala State Lottery Agents and Sellers Welfare Fund	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): FY23/24 revenue from the Kerala State Lotteries × % of annual lottery turnover allocated to the Kerala State Lottery Agents and Sellers Welfare Fund[xi] 2023 data adjusted to 2024 price level	N/A

ix Includes Catalytic Capital Fund (CCF), Climate Change Fund-Interest Differential (CCF-ID), Cooperative Development Fund (CDF), Financial Inclusion Fund (FIF), Research and Development (R&D) Fund, Tribal Development Fund (TDF), and Watershed Development Fund (WDF). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC) also meets the public discretionary criteria but was excluded given no new injection of public resource in FY25.

x Based on the Government of India, Ministry of Mines' Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY) 2024 guidelines, at least 70% of funds are to be spent on high-priority areas, including drinking-water supply, pollution control measures, health care, sanitation, and welfare for vulnerable groups (women and children, elderly, disabled); excludes funding for basic infrastructure development.

xi According to The Kerala State Lottery Agents' and Sellers' Welfare Fund Act, 2008 (Act 2 of 2009), 1% of the total sale proceeds of lottery tickets collected from the Kerala State Lotteries Department is contributed to the Kerala State Lottery Agents' and Sellers' Welfare Fund each year.

Table 14
India: Voluntary time contributions

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
National Statistics Office (2025): *Time Use in India, 2024: Time Use Survey*[32]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 454,192 individuals aged 6+)	2024	<u>Data available:</u> % of persons (aged 6+) in rural and urban areas who volunteer on a random day Average daily volunteer hours spent by those volunteers (aged 6+) Note: for rural and urban volunteering figures, no further age splits are available to estimate working age or adult-specific figures <u>Definition:</u> Volunteering defined as unpaid work for other households, includes direct, community-based and organisation-based volunteering	Volunteer hours = volunteer hours in urban areas* + volunteer hours in rural areas** + volunteer hours by SHGs*** *Urban population volunteer hours = population size of India aged 6+ × % of urban population × % of volunteers in urban area × average daily volunteer hours in urban area × number of days in 2024 **Rural population volunteer hours = population size of India aged 6+ × % of rural population less SHG population × % of volunteers in rural area × average daily volunteer hours × number of days in 2024 Note: SHG population removed as SHG volunteering could be underrepresented in the survey; SHG volunteer hours were separately estimated as below ***Volunteer hours by SHGs = number of SHG members × % of SHG members making time contribution × average monthly volunteer hours per member × number of months in a year Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year)	Value of annual number of volunteers is not available due to survey design; only daily volunteer participation is available and cannot be reliably converted to an annual figure Unspecified unpaid work (e.g. training hours by trainee) which does not align with the Commission's definition of volunteering may be included in the estimate and cannot be reliably disaggregated The estimate of voluntary time contribution by SHGs draws on assumptions based on qualitative interviews with State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs) and can differ from the actual figure, as this metric is thus far not available in SRLM/NRLM (National Rural Livelihoods Mission) reporting
National Commission on Population (2019): *Population Projections for India and States 2011–2036*[33]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Total population size % of urban population in total population		
National Statistics Office (2024): *Women and Men in India 2023*[34]	Government data sources: national statistics publication	2021, 2026 (2024 data unavail-able)	Projected population size by age group, as % of total population		
DAY-NRLM: "e-Governance Application"[35]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2025 (2024 data unavail-able)	Number of SHG members		
Interviews with officials from: Bihar State Rural Livelihoods Mission (JEEViKA) Chhattisgarh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (BIHAN) Madhya Pradesh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-SRLM) Uttar Pradesh State Rural Livelihoods Mission (PRERNA)	Public-sector data sources: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures—interviews	N/A (in-terviews con-ducted in 2025–26)	<u>Validated assumptions on:</u> % of SHG members making time contribution Average monthly volunteer hours per member <u>Definition:</u> Volunteering defined as time SHG members contribute to public, community, and welfare activities beyond their required SHG roles and responsibilities (e.g. crisis response, maintenance of community infrastructure), either unpaid or for a nominal stipend (minimal amount to cover basic transport or meal costs only, not considered as direct benefit or compensation)		


Table 15

India: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Charitable organisations					
Office of the Charity Commissioner (2025): *Income of Digitised Public Charitable Trust*[36]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2024	Includes dividend, rent, interest income from Public Charitable Trusts in Maharashtra (n= 67,783 Public Charitable Trusts with reported data)	Annual income from charitable organisations' assets = dividend + rent + interest income from Public Charitable Trusts with available data Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, income from assets in other Public Charitable Trusts beyond Maharashtra, and income from capital gains from sales of investment assets are not extrapolated Note: multi-year data available, but due to significant variance in number of organisations with data across years, not comparable and hence average not computed to avoid misrepresentation	Data for Public Charitable Trusts that do not report are not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap

Exhibit B6

Indonesia: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	129.3	19,476.5

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
IDR trillion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	Data unavailable
Faith-based assets[5] (2020–2024 average)	0.009 (0.0006)
Total	0.009 (0.0006)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of IDR 1 = $0.00006305. 2. Figure includes 2% uncategorised giving that may encompass monetised value of in-kind donations. Most in-kind donations are excluded. 3. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving and corporate capabilities, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 4. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 5. Figure includes data from 8 out of a total of 38 provinces with data available.

Table 16
Indonesia: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Commission on Asian Philanthropy, and Social Trust Fund UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (2026): *National Public Survey for Islamic Philanthropy*[37]	Government data source: government-published survey (n= 8,360 individuals aged 18+)	2025 (2024 data unavail-able)	Raw data available for each sampled Muslim respondent: Giving amount for *zakat fitrah*, *zakat mal*, and *waqf* in the last 12 months, in cash Giving amount for *infak and sedekah* in the last 1 month, split by cash and in-kind Giving amount for *infak and sedekah* during the month of Ramadan, sum of cash and in-kind, without split Survey weight calibrated to the total Muslim population of Indonesia aged 18+ Note: extreme outliers in giving amounts were adjusted to improve representativeness Additional data available: Total population size of Indonesia aged 18+	Mass individual giving = mass individual giving (Islamic)* + Mass individual giving (non-Islamic)** *Mass individual giving (Islamic) = total annual *zakat fitrah*, *zakat mal*, *waqf*, and *infak and sedekah* giving amount in cash, weighted to the total Muslim population of Indonesia aged 18+ *Infak and sedekah* giving amounts were annualised using last 1-month & Ramadan giving (if specified); each respondent's Ramadan giving was split into cash and in-kind using their reported last 1-month giving's cash and in-kind split Mass individual giving (Islamic) data adjusted to 2024 price level and to 2024 population size using the total population size of Indonesia aged 18+ **Mass individual giving (non-Islamic) applies the midpoint of the range of total cash giving from national-level public collection activities reported to MoSA	The Islamic giving estimate includes a small component (<2%) that could not be reliably disaggregated into cash or in-kind, as some respondents reported Ramadan *infak and sedekah* giving but did not report the last 1-month giving with cash and in-kind split The non-Islamic giving estimate may include some overlap with Islamic giving data from the *National Survey for Islamic Philanthropy* due to the different data collection methodologies (donor reporting versus organisation reporting) Non-Islamic giving from public collection activities at single province or sub-province levels and informal non-Islamic giving are not reflected due to data limitations; these amounts are expected to be small based on consultation with local experts
Consultation with Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and BAPPENAS (2026)[xii]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures	2024	Total cash giving collected from national-level public "money or goods collection" activities aimed at social welfare, mental, religious, spiritual, physical, or cultural development, carried out under valid permits to organise such collections issued by MoSA		

xii BAPPENAS stands for Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, formally the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency of the Republic of Indonesia.

Corporates					
Koyfin: "My Screens"[38]	Non-government local data source: private market data	2024	Data available: Ranking of Indonesian companies by market capitalisation Corporate income tax paid by largest 40 companies by market capitalisation	Corporate giving = average philanthropy spending-to-tax ratio of the largest 40 listed companies* × total corporate income tax collected across all companies (listed and non-listed)** *Largest 40 listed companies were selected based on market capitalisation and represent more than 15% of total corporate income tax collected Non-comprehensive disclosures (e.g. reporting at the subsidiary rather than the group level) were excluded **Assumes other companies have the same corporate giving-to-tax ratio as the largest 40 companies	The estimate is based on the largest 40 listed companies' philanthropy-spending-to-profit ratios, which may differ from smaller companies' ratios Reported corporate philanthropy spending by the largest 40 listed companies may include non-monetary giving that cannot be reliably disaggregated
Various company annual reports[xiii]	Non-government local data source: bottom-up estimates from each organisation reporting	2024	CSR expenses and/or donations reported by largest 40 companies by market capitalisation		
OECD (2026): "Global Revenue Statistics"[39]	Government data source: tax system administrative records	2024	Total annual corporate income tax collected in Indonesia		
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[40]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavail-able)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth brackets, estimated by household wealth distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = Indonesia UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *Indonesia UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket; adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public discretionary[xiv]					
Palm Oil Magazine (2025): "Palm Oil Export Levies Hit Rp28 Trillion, Paving the Way for Sustainable Smallholder Empowerment"[41]	Non-government local data source: publication referencing government figures—media article	2024	Palm Oil Plantation Fund	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Palm oil export levy collection amount within total revenue of Palm Oil Plantation Fund Management Agency (BPDPKS), representing total funds that could be allocated towards philanthropic usage beyond fiscal budget mandate	N/A

xiii Annual reports of the 40 largest Indonesian listed companies by market capitalization (fiscal year 2024), retrieved from company investor-relations websites during May–June 2026.

xiv Danantara Trust Fund would be included by definition, but the fund was established in 2025 and therefore there are no relevant data for the 2024 estimate.

Table 17
Indonesia: Voluntary time contributions


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Commission on Asian Philanthropy, and Social Trust Fund UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (2026): *National Public Survey for Islamic Philanthropy*[42]	Government data source: government-published survey (n=8,360 individuals aged 18+)	2025 (2024 data not available)	Raw data available for each sampled Muslim respondent: Volunteer participation in past year Weekly average volunteer hours Survey weight calibrated to the total Muslim population of Indonesia aged 18+ Demographic variables including age, gender, education, province, and village administrative status Additional data available: Total population size of Indonesia aged 18+ Definitions: For volunteer participation, volunteering defined as participating voluntarily (unpaid) in community activities For volunteer hours, hours spent on participating in "organised" and "individual (not with an organisation)" volunteer activities were included	Number of volunteers = total number of volunteers reported in the survey, weighted to the total Muslim population of Indonesia aged 18+ Volunteer hours = sum of annual volunteer hours for each segment based on demographic variables, calculated as segment population size* × weighted volunteer participation rate × weighted median annualised volunteer hours** *Segment population size = sum of segment's survey weights **Weekly volunteer hours were annualised based on assumptions about regular volunteering patterns in the Muslim population, validated through consultation with local stakeholders Assumes homogenous volunteering behaviour within each demographic segment Population sizes were adjusted for 2024 using total population size of Indonesia aged 18+	Contributions by non-Muslim population (~13% of population[43]) were not extrapolated due to data limitations and potential cultural differences; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap

Table 18
Indonesia: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Faith-based assets					
Indonesian Waqf Board (BWI) (2022–24): *National Waqf Index 2021-2024*[44]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures	2020–24	Reported net profits or surplus of *waqf* asset management, based on annual BWI National Waqf Index reports (data available for 8 out of 38 provinces)	Annual income from faith-based assets as the sum of reported net profits or surplus of *waqf* asset management across provinces with available data For provinces with data prior to 2024, data adjusted to 2024 price level For provinces with data across years, data adjusted to 2024 price level, then averaged across years Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, income from assets in other provinces is not extrapolated	Income from *waqf* assets not managed by BWI (e.g. informal entities or individuals) is not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap

Exhibit B7

Japan: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	19.9	1,335.9

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
JPY billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	Data unavailable
Faith-based assets	Data unavailable
Total	–

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of JPY 1 = $0.006610. 2. Range is based on two alternative data sources: Family Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau of Japan, and Giving Japan published by the Japan Fundraising Association. Lower range figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 3. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 4. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Table 19
Japan: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals[xv]					
Lower range					
Statistics of Japan (2025): *Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)*, "Annual expenditure per household by item: Time series (expenditure amount) – 2017–2024"[45]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 7,896 households)[xvi]	2024	Average annual household donation expenditure Derived from household expenditure records, coded under FIES classification; the donation category is defined as "transfer expenditures such as donations or celebratory cash gifts to organisations or similar entities outside the household" and covers general donations, Community Chest fundraising, hometown tax donations, and cash donations at charity bazaars The estimate may capture cash and in-kind giving, as well as formal and informal giving, depending on how households record relevant transactions	Mass individual giving (lower range) = average annual household donation expenditure × total Japanese resident households	Religious giving is not reflected (Note: FIES has a separate "religious contribution" category; however, it was not added because it also includes non-philanthropic expenditures such as incense purchases, grave-cleaning charges, and membership fees to religious organisations) The estimate may include in-kind giving and individual hometown tax that cannot be reliably disaggregated from the published data[xvii] High-income households may be underrepresented as FIES methodology requires detailed income and expenditure recording
Statistics of Japan (2025): "[Japanese Residents] Population and Household Registered in the Basic Resident Register, 2025"[46]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Total number of households in Basic Resident Register (Japanese residents only, to align with FIES sample)		

xv The lower and upper range estimates are derived from two independent sources that capture philanthropic giving through different methodologies. Neither source provides a complete measure of mass individual giving; the range reflects differences in scope and survey design.

xvi FIES uses stratified random sampling of households. Data are collected through in-person visits by enumerators and participating households' recording of daily income and expenditure over a 3–6 month period.

xvii Individual hometown tax is not treated as philanthropic giving under the Commission's definition as it is a tax-linked mechanism that reallocates part of an individual's fiscal obligation, often with reciprocal benefits. The extent to which individual hometown tax is captured in the FIES-based estimate cannot be determined from the published data. However, total individual hometown tax contributions in 2024 at JPY 1.27 trillion ($8.4 billion) far exceeded the FIES-based mass individual giving estimate of JPY 475.2 billion ($3.1 billion), suggesting that FIES does not fully capture hometown tax contributions within the donation expenditure category. The difference may reflect the way household expenditures are reported and subsequently classified under FIES expenditure categories.

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Upper range					
Japan Fundraising Association (2025): "Infographic for Giving Japan 2025"[47]	Non-government local source: sector-published survey (n= 5,394 valid individual responses)[xviii]	2024	Individual donations made in 2024, excluding hometown tax donations Based on survey responses reporting monetary donation amounts by listed activity or organisation type; may include formal and informal giving[xix]	No adjustment made to data from source	The estimate includes political donations that cannot reliably be disaggregated from the publicly available data The estimate may be affected by response bias as the survey had a 23.5% response rate The online survey design may skew the sample towards younger, highly educated, or civically engaged respondents
Corporates					
National Tax Agency (2026): *Corporation Sample Survey Results* "Table 6: Donations, Entertainment Expenses, etc."[48]	Government data source: government-published survey (n= 2,417,580 corporates)	2024	Data available: Total donation expenditure, which consists of tax-deductible donation and non-tax-deductible expenditure Non-tax-deductible donation expenditure, which includes (without breakdown): (1) giving above tax-deduction limits, (2) donations to foreign affiliated parties of the corporate and internal donations to head office, and (3) donations to corporations in complete-control relationship Note: the data are available for sampled corporates, which represent 80.6% of all corporates	Corporate giving = extrapolated total donation expenditure – extrapolated non-tax-deductible donations* – political donations** Note: total donation expenditure and tax-deductible donation expenditure were extrapolated from the sampled corporates to the full corporate population based on response rates and average giving levels within each asset-size range *Non-tax-deductible donations were excluded as they include non-philanthropic amounts such as donations to own or affiliated corporate entities **Tax-deductible donations to political parties or organisations reported by *Tokyo Keizai Online (2025)* were adjusted to 2024 price level and excluded from total	Philanthropic portion of the non-tax-deductible donations is not reflected as it cannot be disaggregated from other non-tax-deductible donations that are not philanthropic in nature, such as corporate transfers to the company's own or affiliated entities; the amount is likely small as corporate philanthropic giving is expected to be predominantly channelled through tax-deductible donations Direct CSR spending on external programmes is not reflected due to data limitation; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap
Tokyo Keizai Online (2025): "Ranking: Listing the Top 303 Companies and Organizations Making the Highest Political Donations"[49]	Non-government local data source—media article	2023 (2024 data unavail-able)	Donations to 5 major political parties in 2023		

xviii The Giving Japan survey was conducted online among registered online panel respondents aged 20–79 residing in Japan.

xix Listed activity or organisation types included donations to governments (excluding hometown tax), political donations, religious organisations, community chests, Japanese Red Cross Society, and organisations, groups, or activities related to community, disaster relief, international cooperation, arts, culture and sport, education and research, employment promotion and support, education and research, health and welfare, environment, human rights, industry/commercial associations and labour unions, social contributions, and others.


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[50]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavail-able)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth bracket, estimated by household wealth distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = Japan UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *Japan UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket; adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public discretionary					
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (2025): *Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 2024*[51]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures	2024	Dormant deposits	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): "Provision of reserves for payment of dormant deposit grants" representing total funds that could be allocated towards philanthropic usage, as the reserve will be accumulated for future grants to support public-interest activities under the Dormant Deposits Utilisation System	N/A
The Nippon Foundation (2025): "FY2024 Revenue and Expenditures (April 1, 2024–March 31, 2025)"[52]	Non-govern-ment local data source: Organisation-al reporting	2024	Grants received from motorboat racing	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4) No adjustment made to data from source	N/A

Table 20
Japan: Voluntary time contributions

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Statistics of Japan (2021): *Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities, Questionnaire A*[53]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 162,786 individuals aged 15+)	2021 (2024 data unavail-able)	Data available: Total participation rate in volunteering in the past year Average time spent per day (minutes) per volunteer in past year, by activity category Average participation days per volunteer in past year, by activity category Number of participants in volunteering in the past year, by activity category and total Definition: Volunteering defined as volunteer activities (excluding those undertaken for work) in the areas of health or medical, the elderly, handicapped, children, sports, culture, art, science, local improvement, safety promotion, conservation, environmental, disaster, and international cooperation Note: results available for populations aged 10+ and 15+; 15+ dataset used in volunteering calculations to more closely align with other jurisdictions' population age-range coverage	Number of volunteers = total participation rate in volunteering × population size of Japan aged 15+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × annual average hours per volunteer* *Annual average hours per volunteer = sum of annual average hours per volunteer for each activity category, calculated as average volunteering time per day × average participation days × number of participants in the activity category (from the survey) ÷ total number of participants (from the survey) Assumes participation rates and average hours remain unchanged between 2021 and 2024	Volunteer hours under the "other" activity category are not reflected due to data limitations; this amount is likely small as a small share of total volunteers participated in "other" volunteering activities
Statistics of Japan (2025): *Population Estimates / Annual Report 2024*[54]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Population size by age group		

Exhibit B8

Malaysia: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	8.5	206.4

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

MYR billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	Data unavailable
Faith-based assets[5]	0.006 (0.001)
Total	0.006 (0.001)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of MYR 1 = $0.2189. 2. Range is based on formal Islamic giving and overall giving estimates. Lower range includes institutional collection of individual *zakat* and *waqf* data from State Islamic Religious Councils and Yayasan Waqaf Malaysia, and upper range includes estimated informal giving and non-Islamic formal giving based on survey data from World Giving Report, Charities Aid Foundation and official income data. 3. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving and corporate capabilities, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 4. Total may not add up due to rounding. 5. Figure includes data from 2 states out of a total of 13 states and 3 federal territories with data available.

Table 21
Malaysia: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Lower range					
JAWHAR: "Zakat Collection Statistics for All Malaysia"[55]	Government data source: other administrative data	2024	Total *zakat* collection (data available for all states and federal territories except Perlis)	Mass individual giving (lower range) = individual formal *zakat* giving* + individual formal cash *waqf* giving** *Individual formal *zakat* giving = total *zakat* collection × (1 – business *zakat* share) Business *zakat* share is based on total and annual business *zakat* collection by 4 states and 3 federal territories **Individual formal cash *waqf* giving = sum of individual cash *waqf* collected at federal level, and state or federal territory levels, based on available data	*Infaq* or *sadaqah* not captured in SIRC's collection and reporting practices; giving to donation platforms operated by non-SIRC entities; cash *waqf* funds by YWM other than Dana Wakaf Tunai Malaysia; cash *waqf* of 5 states without publicly available data; and non-Islamic giving are not reflected due to data limitations Note: *zakat* and *waqf* giving are not extrapolated beyond available data given contextual differences across states and federal territories
State Islamic Religious Councils (SIRC) annual reports and public disclosures	Public-sector data source: other administrative data	2022, 2023, or 2024 (depending on state and federal territory)	Annual business *zakat* collection by respective SIRCs (data available for 4 of 13 states and all 3 federal territories) Individual cash *waqf* collection by respective SIRCs (data available for 8 of 13 states and all 3 federal territories)		
Yayasan Waqaf Malaysia (YWM) (2025): *Annual Report 2024*[56]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2024	Cash *waqf* collection at federal level by YWM for Dana Wakaf Tunai Malaysia fund		
Upper range					
CAF (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[57]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 504 individuals aged 18+)	2024	Average annual donation amounts as % of income Donations include giving to a charitable organisation, to a religious organisation or for a religious cause, and directly to people in need Income refers to annual "take-home income"	Mass individual giving (upper range) = total donation amounts as % of income × total income of population* *Total income of population = annualised monthly mean household income x number of Malaysian-citizen households	The estimate is based on a sample that may overrepresent urban and more highly educated demographics due to the survey format and design
Department of Statistics Malaysia (2025): *Household Income Survey Report: Malaysia 2024*[58]	Government data source: government-published survey (n= 57,959 households)	2024	Data available: Monthly mean gross income of Malaysian-citizen households Number of Malaysian-citizen households		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Corporates					
Koyfin: "My Screens"[59]	Non-government local data source: private market data	2024	Data available: Market capitalisation (end December 2024) Profits after tax of listed companies in Malaysia during 2024	Corporate giving = average philanthropy spending as a % of profits after tax (PAT) in the largest 10 listed companies* × total PAT of all listed companies** *Largest 10 listed companies were selected based on market capitalisation and represent 35% of PAT of listed companies Non-comprehensive disclosures (e.g. reporting at the subsidiary rather than the group level) were excluded **Assumes the rest of listed companies have the same corporate giving-to-PAT ratio as the largest 10 companies Note: based on consultation with local experts, extrapolating to all listed companies is considered appropriate as they are likely to account for the majority of corporate giving, and their giving behaviour may not be representative of non-listed companies	This is a conservative estimate that includes listed companies only The estimate is based on the largest 10 listed companies' philanthropy-spending-to-PAT ratios, which may differ from smaller companies' ratios Reported corporate philanthropy spending by the largest 10 listed companies may not include non-monetary giving that cannot be reliably disaggregated
Various company annual reports	Non-government local data sources: bottom-up estimates from each organisation reporting	2024	Annual reporting on corporate giving/ philanthropy (e.g. CSR expenses, allocation towards social-impact programmes, community investment amount, etc.)		
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[60]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavail-able)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth bracket, estimated by household wealth-distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = Malaysia UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *Malaysia UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket; adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data, due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public discretionary					
Anwar Ibrahim (2023): "Belanjawan 2024 Speech: Introducing the Supply Bill (2024) in Dewan Rakyat"[61]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—budget speech by Prime Minister and Minister of Finance	2024	Fiscal budget allocations to matching grants	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): National budget allocation "to support efforts taken by NGOs and civil society organisations including Yayasan Hasanah" Note: this fund is allocated as a matching grant, based on consultation and validation with local experts	N/A

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Public discretionary					
Ministry of Finance (2023): *Budget 2023 Touchpoints*[62]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—budget publication	2024	Fiscal budget allocations to matching grants	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): National budget allocation for matching grant portion of i-TEKAD	N/A

Table 22
Malaysia: Voluntary time contributions

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
CAF (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[63]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 504 individuals aged 18+)	2024	Data available: % of population who reported volunteering in 2024 Average annual volunteer hours in 2024 overall (including volunteers and non-volunteers) Definition: Volunteering defined as unpaid, voluntary work either in one's community or further afield	Number of volunteers = % of population reporting volunteering × population size of Malaysia aged 18+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × average annual volunteer hours per volunteer* *Average annual volunteer hours per volunteer = average annual volunteer hours overall ÷ % of population reporting volunteering Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year)	The estimate is based on a sample that may overrepresent urban and more highly educated demographics, due to the survey format and design
Department of Statistics Malaysia (2025): *Current Population Estimates, Malaysia, 2025*[64]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Population size by age group		

Table 23
Malaysia: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Faith-based assets					
State Islamic Religious Council (SIRC) annual reports	Public-sector data source: other administrative data	2022, 2024	*Waqf* returns reported by SIRCs, such as rental income (data available for 2 states out of a total of 13 states and 3 federal territories)	Annual income from faith-based assets as the sum of reported *waqf* returns from 2 states with available data 2022 data adjusted to 2024 price level Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, income from assets in other states and federal territories is not extrapolated	Scope of *waqf* returns reported by different SIRCs could vary

Exhibit B9

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving

Point estimate

New philanthropic monetary inflows
SAR billion ($ billion)[1]



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	2.5	166.9

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
SAR billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	Data unavailable
Faith-based assets	8.3 (2.2)
Total	8.3 (2.2)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of SAR 1 = $0.2665. 2. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving and corporate capabilities, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 3. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Table 24
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
King Khalid Foundation (2018): *Saudi Non-profit Trends Report 2018*[65]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 1,283 individuals aged 18+)	2017 (2024 data unavail-able)	Median annual cash donations by Saudi nationals Donations consist of formal giving and informal giving	Mass individual giving = general mass individual giving* + affluent giving** *General mass individual giving = annual median donation by Saudi nationals × total Saudi national population aged 18+ 2017 data adjusted to 2024 price level Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year) **Affluent giving = total donations across government donation platforms × Ehsan Platform's share of total donations × share of donations on Ehsan Platform contributed by "donors with high values" (assumed as non-UHNWI affluent individuals) Note: affluent giving was included in total mass individual giving as survey-based estimates using median giving may under-represent high value donations	Giving by non-nationals are not reflected; domestic giving by this segment is likely to be small, based on consultation and validation with the Commissioner The estimate may be affected by response bias as the survey question on giving value had a 54% response rate The estimate is based on 2017 data as the most recent data available
General Authority for Statistics (2025): *Population Estimates Publication 2024*[66]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Estimated Saudi national population size by gender and age group		
King Khalid Foundation (2025): *Non-profit Sector Outlook 2025*[67]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report (using government data)	2024	Data available: Total donation amount in 2024 across government donation platforms Ehsan Platform's share of total donations by end of 2024 Share of donations on Ehsan Platform contributed by "donors with high values", defined as donations of SAR 100,000 ($26,650) or above, by end of 2024		
Corporates					
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (2025): "Minister Al-Rajhi: Social Responsibility Contributions Surpass 4 Billion Riyals"[68]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—official announcement	2024	% of private-sector contribution in total social spending May or may not include cash and in-kind corporate donations	Corporate giving = % of private-sector contribution in total social spending × "health and social development sector" budget Assumes social spending refers to "health and social development" sector expenditure within government budget, based on consultation and validation with the Commissioner	Definition and scope of "private-sector contribution" is not available
Ministry of Finance (2025): *Year-End Budget Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2024*[69]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—fiscal budget	2024	National government budget for "health and social" sector		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
UHNWIs					
Saudi Press Agency (2026): "'Sakhaa Program' enables donors to implement development projects in the Kingdom's regions at a cost exceeding 14 billion riyals by the end of 2025"[70]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—press release	2023–25 total	Cumulative value of development projects under the Sakhaa Program by end of 2025 (includes contributions by 38 individuals) The Program's minimum contribution requirement is SAR 30 million ($8 million)	2024 UHNWI giving was estimated by annualising cumulative contributions received between programme launch (May 2023) and end of 2025, assuming constant average monthly contribution	UHNWI giving outside the Sakhaa Program is not reflected due to data limitations
Public discretionary					
Misk (2022): "The Mohammed Bin Salman Foundation (Misk) Announces Completion of Strategic Investment in Japanese Gaming Companies SNK"[71]	Non-government local data source: publication referencing government figures—media article	2011–21 total (2024 data unavail-able)	Misk Foundation (under special funds from state leadership)	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Amount of personal funding from Foundation's founder, His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman 2024 estimate was calculated as an annual average of 2011–21 total, further adjusted to 2024 price level	N/A

Table 25
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Voluntary time contributions


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
General Authority for Statistics (2026): *Volunteer Work Statistics 2025*[72]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 24,000 individuals aged 15+)	2025 (2024 data unavailable)	Data available: % of population reporting volunteering during previous 12-month period Average hours of volunteer work during previous 4-week period among volunteers Definition: Volunteering defined as any unpaid and non-compulsory activity carried out for purpose of producing goods or providing services to others	Number of volunteers = % of population who volunteered in 2025 × Saudi national population size aged 15+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × average volunteer hours in past 4 weeks × annual adjustment ratio* *As the 2025 survey only reports an average volunteer-hours figure for past 4 weeks and excludes a figure for past 12 months, a 12-month-to-4-week ratio from a 2018 survey was applied to the 2025 past 4-week figure Assumes 2024 volunteering participation and hours were consistent with 2025 values Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year) Current estimates only pertain to Saudi nationals, to be consistent with mass individual giving scope, based on consultation with the Commissioner	N/A
General Authority for Statistics (2019): *Voluntary Work Survey 2018*[73]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 19,800 individuals aged 15+)	2018	Data available: Average hours of volunteer work during previous 4-week and 12-month periods Definition: Volunteer work defined as any activity (or contribution) where an individual provides services for no financial gain to benefit another person or any (governmental, profit, or non-profit) organisation, but not any household member		
General Authority for Statistics (2025): *Population Estimates Publication 2024*[74]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Saudi national population size by gender and age group		

Table 26
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Faith-based assets					
General Authority for Awqaf and Jadwa Investment (2024): *Sustainable Investments for the Endowment Sector: Challenges and Solutions*[75]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures	2023 (2024 data unavailable)	Data available: Total value of *awqaf* assets within Saudi Arabia, covering various *awqaf* types (e.g. land, cash) Annual average return rates of *awqaf* assets managed by government, investment fund managers, and community (NGOs, charities, etc.) estimated from available data	Annual *awqaf* return estimated by multiplying total asset value by average return rate Asset value in 2023 was inflated to estimate 2024 value; this assumes total *awqaf* asset stock remains consistent between 2023 and 2024	N/A

Exhibit B10

Singapore: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	1.4	11.2

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
SGD billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations[4] (2023–2024 average)	2.3 (1.7)
Faith-based assets (2020–2024 average)	0.02 (0.02)
Total	2.3 (1.8)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of SGD 1 = $0.7484. 2. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 3. Total may not add up due to rounding. 4. Figure includes data of registered charities with publicly available data on Charity Portal.

Table 27
Singapore: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
Commission of Charities (COC) (2026): *Commissioner of Charities Annual Report 2024*[76]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2024	Donation revenue of registered charities by sector, consisting of cash and in-kind giving Split available by: Tax-deductible donations (TDD) by individuals Tax-deductible donations (TDD) by corporates Total non-tax-deductible donations (non-TDD)—no breakdown available between individuals and corporates	Mass individual giving = formal giving through registered charities* + informal giving to individuals**– UHNWI giving*** *Formal giving through registered charities = sum of individual donations to each charity sector, calculated as COC recorded donation income × individual TDD-total-donation ratio Assumes non-TDD has the same split between individuals and corporates as TDD for all sectors, except the religious sector where all donations are made by individuals **Informal giving to individuals = formal giving × informal (to individuals)-to-formal donor ratio Assumes giving value split would follow donor split ***See UHNWI giving estimate below	The estimate includes in-kind giving that cannot be reliably disaggregated Estimated formal non-TDD by individuals is based on individual share of TDD, which may differ from the actual individual share of formal non-TDD Formal giving to philanthropic institutions that are not registered charities is not reflected due to data limitations; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap Informal giving to non-registered organisations or entities (e.g. informal community or mutual aid groups) is not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap
National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (2024): *National Giving Study 2023*[77]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-published survey (n= 1,951 individuals aged 15+)	2023 (2024 data not available)	% of donors who donated through formal channels % of donors who donated informally (not through any organisation, e.g. directly to individuals)		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Corporates					
Commission of Charities (COC) (2026): *Commissioner of Charities Annual Report 2024*[78]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2024	Donation revenue of registered charities by sector, consisting of cash and in-kind giving Split available by: Tax-deductible donations (TDD) by individuals Tax-deductible donations (TDD) by corporates Total non-tax-deductible donations (non-TDD)—no breakdown available between individuals and corporates	Corporate giving = giving through registered charities* + giving outside registered charities** *Giving through registered charities = sum of corporate donations to each charity sector, calculated as COC recorded donation income × corporate TDD-to-total-donation ratio Assumes non-TDD has the same split between individuals and corporates as TDD for all sectors, except the religious sector where all donations are made by individuals **Bottom-up estimates upon review of individual company reporting	The estimate includes in-kind giving that cannot be reliably disaggregated Estimated non-TDD by corporates is based on corporate share of TDD, which may differ from the actual corporate share of non-TDD Giving to entities that are not registered charities is not reflected, beyond the current inclusion of large companies with reported figures, due to data limitations; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap
Various company annual reports	Non-government local data source: bottom-up estimates from each organisation reporting—annual reports	2024	Large corporates' social contribution amounts that are: Clearly excluded in COC data (e.g. giving to institutions that are not registered charities, or direct CSR spending on external programmes) Clearly domestic giving (giving that was entirely or partially cross-border, to outside Singapore, was excluded)		
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[79]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavailable)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth bracket, estimated by household wealth distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = Singapore UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *Singapore UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket, adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public discretionary[xx]					
Singapore Totalisator Board and its subsidiaries (2025): *Financial Statements Year ended 31 March 2025*[80]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures—financial statement	2024	Tote Board	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Grant disbursement amount The estimate uses the grant disbursement amount as there is no clarity on the proportion of revenues set aside for philanthropic purposes	The disbursement amount may differ from the actual proportion of revenues set aside for philanthropic purposes (i.e. contribution to reserves)

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Public discretionary[xx]					
Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (2024): *MCCY COS 2024 Factsheet*[81]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures – ministry budget announcement	2024	One Team Singapore Fund (OTSF)	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Additional budget set aside for One Team Singapore Fund (matching fund) mentioned in ministry's Committee of Supply 2024 speech	N/A

Table 28
Singapore: Voluntary time contributions

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (2026): *National Giving Study 2025*[82]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-published survey (n=3,699 individuals aged 15+)	2025 (2024 data unavailable)	Data available: % of people who engaged in volunteerism in the past 12 months Median volunteer hours among volunteers in the past 12 months Definitions: In the *National Giving Study 2025*, behaviours were classified as volunteering if they meet pre-specified criteria, including: directed beyond kin or close friends, undertaken voluntarily rather than under coercion, and uncompensated in substantive terms In the *National Giving Study 2023*, volunteering was defined as an activity done of one's own free will, without expecting financial payment, to help others outside of one's household, family, relatives, or friends	Number of volunteers = % of sample reporting volunteering* × population size of Singapore aged 15+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × annual median volunteer hours* *For % volunteering and median volunteer hours, average of 2023 and 2025 values taken as 2024 value not available	N/A
National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (2024): *National Giving Study 2023*[83]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-published survey (n=1,951 individuals aged 15+)	2023 (2024 data unavailable)			
Singapore Department of Statistics (2026): "Total Population by Broad Age Group and Sex, At end June"[84]	Government data sources: national statistics publication	2024	Population size by age group		

xx Cultural Matching Fund, Enhanced Fundraising Programme, Rare Disease Fund, and SG Gives Matching Grant would qualify for inclusion as matching funds but were excluded as no relevant 2024 new injections were identified. The additional funding announced under Budget 2025 for the SG Gives Matching Grant, Cultural Matching Fund and the Enhanced Fundraising Programme falls outside the scope of the 2024 estimate. The amount of new injection by the Government of Singapore into the Rare Disease Fund in 2024 is not publicly available.


Table 29

Singapore: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Charitable organisations					
Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (2025): "Charity Portal"[85]	Government data source: other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting)	2023–24	Reported financial data of registered charities, scraped from Charity Portal Includes investment income (interest, dividend, and rental income) from assets of registered charities, including foundations, social service agencies, schools and universities, non-profit clinics and hospitals, ethnicity/clan-specific self-help groups, religious organisations, and other government-linked organisations	Estimated as the sum of all reported investment income by each registered charity 2023 data adjusted to 2024 price level, then averaged across 2 years (2023–24) Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, income from assets of philanthropic institutions that are not registered charities is not extrapolated	Income from assets in registered charities without publicly available financial data on Charity Portal is not reflected; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap
Faith-based assets					
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (2021–2025): *Annual Reports 2020–2024*[86]	Public-sector data source: other administrative data—financial statements	2020–24	Total income from all *wakaf* assets (including those managed by private and corporate trustees) in Singapore as all assets need to be registered under MUIS by law	2020–23 data adjusted to 2024 price level, then averaged across 5 years (2020–24)	N/A

Exhibit B11

Thailand: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	11.8	305.4

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

THB billion ($ billion)[1]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	5.9 (0.2)
Faith-based assets	Data unavailable
Total	5.9 (0.2)

Notes: 1. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of THB 1 = $0.02839. 2. Figure may include monetised value of in-kind giving, as monetary giving cannot be reliably disaggregated. 3. Total may not add up due to rounding.

Table 30
Thailand: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Mass individuals					
National Statistical Office (2025): *The Household Socio-Economic Survey 2024*[87]	Government data source: national statistics publication (n= 57,600 households)	2024	Data available: Average monthly household expenditure on donations ("Donate money/material given to other organisation/ foundation" and "Other contributions"), which are classified as giving by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI)[88] Total number of households Note: donations consist of both cash and in-kind giving, and both formal and informal giving	Mass individual giving = average monthly household expenditure on donations × total number of households	The estimate includes in-kind giving that cannot reliably be disaggregated
Corporates					
National Statistical Office (2018): *The 2018 Non-Profit Organization Survey*[89]	Government data source: government-published survey (n= 30,000 NPOs)	2017 (2024 data not availa-ble)	Donation income of non-profit organisations (NPOs) in 2017 (data on 30,000 NPOs extrapolated to total 84,000 NPOs in Thailand) This includes cash and in-kind giving from individuals, parent organisations, and other domestic private organisations	Corporate giving to NPOs in 2024 = donation income of all NPOs in 2017 × growth in NPO income between 2017–24* × % of NPO income from corporates *Growth in NPO income between 2017–24 estimated using 2017 actual NPO income and KResearch's 2025 forecast, assuming steady growth over time	The survey's income figures may include resources passing through organisations (e.g. inter-NPO transfers) rather than capturing initial injection from source, which cannot be reliably disaggregated The estimate includes in-kind donations that cannot reliably be disaggregated Direct CSR spending on external programmes is not reflected due to data limitations; no suitable benchmarks are available to gauge the extent of the data gap Growth projections of NPO income to 2024, based on 2017 data, may not fully reflect actual growth in the time period
Kasikorn Research Center (2025): *The Potential Size of Corporate Philanthropic Fund in Thailand*[90]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2025	Data available: Forecast of Thailand's 2025 philanthropic fund (i.e. total NPO income) based on the 2018 NPO survey Estimation of % of total NPO income from corporates		

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
UHNWIs					
Shorrocks et al. (2023): *Global Wealth Databook 2023*, UBS[91]	Non-government local data source: sector-based research/ consolidation report	2022 (2024 data unavailable)	Number of high-net-worth individuals by wealth brackets, estimated by household wealth distribution data in each jurisdiction	UHNWI giving = Thailand UHNWI wealth* × UHNWI giving-to-wealth ratio (midpoint of China and India) *Thailand UHNWI wealth estimated based on UHNWI wealth brackets and number of UHNWIs in each bracket; adjusted to 2024 price level Assumes UHNWI giving proportionate to UHNWI wealth and at the level of China and India	The estimate does not use local data due to the limited availability of data sources that met our assessment and inclusion criteria
China benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for China					
India benchmark—please refer to the methodological notes for India					
Public discretionary					
Tangcharoensathien et al. (2024): "The Thai Health Promotion Foundation: Two Decades of Joint Contributions to Addressing Noncommunicable Diseases and Creating Healthy Populations"[92]	Non-government local data source: publication referencing government figures—academic publication	2021 (2024 data unavailable)	ThaiHealth	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Total ThaiHealth revenue (2% surcharge of excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol) Used exchange rate noted in source ("THB to $") to convert to THB, then adjusted to 2024 price level	N/A
Thai Media Fund (2025): *Annual Report 2024*[93]	Public-sector data source: public-sector-reported or -quoted figures—annual report	2024	Safe and Creative Media Development Fund	Included based on public discretionary criteria (see section 4): Revenue from fines collected from copyright infringements Money received from allocation by Broadcasting and Telecommunications Research and Development Fund for Public Interest (BTFP), administered by the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC)	N/A

Table 31
Thailand: Voluntary time contributions


Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
CAF (2025): *World Giving Report 2025*[94]	Non-government local data source: sector-published survey (n= 505 individuals aged 18+)	2024	Data available: % of population who reported volunteering in 2024 Average annual volunteer hours in 2024 overall (including volunteers and non-volunteers) Definition: Volunteering defined as unpaid, voluntary work either in one's community or further afield	Number of volunteers = % of population reporting volunteering × population size of Thailand aged 18+ Volunteer hours = number of volunteers × average annual volunteer hours per volunteer* *Annual average volunteer hours per volunteer = annual average volunteer hours overall ÷ % of population reporting volunteering Population data adjusted to fit the population of the data source (e.g. interpolated for accurate age groups, correct reference year)	The estimate is based on a sample that may overrepresent urban and more highly educated demographics, due to the survey format and design
Department of Provincial Administration: *Official Statistics Registration System: Population Statistics by Age Group, Areas throughout the Country, 2024*[95]	Government data source: national statistics publication	2024	Population size by age group		

Table 32
Thailand: Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Charitable organisations					
National Statistical Office (2018): *The 2018 Non-Profit Organization Survey*[96]	Government data source: government-published survey (n= 30,000 NPOs)	2017 (2024 data unavail-able)	Includes income from sales of assets, interest, and dividends of NPOs in Thailand in 2017 (data for 30,000 NPOs extrapolated to total 84,000 NPOs in Thailand) Income values are aggregated and categorised by NPO types	Estimated as income of NPOs less income of trade associations, chamber of commerce, employers' associations, and labour unions as they have a clear, exclusive membership base and private-sector focus 2017 data adjusted to 2024 price level Note: consistent with our methodological choice in section 4, rental income is not extrapolated	The estimate is based on 2017 data as the most recent data available

Exhibit B12

United Arab Emirates: 2024 quantification estimate of domestic philanthropic giving[1]



Voluntary time contributions

	Number of volunteers, million	Volunteer hours, million
Volunteering	TBD	TBD

Income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems
AED billion ($ billion)[2]

Assets owned by charitable organisations	TBD
Faith-based assets	TBD
Total	TBD

Notes: 1. Erth Zayed Philanthropies, the UAE Commissioner, has convened relevant local and federal stakeholders across the local giving system to develop estimates of the total value of domestic giving. Majra, the National CSR Fund, has contributed its 2024 data reflected in this table.
2. Based on the 2024 average exchange rate of AED 1 = $0.2723.

Table 33
United Arab Emirates: New philanthropic monetary inflows

Data source	Data source category	Data year	Data scope or definition	Estimation approach and adjustments	Limitations
Corporates					
Majra – National CSR Fund (2026): *UAE Community Contributions Report 2024 and 2025*[97]	Government data source: government-reported or -quoted figures—research report	2024	2024 financial contributions of corporates were included, where corporates include listed and non-listed firms classified as "private sector" or "government" (state-owned enterprises and government-related commercial entities) Financial contributions include (1) reported contributions verified through data and (2) estimated unreported contributions for listed and non-listed firms that currently do not disclose CSR contribution amounts	Total is the sum of reported contributions and estimated unreported contributions Estimated unreported contributions were derived from current reported contributions and Majra's assumptions on the share of (currently not captured) listed and non-listed firms	The estimated amount for unreported contributions cannot be directly verified (a limitation common to all extrapolated data)

6. Recommendations and way forward

The quantification exercise surfaces several philanthropic ecosystem data challenges across Commission jurisdictions. These include variable taxonomies and methodologies, relatively limited visibility for informal mass individual and UHNWI giving, emerging but not yet standardised measurement of public discretionary giving, and differences in disclosure standards for income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems, to name a few. They reflect not only differences in technical and methodological terms, but also the broader political, cultural, and economic contexts that shape how organisations are categorised and how data are collected, organised, and reported. For these reasons, data definitions will and should remain tailored to local context, but these challenges also point to a compelling regional opportunity: to develop shared principles and practices that make philanthropic data more visible, granular, interoperable, and ultimately more actionable and insightful for policymaking.

Therefore, the Commission recommends two priorities to explore for regional collaboration—to improve data visibility of philanthropic ecosystems—for further discussion with policymakers, researchers, and practitioners:

1. Shared design principles for the governance architecture of philanthropic data
2. Shared practices for interoperable and high-quality data across Asia, namely:
    a. Interoperable and granular taxonomies
    b. Rigorous data collection and methodology
    c. Infrastructure building to enable consistent implementation over time

This shared knowledge infrastructure could become a regional public good, supporting learning and coordination in Commission jurisdictions and also enabling other jurisdictions to benefit from established approaches and evidence. Interoperability and higher-quality data could enable meaningful cross-jurisdiction comparative analysis. For example, comparable quantitative evidence on the impact of different growth playbooks could provide policymakers with benchmarks for what is reasonable to expect in their own jurisdictions.

1. Shared design principles for the governance architecture of philanthropic data

Building comprehensive philanthropy data requires clear institutional ownership, which is not straightforward to establish as responsibility often spans multiple ministries and government departments. A shared set of design principles for data governance could help jurisdictions—particularly those at an earlier stage in this effort—to clarify ownership, accountability, and coordination.

Jurisdictions with higher-quality philanthropy data tend to have a clearly designated public institution responsible for managing data for each source of philanthropic giving. The accountable institution may vary for each giving source and each institution may bring different advantages when it comes to data management.

- **Ministries of finance and tax agencies** are often responsible for public discretionary sources and other sources of giving with any tax-deduction benefits. Housing data here can lead to easier mapping to assess the impact of various fiscal policies on donations, and benefit from the robust data infrastructure of the broader tax system.

- **National statistics offices** hold strong data-management and analytical expertise, so locating data here can lead to greater methodological rigour and consistency.

- **Line ministries** overseeing national missions or national development planning, civil affairs, social welfare, and charity are usually closer to the demand and needs of the country, and therefore may be better positioned to use data to guide complementary deployment of philanthropic resources with public financing.

- **Ministries overseeing corporate giving** may include ministries responsible for commerce, economic affairs, or corporate affairs. Housing corporate giving data in these institutions can enable data-driven decision-making, given the expectations and/or policies they set for corporate giving practices.

There is no “one size fits all”; governance architecture will ultimately work best when tailored to the needs of the jurisdiction, while considering the advantages of different institutional owners and enabling national coordination for alignment to national priorities. Shared design principles, based on lessons from governments on what works in their context and given their priorities, can accelerate cross-learning across the region.

2. Shared practices for interoperable and high-quality data across Asia

a. Interoperable and granular taxonomies

At the jurisdiction level, having standard definitions and taxonomies for philanthropy data is both feasible and beneficial, with the government taking a lead to ensure clarity about what each data point includes or excludes. Well-defined and granular data enable more actionable insights, helping to target specific sets of actors (the five philanthropy models) and think through deployment of different resource pools (for example, the four sources of philanthropic giving).

There are several examples. First, measuring the scale of informal giving in communities provides an indication of how much communities are supporting their own social protection and disaster resilience—areas in which governments also invest substantially. Second, the amount of giving channelled through different types of actors informs expectation-setting and regulatory needs: those channelling larger amounts of philanthropic resources may be subject to higher disclosure and accountability requirements. Giving amounts attributed to companies that are government-affiliated, listed, or leaders in major economic sectors often have more weight because these companies have a higher degree of public responsibility and can serve as role models for others. Third, separating out UHNWI giving and mass individual giving reflects the very different behaviours, motivations and capacities of the two kinds of actors. For example, UHNWIs can make larger donations to catalyse large-scale projects or infrastructure that may be more challenging to achieve via crowdfunding from mass individuals. See Exhibit B13 for a starting list of good practices in data granularity by sources of giving, to be continually refined with researchers and practitioners.

Exhibit B13

Examples of good practices for granularity of data by sources of giving

Granularity of overall definitions	Granularity of data to be collected and disclosed
Mass individuals	
• Clarity on inclusion or exclusion of donations to own family and household • Clarity on inclusion or exclusion of non-monetary giving (e.g. in-kind, volunteering)	• Sub-components of formal and informal giving (e.g. tax-deductible or non-tax-deductible, donated through registered organisations or otherwise, donated to organisations or individuals) • Donation channel types based on local context (e.g. legally registered charitable organisations, specific categories of community-based organisations, digital platforms) • Types of giving where applicable (e.g. Islamic giving has *zakat mal*, *zakat fitrah*, *infak and sedekah*) • Donor segments (e.g. income level, geography, occupation, age) • Formats (e.g. cash, movable assets, immovable assets)
Corporates	
• Clarity on inclusion or exclusion of non-cash contributions (e.g. shares, in-kind, corporate assets and capabilities, corporate volunteering)	• Donor segments (e.g. industry, size, listed/non-listed, government affiliation) • Donation channel types based on local context (e.g. legally registered charitable organisations, government funds or initiatives, direct CSR spending on external programmes) • Formats (e.g. cash, shares, movable assets, immovable assets, corporate capabilities, corporate volunteering)
UHNWIs	
• Thresholds to separate UHNWIs from mass individuals and from corporates • Clarity on inclusion or exclusion of non-cash contributions (e.g. shares, in-kind, assets)	• Donor segments (e.g. level of wealth, geographic base of wealth, occupation or related industry) • Pledges vs. actual disbursements • Formats (e.g. cash, shares, movable assets, immovable assets)
Public discretionary	
• Types of sources to consider under inclusion criteria • Boundaries in governance structure and mandated usage to separate these sources from fiscal budgets used for government mandates	• Types of sources (e.g. ring-fenced levies, lotteries) • Mandated purpose (e.g. by national missions) • Fund-specific (e.g. for dormant deposits, to include total collection, reserves for reclaims, actual reclaims)

At the regional level, identical standards are impractical due to different contexts. Nevertheless, interoperability is achievable through sufficiently granular regional taxonomies that enable data from different jurisdictions to be mapped in such a way that comparable components can be identified even if the top-line breakdown or definitions are different. For example, one jurisdiction may classify giving through grassroots self-organisations as formal giving, while another may treat it as informal. As long as there is a way to identify the giving amount specific to this group, an apples-to-apples comparison is possible even if classifications of formal and informal giving are different. Cross-jurisdiction comparisons can be valuable for developing growth playbooks, using data in other jurisdictions to inform domestic priorities, designs, and expectations for new policies and platforms (see Exhibit B14 for examples).

Exhibit B14

Examples of valuable comparative analysis for cross-learning, drawing on growth playbooks

Growth playbook	Sources of giving	Examples of cross-jurisdiction comparative analysis
Community-led: digital giving platforms	Mass individuals, corporates	• Growth rates in giving through a defined set of digital platforms (e.g. platforms that facilitate peer-to-peer or donor-to-organisation giving) to inform decision on what platforms to introduce • Types of individual and corporate segment that donate through digital-giving platforms to inform design and target-setting
Corporate-led: mandatory corporate social responsibility	Corporates	• Composition of contributions by targeted corporate segments (e.g. government-affiliated companies, listed companies) to inform segmented strategy • Giving as a percentage of net profits on average or by segments to inform thresholds and expectation-setting
State-led: dormant deposits	Public discretionary	• The range of deposit amounts that become dormant, reclaim rates, operating and management expenses, and amount reserved to be allocated as philanthropic capital to inform design of financing model and governance structure

b. Rigorous data collection and methodology

Data quality is highly influenced by methodological rigour, and shared practices for data collection and methodologies can help jurisdictions close data-visibility gaps more efficiently and effectively. For example, the quality of data from surveys depends on sampling design, instrument design, and data cleaning processes.

Exhibit B15 highlights our key learnings on good practices for commonly used, high-quality data sources across Commission jurisdictions, providing a starting point for further consolidation and refinement across the region. These practices would improve with greater nuance around trade-offs and a shared understanding of the conditions in which different choices are made. Among other factors, choices of methodology are usually influenced by budgets, the availability of skilled enumerators, and survey administration tools.

Exhibit B15

Key learnings on good methodological practices by data source types

Data source type	Relevant source of giving	Key learnings on good methodological practices (non-exhaustive)
National statistics publications and population-level surveys	Mass individuals, corporates	• Include philanthropic giving in a broader expenditure or time-use question section to reduce social-desirability bias • Capture answers with multiple periods for triangulation, both quarterly and annually • Capture information on giving channels to break down giving that goes through institutions or informal networks • Balance trade-off between data collection rigour and sample representativeness—for example, adopting an account book approach to capture data on daily/weekly patterns of household expenditure/time use over a period of time (e.g. 3–6 months) could be more accurate than alternatives, but the substantial time requirements for respondents may deter higher-income population segments, leading to a sample that is biased towards lower-income segments
Philanthropy-specific surveys	Mass individuals, corporates	• Predetermine sampling and weighting design that leverages accurate, official national demographic data • Design data collection instruments and processes considering impact on representativeness—for example, online surveys are cost-effective and have reach benefits but may be biased towards more educated and higher-income segments; in-person surveys tend to require more time in validation of answers, which may deter working populations, especially in urban settings • Capture giving amount in exact numbers rather than in amount brackets, and do relevant breakdown for granularity as needed by jurisdictions • Include final checking where inconsistencies are flagged (e.g. when two supposedly mutually exclusive and collectively comprehensive categories do not add up to the total or when the total is smaller than a specific breakdown provided) so that respondents can reconfirm the numbers provided • Capture information that would allow benchmarking to existing data available for triangulation (e.g. if the government already has data on tax-deductible donations, it would be good to capture specifically tax-deductible vs. non-tax-deductible breakdowns) • Integrate processes to validate and adjust extreme values and influential cases (e.g. call-backs and outlier identification)
Tax system administrative records	Mass individuals, corporates, UHNWIs	• Disclose annual tax-deductible donation amounts as publicly available information • Break data down by source of giving (mass individuals, corporates, UHNWIs) determined by reported asset size or donation amounts above certain thresholds
Other administrative data (aggregated based on reporting) or government-published surveys (e.g. revenues of charitable organisations)	Mass individuals, corporates, income from assets in philanthropic ecosystems	• Capture data by revenue type (e.g. donation income vs. income from assets) • For donation income, capture data by source of giving (mass individuals, corporates, UHNWIs)

c. Infrastructure building to enable consistent implementation over time

Finally, shared practices for how data infrastructure is built for consistent delivery over time would also be a valuable public good for the region, allowing jurisdictions to identify their most suitable path forward. Comparable time-series data can provide valuable insights into trends and patterns that inform future action and policymaking. However, comparison requires data to be collected regularly—preferably annually—using a consistent and comparable methodology. This is not always the case across jurisdictions. Efforts to improve and innovate methodological approaches can themselves lead to incomparable results over time. In such cases, changes in methodology should be clearly documented so that users can distinguish real changes in philanthropic activity from changes arising from measurement.

Among Commission jurisdictions, the most consistent time-series data are produced when data collection is embedded in institutional infrastructure rather than being the result of standalone, one-off academic research. Two types of formal institutions are observed as a starting point for cross-learning. The first of these formal institutions is government. This includes administrative data (for example, tax data, corporate reporting data) and regular outputs from statistics departments (for example, household expenditure surveys). The second comprises institutions and institutional partnerships ideally affiliated with, or recognised by, government, which publish regularly and specialise in philanthropic data collection and disclosure, delivering on sustainability and consistency. In some jurisdictions, place-based institutions that focus on a particular geographic region have been observed to build localised data collection platforms.

The way forward

Leading up to the Commission's final report in 2027, we aim to work with policymakers and decision-makers across Asia to explore the value proposition and feasibility of shared knowledge infrastructure to advance the two areas discussed in this section: (1) shared design principles for the governance architecture of philanthropic data; and (2) shared practices for interoperable and high-quality data across Asia.

We look forward to engaging policymakers and decision-makers around the three investment areas laid out in Finding 3 of the interim report, starting with the first, to improve data visibility and to continue the discussion in this annex.

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